



# ***JPRS Report***

# **Soviet Union**

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## ***SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES***

No 1, January 1991

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# Soviet Union SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

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**The Mass Release of Special Settlers and Exiles  
(1954-1960)**

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[Article by Viktor Nikolayevich Zemskov, candidate of historical sciences and senior science associate at the USSR History Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Our journal has published his article "Special Settlers" (No 11, 1990)]

[Text] The dispatch of new contingents for special settlement did not end even right until the death of I.V. Stalin. As a result, by 1 January 1953, the number of special settlers reached the maximum amount of

2,753,356 persons (Table 1). The end of the "leader of the peoples, the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 27 March 1953 on Amnesty (it virtually did not involve the special settlers), the arrest of L.P. Beriya and the first indications of the coming thaw in social and political life gave rise to hope and even confidence among the basic mass of special settlers of their early release. In 1953, there were neither large influxes into special settlement nor large releases from there. To put it one way, this process frittered along in one direction and the other. But even in 1953, the number of released persons began to noticeably prevail over the number of persons sent to special settlement. As a result, regardless of the natural increase (the birthrate was significantly higher than the death rate), during 1953, the number of special settlers declined by 33,284 persons [1].

**Table 1: Number and Composition of Special Settlers (as of 1 January 1953)\*[2]**

No	Contingents	Registered	Present	Including			Escaped	Arrested
				Men	Women	Children		
1.	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1.	GERMANS	1,224,931	1,209,430	326,538	473,129	409,763	834	14,667
	Deportees	855,674	846,340	229,850	330,262	286,228	642	8,692
	Repatriated	208,388	203,796	45,241	88,763	69,792	147	4,445
	Local	111,324	110,332	28,037	41,151	41,144	25	967
	Mobilized	48,582	48,001	23,250	12,305	12,446	20	561
	Other	963	961	160	648	153	—	2
2.	FROM the NORTHERN CAUCASUS	498,452	489,118	125,237	162,807	201,074	107	9,227
	Chechens	316,717	310,630	81,450	102,176	127,004	78	6,009
	Ingush	83,518	81,100	20,249	26,124	34,727	21	2,397
	Karachai	63,327	62,842	15,223	22,026	25,593	7	478
	Balkars	33,214	32,887	7,841	11,854	13,192	1	326
	Other	1,676	1,659	474	627	558	—	17
3.	FROM the CRIMEA	204,698	199,215	57,759	80,828	60,628	333	5,150
	Tatars	165,259	160,734	46,461	64,053	50,220	207	4,318
	Greeks	14,760	14,486	4,444	6,323	3,719	33	241
	Bulgarians	12,465	12,193	3,689	4,962	3,542	18	254
	Armenians	8,570	8,310	2,409	3,758	2,143	44	216
	Other	3,644	3,492	756	1,732	1,004	31	121
4.	OUN MEMBERS	175,063	171,566	47,414	83,905	40,247	358	3,139
5.	FROM the BALTIC in 1945-1949	139,957	138,337	39,952	64,097	34,288	162	1,458
	Lithuanians	81,158	80,189	24,982	35,133	20,074	157	812
	Latvians	39,279	38,911	10,667	19,070	9,174	3	365
	Estonians	19,520	19,237	4,303	9,894	5,040	2	281
6.	FROM GEORGIA in 1944	86,663	86,100	22,754	28,037	35,309	55	508
	Turks	46,790	46,516	12,424	15,382	18,710	39	235
	Kurds	8,843	8,694	2,269	2,504	3,921	11	138
	Khemshils	1,397	1,385	355	365	665	—	12
	Other	29,633	29,505	7,706	9,786	12,013	5	123

Table 1: Number and Composition of Special Settlers (as of 1 January 1953)\*[2] (Continued)

No	Contingents	Registered	Present	Including			Escaped	Arrested
				Men	Women	Children		
7.	KALMYKS	81,475	79,376	23,098	30,360	25,918	59	2,040
8.	"FROM the BLACK SEA COAST" in 1949	57,142	56,858	17,898	19,982	18,978	5	279
	Greeks	37,352	37,188	11,426	13,280	12,482	1	163
	Dashnaks	15,486	15,395	4,879	5,326	5,190	3	88
	Turks	1,794	1,778	724	490	564	1	15
	Other	2,510	2,497	869	886	742	—	13
9.	VLASOVITES	56,746	39,872	39,719	153	—	618	16,256
10.	POLES	36,045	35,820	9,619	13,715	12,486	6	219
11.	FROM MOLDAVIA in 1949	35,838	35,414	10,487	14,390	10,537	14	410
12.	UNDER UKASE of 2 JUNE 1948	27,275	25,061	12,408	12,653	—	51	2,163
13.	FORMER KULAKS	24,686	24,391	6,541	8,936	8,914	85	210
14.	KULAKS FROM LITHUANIA in 1951	18,104	18,097	5,512	7,418	5,167	2	5
15.	FROM the BALTIC in 1940-1941	14,301	14,61	3,576	8,878	1,607	63	177
16.	FROM GEORGIA in 1951-1952	11,685	11,679	3,291	3,769	4,619	—	6
17.	FROM MOLDAVIA in 1940-1941	9,793	9,727	2,921	5,191	1,615	5	61
18.	JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES	9,363	9,324	2,786	3,754	2,784	1	38
19.	FROM KRASNODAR KRAY and ROSTOV OBLAST in 1942	6,057	6,046	2,173	3,144	729	—	11
20.	FROM the WESTERN OBLASTS of the UKRAINE and BELORUSSIA in 1940-1941	5,592	5,588	1,700	3,054	834	—	4
21.	VOLKSDEUTSCHE and "GERMAN ACCOMPLICES"	4,834	4,674	878	2,715	1,081	33	127
22.	IRANIANS	4,707	4,665	1,501	1,675	1,489	4	38
23.	ANDERS FOLLOWERS	4,520	4,515	1,440	1,558	1,517	1	4
24.	KULAKS FROM WESTERN BELORUSSIA in 1952	4,431	4,431	1,143	2,098	1,190	—	—
25.	BASMACKS	2,747	2,735	716	698	1,321	—	12
26.	KABARDA	1,717	1,672	385	755	532	7	38
27.	KULAKS FROM WESTERN UKRAINE in 1951	1,445	1,445	475	640	330	—	—
28.	FROM PSKOV OBLAST in 1950	1,356	1,351	342	667	342	—	5
29.	KULAKS FROM IZMAIL OBLAST in 1948	1,157	1,153	388	434	331	—	4
30.	TRUE ORTHODOX CHRISTIANS (IPKh)	995	901	174	569	158	2	92
31.	FROM IRANIAN and AFGHAN FRONTIERS in 1937	916	916	322	329	265	—	—
32.	UNDER UKASE of 23 JUNE 1951	591	585	270	315	—	3	3

Table 1: Number and Composition of Special Settlers (as of 1 January 1953)\*[2] (Continued)

No	Contingents	Registered	Present	Including			Escaped	Arrested
				Men	Women	Children		
33.	INTERNED FROM POLISH TERRITORY	74	74	67	3	4	—	—
	TOTAL:	2,753,356	2,694,197	769,484	1,040,656	884,057	2,808	56,351

\* On 1 January 1953, among the 1,810,140 present adult special settlers (from 17 years and older) there were: 788,975 Germans, 183,445 Chechens, 163,653 Ukrainians, 111,037 Tatars, 75,024 Lithuanians, 56,589 Russians, 53,019 Kalmyks, 46,303 Ingush, 40,590 Greeks, 37,225 Karachai, 33,102 Latvians, 31,654 Poles, 29,848 Turks, 25,873 Moldavians, 20,860 Azerbaijani, 20,238 Armenians, 19,762 Balkars, 16,070 Estonians, 11,432 Bulgarians, 7,169 Georgians, 6,621 Belorussians, 5,168 Jews, 4,993 Kurds, 3,459 Uzbek, 2,074 Kazakh, 1,572 Kabarda, 1,352 Gagauz, 1,257 Assyrians, 1,237 Tajiks, 1,063 Gypsies, 977 Romanians, 720 Khemshils, 616 Ossetians, 529 Bashkir, 520 Chuvash, 480 Mordvins, 430 Turkmen, 375 Karelians and Finns, 375 Kumyks, 338 Adzhar, 313 Avar, 265 Laz, 212 Karakalpak, 193 Udmurt, 183 Czech, 174 Cherkes, 174 Yezid, 160 Abaz, 153 Abkhazians, 127 Lezgin, 123 Mari, 122 Buryat, 90 Adyge, 83 Komi, 74 Hungarians, 61 Austrians, 59 Nogai, 50 Dargin, 399 Kirghiz, 380 Iranians, and 721 other. (Author's note.)

On 1 January 1954, there were 2,720,072 special settlers registered (786,539 men, 1,060,624 women and 872,909 children), including 1,240,482 Germans (870,257 deportees, 208,379 repatriated, 115,426 local, 46,420 mobilized); 506,618 from the Northern Caucasus (324,319 Chechens, 83,598 Ingush, 64,818 Karachai, 33,883 Balkars); 202,464 from the Crimea (165,629 Tatars, 36,835 Greeks, Armenians, Bulgarians and others); 173,714 OUN [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists] members; 138,586 from the Baltic in 1945-1949; 88,501 from Georgia in 1944 (48,122 Turks, 9,013 Kurds, 1,451 Khemshils, 29,915 other); 81,246 Kalmyks; 56,262 from the "Black Sea Coast" (38,973 Greeks, 15,508 Dashnaks, 1,781 Turks); 36,216 Poles (evacuated in 1936); 36,057 from Moldavia in 1949; 22,960 under the Ukase of 2 June 1948; 20,219 Vlasovites; 17,943 kulaks from Lithuania in 1951; 17,121 former kulaks (evacuated in 1929-1933); 15,987 from the Baltic in 1940-1941; 10,408 from Moldavia in 1940-1941; 10,218 Jehovah's Witnesses, 6,217 from Krasnodar Kray and Rostov Oblast in 1942; 5,428 from Georgia in 1951-1952; 5,189 from the Western oblasts of the Ukraine and Belorussia in 1940-1941; 4,651 Iranians (evacuated in 1950 from Georgia); 4,583 kulaks from Western Belorussia in 1952; 4,539 Anders followers; 4,234 Volksdeutsche and

German accomplices; 2,695 Basmacks; 2,610 kulaks from the Western Ukraine in 1951; 1,707 Kabarda; 1,386 from Pskov Oblast in 1950; 881 from the Iranian and Afghan frontiers in 1937; 872 IPKh [and True Orthodox Christians] and 79 interned from Polish territory [ibid.].

According to the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 5 July 1954 "On Lifting Certain Restrictions in the Legal Status of Special Settlers" removed from registration were the following: a) the children of special settlers who had not reached the age of 16; b) children of special settlers over the age of 16 studying in institutions of learning [ibid.]. After the removal of the designated individuals from registration, the number of special settlers declined by almost one-third. For example, during 1954, according to the Decree of 5 July and other decisions, some 42,560 Baltic residents were removed from the registration of the special settlements (Table 2). However, the release carried out of persons under the age of 16 to a significant degree was conditional as the children, although being removed from registration, continued to live with their parents who were in special settlement.

Table 2: Release of Baltic Residents From Special Settlement in 1954 [3]

Contingents	Total	Including			
		Children Under 16	According to Decree of Republic Councils of Ministers	By Rulings of Court Bodies	Under Conclusions of MVD Bodies
From Lithuania in 1945-1949	19,896	19,483	188	54	171
From Latvia in 1949	9,635	8,569	650	83	333
From Estonia in 1949	4,966	4,849	23	18	76
From Lithuania in 1951 (kulaks)	5,186	4,864	322	—	—
From the Baltic in 1940-1941	2,877	2,211	70	—	596
TOTAL:	42,560	39,976	1,253	155	1,176

On 13 August 1954, the decree was approved of the USSR Council of Ministers on Lifting Restrictions From Special Settlement From Former Kulaks and Other Persons [ibid.]. Release was to be provided for kulaks who had been evacuated in 1929-1933 and Germans from the subcontingents "local" and "mobilized" who had never been resettled but at one time had been registered in the special settlements at the place of their permanent residence. The choice of these contingents for removal from registration was far from accidental as these were considered the most settled and were not capable, if they were released, of disrupting the benefits of special colonization which consisted in the development since 1930 of little-inhabited and uninhabited regions of the nation by a forced resettlement policy. For this reason, in the decree the main argument in favor of releasing the former kulaks of whom less than 12,000 then remained in special settlement [4], was as follows: "...having established themselves firmly in places of their current residence...in line with this the further employment of restrictions on special settlement against these persons is not necessary..." [5].

The decree of 13 August 1954 made two "oversights" as many former special settlers from the contingent of "former kulaks" were demanding compensation for the damages suffered in the resettlement while others intended to return to the villages and hamlets where they had lived before the depossession of the kulaks while the decree did not stipulate that no compensation was owed to them and that they did not have the right to return to the former places of residence. Similar "oversights" were not made in the subsequent ukases and decrees on the release of the special settlers.

On 9 May 1955, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee adopted the Decree on Lifting Restrictions on Special Settlement From Members of the CPSU, Candidate Members of the CPSU and Members of Their Families [ibid.]. All the families of communists were removed from registration in the special settlements. According to the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 24 November 1955 on Removing Certain Categories of Special Settlers from Registration, the following individuals were to be released: participants in the Great Patriotic War or persons receiving USSR orders and medals; women who had married local residents as well as women of Russian, Ukrainian and other nationalities who had been expelled along with the Crimean Tatars, Chechens and others because of marital relationships which were subsequently broken off; single disabled persons and persons suffering from incurable illness who could not independently provide for their existence; members of the families of persons killed on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War; instructors from institutions of learning [ibid.].

In terms of the individuals left in special settlement, decisions were taken which were to mitigate conditions and bring them closer to the status of full citizens. The above indicated decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 5 July 1954 granted the special settlers engaged in

socially useful labor the right to reside within the limits of the given oblast, kray and republic and those on official trips the right to move freely to any point of the nation following general provisions. In truth, an appendix gave a list of contingents of special settlers not covered by this decree: Ukrainian Nationalists, bandits of the OUN-UPA (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists—Ukrainian Rebel Army); the accomplices of bandits and the members of their families expelled from the western oblasts of the Ukraine in 1944-1952; the Anders followers; Jehovah's Witnesses; family members of bandits, the accomplices of bandits and kulaks with families expelled from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as well as from the Western oblasts of the Ukraine and Belorussia and Pskov Oblast in 1945-1952 [ibid.].

On 13 July 1954, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the Ukase on Annulling the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 26 November 1948 on Criminal Liability for Escaping From Places of Compulsory and Permanent Settlement by Persons Expelled to the Remote Areas of the Soviet Union During the Period of the Patriotic War [ibid.]. According to the Ukase of 13 July 1954, the special settlers for escaping were no longer to be sentenced, as before, to 20 years of forced labor (expelled in perpetuity) or to replacing the term of exile by imprisonment for the same period under Article 82 (Part 2) of the RSFSR Criminal Code (term exiles) but were to be held liable under Article 82 (Part 1) of the RSFSR Criminal Code and under the corresponding articles of the criminal codes of the other Union republics (up to 3 years imprisonment).

In practice, apprehended escapees were held criminally liable extremely rarely and, as a rule, were given administrative punishments. In 1954, only 25 special settlers were condemned for escaping while in 1949, for example, the figure was 8,636 [ibid.].

Of important significance was the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 10 March 1955 on Issuing Passports to Special Settlers [ibid.]. The Order of the Council of Ministers of 23 March 1955 on the Induction of Certain Categories of Special Settlers for Military Service mentioned induction, beginning from 1955, for active service in accord with the Law on Universal Military Service for USSR Citizens from among special settlers born in 1936 and the subsequent call-up under general provisions for persons born after 1936 and for whom, according to the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 5 July 1954, certain restrictions were lifted in their legal status [ibid.]. The Instructions of the USSR MVD of 29 April 1956 prohibited the use of arrest as an administrative punishment against special settlers (for violation of conditions, including for escape, a punishment was set in the form of a fine of 100 rubles) [ibid.].

In 1954, the councils of ministers in the Union republics from the territories of which the exiling had been carried out were granted the right to review the cases of individual special settlers and take decisions to release them. The councils of ministers ordered the local soviets to verify the validity of exiling various individuals and handed down decisions following the material submitted by the latter. Later, in 1957-1958, there were at work

commissions of presidiums of the Ukrainian, Moldavian, Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian Supreme Soviets with the right to hand down decisions on release from special settlement. The chief difficulty of this work was that regardless of the "Khrushchev thaw" there was in effect the principle of succession, that is, the previously existing practice of the mass exiling of people not only had not been criticized but as before was viewed as an important and necessary political measure. For saying that the deportation of the peoples or a portion of them was a crime of the regime could land one in the court docket under Article 58<sup>10</sup> of the RSFSR Criminal Code (anti-Soviet agitation). The local authorities could take decisions on release only in the instance that they possessed indisputable evidence that the decrees and instructions on deportation had been violated in this "good and necessary" matter as the mass deportation of people and that various persons, according to the instructions on deportation, were not subject to being sent to special settlement, that is, they had been deported erroneously.

In practice, the broadest field for activity for handing down decisions on the "erroneous deportation" appeared in terms of the peasants which had been dispossessed in 1948-1952 in the Baltic, Western Ukraine, Western Belorussia, Right Bank Moldavia and dispatched for special settlement. The problem was that the classifying of their farms as among the kulak ones was carried out on the basis of the farm lists for 1939-1940, while by the moment of deportation many of them were not kulaks according to any criteria but rather were members of kolkhozes. In 1956-1957, the local soviets in the republics and oblasts where the dispossessed peasants had been deported in 1948-1952 carried out extensive work to verify the soundness of the classifying of their farms as kulak ones. As a result of this in 1957 alone, the Commission of the Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet removed 6,733 persons from registration in special settlement while the Latvian Council of Ministers released 6,122 persons [ibid.]. Many thousands of special settlers were also released under other rulings on "erroneous deportation." Just under the decisions of the Commission of the Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, in 1957, a total of 18,899 special settlers were released.

Under the Decree of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee of 17 September 1954, the Armenian Republic Commission for Reviewing Cases of Persons Condemned for Counterrevolutionary Crimes was granted the right to take decisions on releasing the Dashnaks and members of their families from special settlement [ibid.]. On 21 September 1954, there was promulgated the Order of the USSR Procuracy, the USSR MGB [Ministry of State Security], the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the USSR Ministry of Justice on forming in Armenia a republic commission for reviewing the cases of persons deported from

the republic in 1949 [ibid.]. It was discovered that in June 1949, some 2,698 families (13,000 people) had been deported from Armenia basically into Altay Kray and this included 1,860 "Dashnak" families and 888 of Legionaires (former servicemen of the Armenian Legion organized by the Nazis from Soviet prisoners of war of Armenian nationality). Along with the indigenous inhabitants of Armenia, 350 families (1,454 persons) of Armenians repatriated in 1946-1948 from abroad were deported for their belonging while overseas to the Dashnaksutyun Party. They all comprised the subcontingent of "Dashnaks" in the contingent of special settlers "from the Black Sea Coast" (according to the records of the Department of Special Settlements of the USSR MVD). By September 1954, complaints and statements had been piling up at various levels from 1,963 families (1,810 from the Dashnak families and 153 from the Legionaires).

The Armenian Republic Commission reviewed all complaints and statements. The materials which had served as grounds for deportation were not confirmed for 695 families. Some 18 percent of the families which included participants in the Great Patriotic War and had been awarded USSR orders and medals as well as persons having other services to the state had been deported as a consequence of violating instructions on deportation (in June 1949, the local authorities had shown excessive zeal). Formal grounds were not found for deporting the former Legionaires: in 1945, the bodies of the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs], the NKGB [People's Commissariat of State Security] and Army Counterintelligence SMERSh [Death to Spies] felt it possible not to equate these individuals with Vlasovites and handed down a decision to send them home; the Legionaires were not mentioned in the 1949 instructions on deportation. By June 1956, under rulings by the Republic Commission, all 1,963 families which had submitted complaints and statements had been removed from registration in the special settlements. This included 249 families the members of which, while abroad, were members in the Dashnaksutyun Party and before repatriation to the USSR had submitted a declaration on breaking ties with it and did not engage in any hostile work after arriving in the USSR. Here also were 391 families the heads of which prior to the establishing of Soviet power in Armenia had been members of the Dashnaksutyun Party, but after the establishing of Soviet power had left it or had been in the illegal Dashnak organization and for which they were condemned and upon serving their sentence had not shown themselves to be in any way anti-Soviet [ibid.].

In September-October 1955, work was done to discover among the special settlers those persons who had come under the action of the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 17 September 1955 on Amnesty of Soviet Citizens Who Collaborated With the Occupiers During the Period of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 [ibid.]. This category as a whole included

the special settlers from the contingents of "Vlasovites," "German accomplices" and "Volksdeutsche" which numbered, according to the data on 1 January 1955, respectively, 11,074, 2,305 and 1,129 persons. Here in the last two contingents there was a predominance of legally innocent persons who had ended up in special settlement as members of the families of Volksdeutsche and German accomplices (the families of the Vlasovites were not deported). Separated from the contingent deported in 1949 from the "Black Sea Coast" were 2,661 persons who during the war had served in the Nazi-organized "national legions" and the members of their families (persons of Armenian nationality prevailed). From the persons deported in 1949 from Moldavia, they selected around 4,000 persons who had collaborated during the war with the German and Romanian police bodies and the members of their families. Among the Estonians they separated out the former members of the military-Nazi organization Omakeytse. A total of 21,169

cases were reviewed for the question of the possibility of releasing the special settlers under the Ukase of 17 September 1955 [ibid.].

Around two-thirds of these were released (Table 3). The remainder remained in special settlement chiefly because of their nationality. Thus, among the Vlasovite special settlers there was a significant number of Germans, Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Ingush, Karachai and others [7] and who in 1951-1953 were not released upon serving the 6-year sentence set for the Vlasovites or now under the amnesty ukase (nationality impeded their release). After the release under the Ukase of 17 September 1955, all at once three contingents ceased to exist, the "Vlasovites," the "German accomplices" and "Volksdeutsche," while the persons who previously made up these contingents and who were left in special settlement because of nationality were classified in other contingents of the special settlers, as Germans, as Northern Caucasians and so forth.

**Table 3: Process of Release From Special Settlement and Exile (1 July 1954-1 July 1957) [6]**

Contingents of Released	Number
Under Decree of USSR Council of Ministers of 5 July 1954	875,795
Under Decree of USSR Council of Ministers of 13 August 1954	117,733
<b>Including:</b>	
a) Former kulaks deported in 1929-1933	11,864
b) Germans (subcontingents: "local" and "mobilized")	105,869
Under Decree of Presidium of CPSU Central Committee of 9 May 1955	13,573
<b>Including:</b>	
a) Members of CPSU and Candidate Members of CPSU	5,699
b) Members of their families	7,874
Persons deported for collaboration with Nazi occupiers (under Ukase of Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet of 17 September 1955)	15,724
Under Decree of USSR Council of Ministers of 24 November 1955	45,119
<b>Including:</b>	
a) Participants in Great Patriotic War and persons decorated with USSR medals and orders	18,752
b) Women marrying local residents as well as women of Russian, Ukrainian and other nationalities deported along with Crimean Tatars, Chechens and others due to marital relations which were subsequently broken	10,143
c) Single disabled persons and persons suffering from incurable illness who were unable to sustain independent existence	8,727
d) Members of families of persons killed on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War	5,015
e) Instructors at institutions of learning	2,482
Germans (subcontingents: "deported" and "repatriated") (under Ukase of Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet of 13 December 1955)	695,216
Poles deported in 1936 (under Decree of USSR Council of Ministers of 17 January 1956)	22,717
"Particularly dangerous state criminals" sent into exile for settlement after serving sentence in corrective labor camps (ITL) of GULAG [Main Administration for Corrective Labor Camps] (according to Ukase of Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 10 March 1956)	60,798
Members of families of teachers, participants in the Great Patriotic War, persons decorated with USSR medals and orders and members of the families of other persons previously removed from registration in the special settlements (according to the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 12 March 1956)	32,737
Kalmyks (according to Ukase of Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet of 17 March 1956)	48,783
Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians deported in 1944 from the Crimea (under Ukase of Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 27 March 1956)	22,059

**Table 3: Process of Release From Special Settlement and Exile (1 July 1954-1 July 1957) [6] (Continued)**

Contingents of Released	Number
Crimean Tatars, Balkars, Turks who were citizens of the USSR, Kurds and Khemshils (under Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 28 April 1956)	178,454
Members of families of Ukrainian and Belorussian Nationalists released from settlement exile (under Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 15 May 1956)	13,841
Chechens, Ingush and Karachai (under Ukase of Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 16 July 1956)	245,390
Foreigners, persons without citizenship and former foreigners accepting Soviet citizenship	27,426
In addition, from 1 July 1954 through 1 January 1957, also removed from registration with special settlements	109,032
<b>Including:</b>	
a) Under decrees of Union republic councils of ministers, executive committees of kray, oblast and rayon soviets	40,366
b) Under rulings of court bodies	22,024
c) Under conclusions of MVD and Procuracy bodies as well as upon serving the term of special settlement	46,642
Removed from registration in first half of 1957 for those newly decorated with USSR orders and medals and members of their families, disabled persons, under individual rulings on release from special settlement and for other reasons	30,242
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>2,554,639</b>

Subsequently, many officers who during the period from 1946 through 1955 were in special settlement as "Vlasovites," were rehabilitated. On 29 June 1956 the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted the Decree on Eliminating the Consequences of Flagrant Violations of Legality Against Former Prisoners of War and Members of Their Families [ibid.]. They verified and reviewed the cases of officers who had been in Nazi captivity and after the war had been sent to special settlement. It was ascertained that a majority of these officers (the latter had been deprived of their officer ranks and the members of their families of state assistance) had no involvement with the traitor Gen A.A. Vlasov and others like him but rather under the harshest conditions of Nazi imprisonment had maintained the dignity of the Soviet man and soldier, many had participated in the anti-Fascist Resistance Movement and, from the standpoint of common sense, merited decorations and not punishments. They ended up in special settlement because the bodies of the NKVD, the NKGB and Counterintelligence SMERSh were unable to find compromising material about them and sufficient for sending them to the GULAG camps. From the results of a review of the cases, a whole series of former special settlers from the Vlasovite contingent regained their officer ranks with the presentation of orders and medals.

On 24 November 1955, the order was issued of the USSR Council of Ministers on removing from registration in special settlement the Greeks who were citizens of the USSR and deported in 1949 from Georgia [ibid.]. They were included in the number of those released upon the conclusions of the MVD and Procuracy bodies (Table 3). Under a special Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 17 January 1956, also removed from the registration of the special settlements were the Poles deported in 1936 from the zone bordering Poland [ibid.]. The Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 12

March 1956 on the Additional Removal From Registration of Certain Categories of Special Settlers provided release for the members of families of instructors at institutions of learning, participants in the Great Patriotic War, persons decorated with USSR orders and medals and the members of families of other persons previously removed from registration of the special settlements [ibid.]. On 15 May 1956, there was issued the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers on lifting restrictions under special settlement from the family members of Ukrainian and Belorussian Nationalists to be released from settlement exile [8].

In the mid-1950s, administrative exile was lifted for the Koreans who had been deported in 1937 from the Far East, the Ingermanlands and Finns who had been forcibly evacuated in 1942 from Leningrad and its surroundings. However, a number of restrictions on the question of returning to the former places of residence was kept.

At the very end of 1955, it was the turn of the deported peoples. On 13 December 1955, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet approved the Ukase on Lifting Restrictions in the Legal Status of Germans and Members of Their Family in Special Settlement [9]. The Germans remaining in special settlement from the sub-contingents of "deported" and "repatriated" were to be released but without the right of returning to the former places of residence and without compensation for harm suffered in deportation. The question arises as to why of all the deported peoples the first to be released from special settlement were precisely the Germans. Here undoubtedly a definite role was played by the visit of the West German Chancellor K. Adenauer to the USSR on 8-14 September 1955. During this time, there was a lively correspondence between the local bodies of the MVD and the USSR MVD concerning the situation of the Germans in special settlement with proposals on the advisability (or inadvisability) of eliminating the special

conditions against them. The time up to December 1955 was spent in working out these proposals and elaborating decisions.

The Ukase of 13 December 1955 excited the hopes of all special settlers. The Crimean Tatars, the Kalmyk, Chechens, Ingush, Karachai, Balkars and others literally attacked the co-workers of the local authorities, the MVD and the Procuracy with the questions: "Why have the Germans been released and we have not?" "Why are we any worse than the Germans?" "When will we be released?" and so forth. There were persistent rumors that the Soviet government had supposedly adopted a decision to release all the special settlers and the local authorities were supposedly concealing this. There was a situation where, having lifted the special conditions against one deported people (the Germans), it was impossible not to adopt analogous decisions for the other deported peoples.

During March-July 1956, the deported peoples were removed from registration in special settlements under the following Ukases of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet: On Lifting the Limitations on the Legal

Status Involving Kalmyks and Members of Their Families in Special Settlement (17 March); On Lifting Restrictions in the Legal Status Against Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians and Members of Their Family in Special Settlement (27 March); On Lifting Restrictions for Special Settlement Against the Crimean Tatars, Balkars and Turks Who Are USSR Citizens; Kurds, Khemshils and Members of Their Families Deported During the Period of the Great Patriotic War (28 April); On Lifting Restrictions for Special Settlement From the Chechens, Ingush, Karachai and Members of Their Family Deported During the Period of the Great Patriotic War (16 July). In addition, on 22 September 1956, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the Ukase on Removing From Special Settlement Registration Certain Categories of Foreigners, Stateless Persons and Former Foreigners Who Adopted Soviet Citizenship [10].

By the time of the adoption of these ukases, the number of special settlers had been sharply reduced by the early removal from registration of children under the age of 16, teachers, students, disabled and so forth. For example, the number of Chechens, Ingush and Karachai released under the Ukase of 16 July 1956 was alone 256,390 persons (Table 4).

**Table 4: Number of Chechens, Ingush and Karachai Removed From Special Settlement Registration Under Ukase of 16 July 1956 [11]**

Republics Where Held for Special Settlement	Total	Including		
		Chechens	Ingush	Karachai
Kazakh SSR	195,911	141,745	36,831	17,335
Kirghiz SSR	47,889	33,569	1,946	12,374
Uzbek SSR	1,167	824	16	327
RSFSR	389*	253	78	58
Turkmen SSR	34	17	11	6
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>245,390</b>	<b>176,408</b>	<b>38,882</b>	<b>30,100</b>

\* Including 103 persons in Irkutsk Oblast, 69 in Magadan, 67 in Krasnoyarsk Kray, 39 in the Komi ASSR, 28 in Kemerovo Oblast and 83 persons in other regions of the RSFSR. (Author's note.)

The ukases involving the nullification of special conditions against the deported peoples and other groups of persons were marked by a half-heartedness and a desire not to provide the slightest criticism for the previously conducted policy of mass deportations. It was argued that the people had been deported "in line with wartime circumstances," and now their remaining in special settlement "was no longer necessary." From the last phrase it stands logically that previously this had been "necessary." There could be no question of any political rehabilitation of the deported peoples. As they had been considered criminal peoples, they were to remain as such with the difference that they would be turned from punished peoples into pardoned ones. All the ukases stated that the removal of the persons from special settlement registration did not entail the return of their property confiscated in deportation and that they did not have the right to return the places from whence they had been deported. As an example, let us quote the full text of the Ukase of 28 April 1956:

#### **UKASE OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET**

**On Lifting Restrictions or Special Settlement From the Crimean Tatars, Balkars, Turks Who Are Citizens of the USSR, Kurds, Khemshils and Members of Their Families Deported During the Period of the Great Patriotic War**

In considering that the existing restrictions on the legal status of the Crimean Tatars, Balkars and Turks who are citizens of the USSR, the Kurds, Khemshils and members of their families under special settlement and deported in 1943-1944 from the Northern Caucasus, from the Georgian SSR and the Crimea are no longer necessary, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. To remove from special settlement registration and release from administrative supervision of the bodies of the USSR MVD the Crimean Tatars, Balkars and Turks

who are citizens of the USSR, the Kurds, Khemshils and members of their families deported to special settlement during the period of the Great Patriotic War.

2. To rule that the lifting of the special settlement restrictions from persons listed in the first article of the current Ukase does not entail the return of their property confiscated in deportation and that they do not have the right to return to the places from whence they were deported.

Chairman of the Presidium  
of the USSR Supreme Soviet K. Voroshilov  
Secretary of the Presidium  
of the USSR Supreme Soviet N. Pegor

Moscow, the Kremlin  
28 April 1956 [12]

The "released" special settlers had to sign that they would not claim a recovery of their property confiscated in deportation and that they would not return to those places from whence they had been deported. Tens of thousands of people refused to sign these documents. In October 1956, the Kazakh MVD reported to the USSR MVD that of the 195,911 Chechens, Ingush and Karachai who had been removed from special settlement registration in the republic, 55,117 persons refused to sign what had been stated to them on release from special settlement and what had been explained in the Ukase of 16 July 1956. In the Kirghiz SSR, of the 47,889 Chechens, Ingush and Karachai removed from special settlement registration, 20,735 persons refused to sign [ibid.]. Thousands of persons spontaneously returned to the places of former residence. For example, according to the data available in the Main Police Directorate of the USSR MVD, on 1 October 1956, some 1,672 German special settlers had returned spontaneously to their places of former residence, including 1,500 to Stalingrad Oblast, 102 to Saratov and 70 persons to Rostov [ibid.].

On 9 January 1957, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the Ukases on the Formation of the Kalmyk Autonomous Oblast as Part of the RSFSR, on the Transformation of the Kabardin ASSR Into the Kabardin-Balkar ASSR, on the Transformation of the Cherkes Autonomous Oblast Into the Karachai-Cherkes Autonomous Oblast and on the Returning of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR to Part of the RSFSR. By these the articles of the Ukases of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 17 March, 28 April and 16 July 1956 which prohibited the Kalmyks, Balkars, Karachai, Chechens, Ingush and members of their families removed from special settlement registration to return to their places of former residence were considered invalid [ibid.].

The ukases of 9 January 1957 placated not only the Kalmyks, Balkars, Karachai, Chechens and Ingush. To a significant degree, they also eliminated the social tension among the former special settlers including Germans, Crimean Tatars, Kurds, Meskhetian Turks and others, instilling in them the hope and certainty (as it was to turn

out subsequently, unrealized) of quick permission to return to the former places of residence and recover the autonomy for those peoples which had it prior to deportation.

In truth, not all the former special settlers who received permission to leave took advantage of this right. Thousands of people had settled into the places where they had been deported, they married local inhabitants, they had their own homes and plots of land, domestic livestock and poultry, a well-paid job and preferred to remain, limiting themselves to the moral satisfaction that at present they were not special settlers but citizens with full rights [13].

Some could not make up their mind to return, fearing that the local authorities in their homeland would greet them not with open arms and that there would be difficulties with residence permits and other factors. Over 1956 and in the first half of 1957, some 62,730 former special settlers received permission to leave in Khabarovsk Kray, Irkutsk, Molotov, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Tomsk, Chita Oblasts and the Buryat-Mongol ASSR, and of this number 53,180 or 84.8 percent left the places of settlement. The remaining 9,550 persons (15.2 percent) preferred to remain or deferred their leaving [14].

The number of special settlers dropped rapidly. While on 1 January 1956, some 904,439 were registered in special settlements, on 1 July 1956 the figure was 611,912, and on 1 January 1957, 211,408 persons. Among the latter were 90,653 OUN members; 13,954 deported in 1940-1941 (3,141 from Lithuania, 2,452 from Latvia, 1,849 from Estonia, 3,901 from Moldavia, 2,606 from the Western Ukraine and 5 from Western Belorussia); 39,839 from Lithuania in 1945-1949; 13,117 from Latvia in 1949; 8,729 from Estonia in 1949; 8,827 from Moldavia in 1949; 22,298 kulaks deported in 1948-1952 (not including the kulaks who were members of the OUN and had been deported in 1945-1949 from the Baltic and Moldavia; 19,920 from Lithuania in 1951; 1,043 from the Western Ukraine in 1951; 652 from Western Belorussia in 1952, 683 from Izmail Oblast in 1948); 6,398 Jehovah's Witnesses; 1,854 Anders followers; 527 Basmack [15]; 530 IPKh; 2,221 under the Ukase of 2 June 1948 (kolkhoz members for the failure to work the required minimum of labor days); 1,725 under the Ukase of 23 July 1951 (for vagrancy and begging); 314 from Pskov Oblast [16]; 355 Dashnaks; 26 Beriya followers [17] and 46 interned from Polish territory [18].

Simultaneously with the special settlers, there was also the release of the exile settlers (sent in perpetuity into exile), the exiles (persons exiled for a certain period) and the deported. On 1 January 1952, there were 78,452 persons in exile and deportation, including 71,980 political prisoners and 6,472 criminals. In 1952, a portion of the exiled settlers, exiles and deported was shifted to the status of special settlers and for this reason, by the start of 1953, their number had declined to 66,420 persons (52,468 exiled settlers, 7,833 exiled and 6,119 deported)

[19], and by the start of 1954, to 63,657 persons [20]. Subsequently, the category of "deported" ceased to exist (in part they were released and in part they were reclassified as exiles and special settlers).

In April 1954, the Ukase of 27 March 1953 was partially extended to the exile settlers. In accord with the Order of the USSR MVD and the USSR General Procurator of 24 April 1954, 11,516 persons were released from settlement exile and these persons had been previously condemned for counterrevolutionary crimes for a period of up to 5 years inclusively [21]. In accord with the Order of the USSR General Procurator, the USSR MVD and the USSR MGB of 16 July 1954 (prior to this there was the decision of the

Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee), 14,083 exiled settlers were released and they had been exiled to settlement under decisions of the Special Meeting of the USSR MVD—MGB [ibid.]

However, the number of exiled settlers and exiles not only did not decline but by the beginning of 1956, had even risen (Table 5), as continuing in effect was the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 21 February 1948 on the Sending of Particularly Dangerous State Criminals Upon Serving Their Sentence to Settlement Exile in Remote Localities of the USSR [ibid.]. Persons condemned, as a rule, on political grounds and who had served their period of incarceration in the GULAG camps, after this were sent into settlement exile.

Table 5: Number and Composition of Exile Settlers and Exiles (as of 1 January 1956) [22]

Incriminations	Total	Including	
		Exile-Settlers	Exiles
Agent of foreign intelligence	3,892	3,892	—
Agent of counterintelligence, police and other punitive bodies established by Nazi occupiers	3,078	3,076	2
Participants in foreign anti-Soviet organizations (ROVS [acronym unknown], NTS [National Labor Union] and others)	758	758	—
Nationalists (members of bourgeois nationalistic parties, organizations and groups):	36,265	36,235	30
Ukrainian	23,952	23,934	18
Belorussian	418	418	—
Lithuanian	5,324	5,317	7
Latvian	1,546	1,543	3
Estonian	2,120	2,120	—
Georgian	133	132	1
Armenian	303	302	1
Jewish	191	191	—
Other	2,278	2,278	—
Participants in anti-Soviet political parties and groups:	2,151	2,078	73
Trotskiyites, Zinov'yevites, Rightists	1,522	1,452	70
Mensheviks	255	253	2
SRs and Tekapists	309	308	1
Anarchists	65	65	—
Terrorists	2,971	1,970	1
Wreckers, saboteurs	852	851	1
Rebels and political bandits	5,384	5,381	3
Traitors of the motherland	1,861	1,860	1
Participants in anti-Soviet religious organizations and groups	1,154	1,153	1
Persons convicted for anti-Soviet agitation	2,701	2,685	16
Various anti-Soviet element	4,341	4,784	557
Deported under Ukase of 23 July 1951 (vagrants)	260	—	260
Deported under rulings of court bodies for crimes	2,764	—	2,764
<b>TOTAL NUMBER PRESENT:</b>	<b>68,432</b>	<b>64,723</b>	<b>3,709</b>
Missing (arrested and wanted)	1,409	508	901
<b>TOTAL (together with missing):</b>	<b>69,841</b>	<b>65,231</b>	<b>4,610</b>

In the disrupting of the system of exile settlement, a crucial role was played by the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 10 March 1956, the text of which we quote in full:

**UKASE OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET**

**On Annulling the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 21 February 1948 on Sending Particularly Dangerous State Criminals, Upon Serving Their Sentence, to Settlement Exile in Remote Localities of the USSR**

1. Hereby nullified is the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 21 February 1948 on Sending Particularly State Criminals Upon Serving Their Sentence to Settlement Exile to Remote Localities of the USSR.

It is hereby established that in the future persons may be sent into exile only under court sentences.

2. The Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian nationalists who have served their sentences and the families of whom are in special settlement under the special government decrees are to be allowed to return to their families.

3. All remaining persons who are in settlement exile on the basis of the Ukase of 21 February 1948 are to be released from further exile.

Chairman of the Presidium  
of the USSR Supreme Soviet K. Voroshilov  
Secretary of the Presidium  
of the USSR Supreme Soviet N. Pegov

Moscow, The Kremlin  
10 March 1956 [23]

After the implemented mass release of the exile settlers and exiles, by 1 January 1957, the number of exiles had been reduced to 4,181 persons (these were basically criminals as well as vagrants). The institution of exile settlement ceased to exist. As for the 8,980 Baltic nationalists who had been in settlement exile, 4,331 of them had been shifted to the status of special settlers, while 4,649 persons who did not have family members in special settlement were released from settlement exile on the general grounds [ibid.]

In just 3 years (from 1 July 1954 through 1 July 1957), some 2,554,639 persons were released from special settlement and exile (Table 3).

In addition, over the period from 1 July 1954 through 1 July 1957, also removed from the special settlement registration were 24,057 deceased, 2,866 condemned for various crimes and who had served their sentence in camps, colonies and prisons and 546 missing persons. As of 1 July 1957, 178,363 persons remained on special settlement registration, including 84,904 OUN members, 51,217 persons deported after the war from Lithuania (including kulaks deported in 1951), 11,064

deported in 1940-1941 from the Baltic, Western Ukraine, Western Belorussia, Right Bank Moldavia, 7,074 from Moldavia in 1949, 6,171 Jehovah's Witnesses, 5,923 from Estonia in 1949, 5,387 from Latvia in 1949, 1,834 under the Ukase of 23 July 1951, 1,411 Anders followers and 3,388 other [ibid.]

In the second half of 1957, the process continued of release from special settlements under the decisions of the Commissions of the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets, the Union Republic Councils of Ministers, the court bodies, the procuracy, the MVD bodies and so forth. Under the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 31 October 1957, removed from the special settlement registration were Azerbaijanis deported in 1944 from the Adzhar ASSR, Akhaltsikhskiy, Akhalkalakskiy, Adigenskiy, Aspindzskiy and Bogdanovskiy Rayons of Georgia (the former subcontingent "other" in the contingent of special settlers deported from Georgia in 1944) [24]. This Ukase stated: "In taking into account that the rayons of the Georgian SSR from whence the citizens of Azerbaijani nationality have been relocated are presently occupied and there are no possibilities for locating them in other rayons of the republic, according to a statement from the Georgian government, these citizens are to be given the right, at their request, to relocate to permanent residence in Azerbaijan" [ibid.]

On 1 January 1958, the national composition of the present 145,968 special settlers (without the 1,773 arrested and wanted) looked as follows: Ukrainians 85,161, Lithuanians 36,330, Moldavians 7,903, Estonians 5,359, Latvians 2,852, Russians 1,759, Belorusians 1,433, Jews 1,054, Poles 978, Bulgarians 897, Gagauz 354, Romanians 311, Armenians 152, Tajiks 108, Uzbeks 74, Tatars 46, Germans 35, Georgians 34, Azerbaijanis 27, Czechs 14, Albanians 14, Kirghiz 13, Kazakhs 12, Chuvash 10, Udmurts 6, Mordvins 6, Bashkirs 6, Gypsies 5, Greeks 4, Kurds 3, Abkhazians 3, Turkmen 3, Kabarda 2, Komi 2, Finns 2, Karelians 1, Buryats 1, Ossetians 1, Swedes 1, Koreans 1 [ibid.]

On 13 January 1958, the USSR Council of Ministers adopted the Decree on Lifting Restrictions for Special Settlement From Persons Interned or Captured During the Great Patriotic War on Polish Territory [ibid.]. Under the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 28 March 1958 on Lifting Restrictions From Certain Categories of Special Settlers, the following were to be released: a) persons elected to the local soviets as well as those elected to trade union and Komsomol bodies and their dependent family members; b) persons who by the time of deportation for special settlement were under the age of 16 [ibid.]

Of the total number (almost 148,000) remaining in special settlement on 1 January 1958, more than 80,000 were members of families of participants and accomplices of the nationalistic underground and these had been deported to special settlement, as a rule, without a

specific charge being leveled against them but rather exclusively out of family or kinship ties. The number of peasants depossessed and deported in the postwar period (up to 1952) from the Baltic, Moldavia and the Western oblasts of the Ukraine and Belorussia was 33,420 persons [ibid.].

The OUN special settlers [25], the Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians of postwar deportation were divided into five groups: "bandits and nationalists," "members of the families of bandits and nationalists," "accomplices of bandits," "family members of accomplices" and "nationalist kulaks with families" (Table 6).

**Table 6: Grouping of Special Settlers of OUN Members, Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians From Postwar Deportation (as of 1 January 1958) [26]**

Groups	Total	Including			
		OUN Members	Lithuanians	Latvians	Estonians
1 Bandits and nationalists	8,168	4,478	2,697	646	347
2 Family members of bandits and nationalists	57,036	46,924	7,913	1,080	1,119
3 Accomplices of bandits	8,609	6,975	1,474	109	51
4 Family members of accomplices	23,250	19,577	3,231	235	207
5 Kulak nationalists with families	11,797	1,458	6,658	1,244	2,437
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>108,860</b>	<b>79,412</b>	<b>21,973</b>	<b>3,314</b>	<b>4,161</b>

Note: This statistic does not include the kulaks who were in special settlement as independent contingents and deported from Izmail Oblast in 1948, from Lithuania in 1951, from the Western Ukraine in 1951 and from Western Belorussia in 1952.

In turn, the special settlers from the group "family members of bandits and nationalists" were classified in

five subgroups (Table 7).

**Table 7: Special Settlers From the Group "Family Members of Bandits and Nationalists" (as of 1 June 1958) [27]**

Subgroups	Total	Including			
		OUN Members	Lithuanians	Latvians	Estonians
Family members of persons killed in liquidating bands	11,620	11,216	340	30	34
Members of families which had served a sentence in camps, colonies and prisons or condemned to death	7,439	6,485	624	244	86
Members of families released from camps, colonies and prisons or residing together with families in special settlement	10,368	8,116	1,462	601	189
Family members of persons in illegal status	4,953	4,538	363	25	27
Family members of bandits and nationalists the location of whom was unknown	8,742	6,800	1,701	113	128
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>43,122</b>	<b>37,155</b>	<b>4,490</b>	<b>1,013</b>	<b>464</b>

Under the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 19 May 1958 on Lifting Limitations From Certain Categories of Special Settlers, the following persons were to be removed from special settlement registration: accomplices of the nationalistic underground and members of their families; former kulaks and members of their families; family members of former landowners, factory owners, merchants, leaders and members of bourgeois political parties and anti-Soviet organizations and leaders of former bourgeois governments [ibid.]. The implementation of this

Ukase in the summer of 1958 led to a sharp drop in the number of special settlers deported both prior to the war and after the war from the Western Ukraine, the Baltic and Moldavia (Table 8). Of the previously existing five groups making up the special settlers of OUN members, Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians in the postwar deportation, remaining in special settlement were just two groups: "bandits and nationalists" and "family members of bandits and nationalists" (Table 9).

Table 8: Number and Composition of Special Settlers (as of 1 January 1958, 1 September 1958 and 1 January 1959) [28]

Contingents	1 Jan 1958	1 Sep 1958	1 Jan 1959
OUN members	79,412	38,618	34,716
From Lithuania in 1945-1949	21,973	6,062	4,907
Kulaks from Lithuania in 1951	13,660	—	—
From Moldavia in 1949	6,120	574	433
Jehovah's Witnesses*	5,720	5,221	5,107
From Estonia in 1949	4,161	604	530
From Latvia in 1949	3,314	1,469	1,434
From Moldavia in 1940-1941	2,466	270	172
From the Western Ukraine in 1940-1941	2,237	971	873
From Lithuania in 1940-1941	1,876	332	279
From Estonia in 1940-1941	1,197	50	39
Anders followers**	1,155	—	—
Kulaks from the Western Ukraine in 1951	881	—	—
Under Ukase of 2 June 1948	860	519	459
From Latvia in 1940-1941	766	153	108
Kulaks from Izmail Oblast in 1948	532	—	—
IPKh	457	278	268
Kulaks from Western Belorussia in 1952	430	—	—
Basmacks	209	—	—
From Pskov Oblast in 1950	159	96	91
Dashnaks	132	—	—
Beriya followers	24	11	—
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>147,741</b>	<b>55,228</b>	<b>49,416</b>

\* On 1 September 1958, among the special settlers in the contingent "Jehovah's Witnesses" (they had been deported under the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 3 March 1951) there were 3,600 residents of the Western Ukraine, 1,413 from Moldavia, 150 from Western Belorussia, 49 from Lithuania and 9 from Estonia. (Author's note.) \*\* On 1 January 1958, among the special settlers of the "Anders followers" (former servicemen from the Anders Polish Army with families and deported under the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 13 February 1951) were 614 residents of Western Belorussia, 496 from the Western Ukraine and 45 from Lithuania. (Author's note.)

Table 9: Composition of Special Settlers Who Were OUN Members, Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians From Postwar Deportation (as of 1 January 1959) [29]

Groups	Total	Including			
		OUN Members	Lithuanians	Latvians	Estonians
Bandits and nationalists	5,410	3,452	1,275	502	181
Family members of bandits and nationalists	36,177	31,264	3,632	932	349
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>41,587</b>	<b>34,716</b>	<b>4,907</b>	<b>1,434</b>	<b>530</b>

Under the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 2 August 1958 on Lifting Restrictions From Certain Categories of Special Settlers, also removed from special settlement registration were servicemen in the Anders Army and members of their families, former

participants in the Basmack bands and Dashnak organizations [ibid.]. The implementation of this Ukase led to the simultaneous elimination of three contingents of special settlers, the "Anders followers," "Basmacks" and "Dashnaks."

The Ukases of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 19 May and 2 August 1958, in addition to the rote statement that the removal of these individuals from special settlement registration did not entail the return of their property confiscated in deportation and that they did not have the right to return to the places from whence they had been deported, contained the crucial stipulation: "The return of the designated individuals to their former places of residence can be granted only with permission from the executive committees of the oblast soviets or the republic councils of ministers (if there is no oblast division) from the territories of which the deportation was made" [ibid.].

The Jehovah's Witnesses were the hardest contingent of special settlers to release. The reasons for this can be discovered from the text of one of the reports forwarded to the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, N.P. Dudorov (September 1957). "The Jehovah's Witnesses behave particularly badly in the places of settlement," this report stated. "According to information from the UVD [Internal Affairs Department] in Tomsk and Irkutsk Oblasts, a majority of the special settler Jehovah's Witnesses who have been located there up to the last have not participated in the elections to the soviets, they sabotage party and government measures, they do not participate in public life and at the same time strictly observe their religious rites, they hold illegal meetings and the most active of them go through the population points spreading anti-Soviet rumors. In Bratskiy Rayon of Irkutsk Oblast, a group of young Jehovah's Witnesses in March 1957 went through the population points spreading an anti-Soviet letter about a 'new life' preaching here Jehovah's Witness views and recruited new members into the Jehovah's Witness sect. The leaders of the Jehovah's Witness underground who live illegally in Moldavia supply anti-Soviet literature to followers residing in Kurgan, Omsk and Tomsk Oblasts and urge them to sabotage the measures of Soviet power" [ibid.]. The conduct of the Jehovah's Witnesses was viewed uniformly as counterrevolutionary and during the designated period they never figured even in the most radical draft decisions to release the special settlers.

In parallel with the mass release of special settlers and exile settlers, there was a rapid drop in the bureaucracy supervising them. Employed in the administrative supervision of the special settlers and exiles (on 1 January of each year) were the following: 15,778 co-workers in 1952, 10,753 in 1953, 8,838 in 1954, 5,282 in 1955, 3,778 in 1956, 780 in 1957 and 705 in 1958 [ibid.].

The last major release of special settlers in the designated period occurred at the start of 1960. Under the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 7 January 1960 on Lifting Restrictions From Certain Categories of Special Settlers, special settlement registration was lifted from the following: a) family members of the leaders and participants in the nationalistic underground and armed nationalistic bands deported from the Western oblasts of the Ukraine, from the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian Union republics and Pskov Oblast; b) former merchants,

landowners, factory owners, members of bourgeois governments and political parties deported from the Western oblasts of the Ukraine, from the Moldavian, Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian Union republics. As in the Ukases of 19 May and 2 August 1958, the return of these persons to their former places of residence was made dependent upon decisions by the authorities of the republics and oblasts from whence the deportation had been carried out [ibid.].

As for the exiles, in contrast to the special settlers, their number in 1957-1958 rose. In 1957, 4,129 persons were sent into exile and in January-November 1958, 5,498 persons. The number of persons sent here exceeded the number of persons released upon serving their time of exile. On 1 January 1958, 6,612 exiles were registered, including 2,114 for whom exile was the basic punishment and for 4,498 a supplementary one. Among those for whom exile was the basic punishment there were 1,635 vagrants and beggars deported for a period of 5 years under the Ukase of 23 July 1951 (previously they had been classified both as special settlers and as exiles and now they were finally considered as exiles). By 1 January 1959, the number of exiles had risen to 9,363 persons and the composition of these by "colors" was as follows: 5,497 condemned for crimes, 87 condemned for counterrevolutionary crimes, 2,688 condemned under the Ukase of 23 July 1951, 93 condemned under the Ukase of 5 October 1956 (gypsies), 392 condemned by people's courts under the laws of the Union republics (vagrants), and 606 persons sent into exile under public sentences on the grounds of the laws of the Union republics [ibid.].

As of 1 January 1959, exiles were serving their exile in the following oblasts, krays and republics: 2,561 persons in Krasnoyarsk Kray, 1,338 in the Komi ASSR, 1,073 in Tyumen Oblast, 925 in Kustanay Oblast, 890 in the Yakut ASSR, 848 in Irkutsk Oblast, 476 in Tomsk Oblast, 397 in Magadan Oblast, 296 in Karaganda Oblast, 223 in the Uzbek SSR, 133 in the Latvian SSR, 37 in the Armenian SSR, 32 in Omsk Oblast, 26 in the Tajik SSR, 20 in Novosibirsk Oblast, 11 in Azerbaijan, 10 in Kemerovo Oblast, 10 in Kirov Oblast, 9 in Perm Oblast, 8 in Sverdlovsk Oblast, 5 in Arkhangelsk Oblast, 5 in the North Kazakhstan Oblast, 4 in Akmolinsk Oblast, 3 in Khabarovsk Kray, 2 in Altay Kray and 2 in Dzhambul Oblast.

With this our acquaintance with statistics on the special settlers and exiles is interrupted as a security classification of Top Secret has been placed on the materials of the subsequent years.

#### Footnotes

1. Central State Archives of the October Revolution, the superior state bodies and the state administrative bodies of the USSR [TsGAOR SSR], collection of documents.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. A portion of the former kulaks deported in 1929-1933 and who by nationality were considered among the peoples deported during the war were classified in other contingents of special settlers, such as Germans, Kalmyk and others (according to the data for August 1952, there were 16,167 such persons, including 13,898 Germans, 87 Kalmyks, 1,716 from Georgia, 450 from the Northern Caucasus and 16 from the Crimea). The Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 13 August 1954 did not extend to them.

5. TsGAOR SSR.

6. Ibid.

7. In March 1949, among the 20,666 special settlers of this contingent residing in Amur Oblast, Krasnoyarsk, Khabarovsk and Primorskiy Krays, the Bashkir and Yakut ASSR's (and this was less than 1/7 of the total number of persons sent in 1946-1947 to special settlement as Vlasovites) there were 7,644 Russians, 3,831 Ukrainians, 770 Azerbaijanis, 1,668 Georgians, 1,110 Armenians, 984 Belorussians, 766 Uzbeks, 685 Germans, 628 Tatars, 602 Kazakhs, 182 Ossetians, 175 Mordvins, 173 Tajiks, 166 Chuvash, 115 Kabarda, 114 Bashkirs, 87 Turkmen, 64 Karachai, 56 Kirghiz, 54 Poles, 54 Udmurts, 54 Adyge, 54 Avars, 53 Cherkes, 46 Moldavians, 43 Lezgin, 40 Mari, 38 Kumyks, 38 Chechens, 34 Karakalpaks, 33 Latvians, 28 Jews and 277 other.

8. The family members of nationalists could return to their previous places of residence but as for the nationalists themselves they subsequently were prohibited from doing this. Under the Ukase of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet of 9 November 1956 on Prohibiting the Former Leaders and Active Members of the Ukrainian Nationalist Underground Who Were Sentenced and Served Their Terms From Returning to the Western Oblasts of the Ukraine, those returning without permission to the Western Ukraine were to be sentenced by the court to exile for up to 5 years. In 1957, analogous ukases were adopted by the Presidiums of the supreme soviets of Lithuania (21 January), Belorussia (22 February), Latvia (5 October) and Estonia (12 October). TsGAOR SSR.

9. TsGAOR SSR.

10. In October 1951, in special settlement were 17,285 persons who were foreigners, stateless persons or persons who had declared themselves foreigners (not including former foreigners who had adopted Soviet citizenship), including: 15,850 Greek subjects, 347 Turks, 27 Germans, 12 Iranians, 3 Poles; there were 727 listed as stateless persons and 319 who claimed to be foreigners but did not possess documents confirming their citizenship.

11. TsGAOR SSR.

12. Ibid.

13. In September 1957, 16,490 families of special settlers lived in their own homes, and around 50,000 families in

communal apartments. Some 38,668 families had their own plots of land and individual gardens. Some 23,750 families had cattle, sheep, goats and poultry.

14. TsGAOR SSR.

15. The former Basmacks with their families were deported from the Tajik SSR under the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 11 January 1950.

16. In 1950, there was the deportation of the "anti-Soviet element" from Pytalovskiy, Pechorskiy and Kachanovskiy Rayons of Pskov Oblast under the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 29 December 1949 on Deporting Kulaks, the Families of Bandits, Nationalists and Repressed Bandit Accomplices. Prior to 1940, these rayons with a predominance of a Russian-speaking population were part of Latvia and Estonia and after the latter were incorporated in the USSR became part of the RSFSR.

17. The Beriya followers were the family members of the close associates of L.P. Beriya who were sent to special settlement under the Orders of the USSR MGB and USSR Procuracy of 28 August 1954.

18. The USSR citizens who were interned and imprisoned in 1944-1945 on Polish territory up to March 1951 were kept in prisoner of war and internee camps and were then sent to special settlement.

19. On 1 January 1953, among the 65,332 persons accounted for as exile settlers, exiles and deported (without the 1,022 arrested and 66 wanted) there were 28,083 Russians, 13,720 Ukrainians, 3,346 Jews, 2,847 Latvians, 2,548 Belorussians, 1,956 Lithuanians, 1,604 Germans, 1,483 Poles, 1,389 Estonians, 1,301 Armenians, 862 Azerbaijanis, 727 Georgians, 610 Moldavians, 605 Tatars, 500 Kazakhs, 453 Uzbeks, 312 Chinese, 254 Karelians and Finns, 243 Chechens, 241 Turkmen, 171 Chuvash, 158 Koreans, 130 Tajiks, 129 Greeks, 123 Hungarians, 104 Romanians, 92 Bulgarians, 90 Bashkir, 84 Kirghiz and 1,167 other.

20. The largest contingent of exile settlers who in 1952 were shifted to the status of special settlers (the latter, in contrast to the exile settlers, formerly kept the status of full citizens but without the right to leave the established place of residence) was the "anti-Soviet element" deported prior to the war from the republics and oblasts which in 1939-1940 became part of the USSR (a predominant number was deported over a period of 2 days, 13 and 14 June 1941). In May-June 1941, some 85,716 persons arrived in settlement exile (not counting those who died and escaped during transporting). Of this number, 27,887 had been deported from Western Belorussia, 22,648 from Moldavia, 12,682 from Lithuania, 9,595 from the Western Ukraine, 9,236 from Latvia and 3,668 from Estonia. Of this number, 19,362 persons were settled in Novosibirsk Oblast, 17,446 in Altay Kray, 16,784 in Krasnoyarsk Kray, 15,413 in Kazakhstan, 11,556 in Omsk Oblast, 3,106 in the Komi ASSR and 2,049 in Kirov Oblast. Subsequently, the geography

of their settlement was broadened. In the documents of the NKVD-MVD, these individuals were designated as former merchants, landowners, factory owners, members of bourgeois governments, political parties and members of their families. By the end of 1952, their number for various reasons had dropped to 29,686 persons.

21. TsGAOR SSR.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. In March 1949, when the number of the subcontinent "other" in the contingent of special settlers deported in 1944 from Georgia comprised 26,044 persons, among them were 24,304 Azerbaijani, 676 Turks, 411 Adzhars, 224 Georgians and 429 other. In point of fact they were removed from special settlement registration during 1954-1956 even before the promulgation of the Ukase of 31 October 1957.

25. The national composition of the OUN members, with rare exception, was uniformly Ukrainian. For example, in March 1949, among the 11,404 adult OUN special settlers (from 17 years and older) residing in Krasnoyarsk Kray, Arkhangelsk and Irkutsk Oblasts, there were 11,339 Ukrainians (99.4 percent), 29 Romanians, 15 Poles, 8 Russians, 4 Jews, 2 Belorussians, 2 Germans, 1 Moldavian, 1 Czech and 1 "other."

26. TsGAOR SSR.

27. Ibid.

28. Of the 49,416 persons remaining on 1 January 1959 in special settlement registration, 8,292 resided in Irkutsk Oblast, 7,558 in Kemerovo Oblast, 5,619 in Krasnoyarsk Kray, 3,858 in Omsk Oblast, 3,750 in Tomsk Oblast, 3,160 in Perm Oblast, 3,105 in Khabarovsk Kray, 2,774 in Karaganda Oblast, 1,763 in Chelyabinsk Oblast, 1,575 in the Komi ASSR, 1,251 in Tyumen Oblast, 978 in Amur Oblast, 942 in Arkhangelsk Oblast, 915 in Chita Oblast, 590 in Kirov Oblast, 569 in the Yakut ASSR, 496 in the Buryat ASSR, 444 in Kurgan Oblast, 281 in Novosibirsk Oblast, 233 in South Kazakhstan Oblast, 230 in the Udmurt ASSR, 179 in Altay Kray, 156 in Magadan Oblast, 142 in Sverdlovsk Oblast, 119 in North Kazakhstan Oblast, 102 in Primorskiy Kray, 102 in Kokchetav Oblast, 90 in Atyubinsk Oblast, 84 in Akmolinsk Oblast, 13 in Kustanay Oblast, 9 in Dzhambul Oblast, 8 in Alma-Ata Oblast, 8 in Kzyl-Orda Oblast, 7 in the Kirghiz SSR, 6 in Guryev Oblast, 5 in West Kazakhstan Oblast and 3 special settlers in Semipalatinsk Oblast. TsGAOR SSR.

29. TsGAOR SSR.

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### Exacerbation of Ethnic Relations in the USSR (Reflection on the Preliminary Results of the 1989 Population Census)

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[Article by Mikhail Nikolayevich Rutkevich, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He is a permanent contributor to our journal]

[Text] The subtitle of the article and its content should not be construed as an attempt by a sociologist to invade the private reserve of demographic science. The all-Union population census is not only a scientific event but also a political one; with good reason Stalin "buried" the results of the 1937 Census and only now are these becoming available to the public [1]. In addition, a census is a concrete sociological study which is colossal in scale and conducted and paid for by the state. Representatives from various areas of social science can and should analyze the census materials.

In the comments offered here the preliminary presently published (October 1990) results of the 1989 Census are examined in comparison with the materials of the 1959, 1970 and 1979 Censuses. The aim is an analysis of the development of nationality or ethnic relations in the USSR in **three aspects**. In the first place, as a source of information on the change in the nationality composition of the nation's population as a whole, the individual regions and republics, and hence on certain very essential reasons and simultaneously consequences of changes in interethnic relations. Secondly, in the sheets of the last census, more space has been given to the questions of population migration than in all the previous ones. However, the census results as yet have not been published for this section<sup>1</sup> and for this reason our ideas on the role of migration, the causes and consequences of ethnic friction and conflicts will undoubtedly require supplementing and possibly correcting. Finally, and thirdly, a comparative analysis of the four census provides material for judging the spread of the Russian language as a means of interethnic contact and in our nation the role of an important integrating factor is assigned to this.

#### How the Crisis in Ethnic Relations Matured

The first postwar census in 1959 was held after all the terrible (including in terms of their demographic consequences) disruptions were already over. But these consequences were still felt for a long time in the distorted sex-age structure of the population. Thus, in January 1959, for every 1,000 men there were 1,220 women and in many regions (Belorussia, the Northwest and a majority of the oblasts in Central Russia) the prewar population had not yet been reached [3]. The consequences of collectivization and starvation, the Stalinist repressions, the deportation of a number of peoples and, of course, the war of 1941-1945 make themselves felt even now. But precisely from the end of the 1950s, the

nation's demographic development basically was carried out by an *evolutionary* means. A comparison of the data of the four censuses conducted with an interval of 10 years (the 1970 Census "falls out" of the series but this has been considered in the calculations) makes it possible to understand much in the process of the development of ethnic relations during the period which preceded their current crisis state.

The sharp exacerbation of interethnic relations began (the dates do not coincide in different regions) not long before January 1989 and, aside from the Transcaucasus, still had "not been able" to tell on the census results.<sup>2</sup> The unleashing of nationalistic passions was still to come; for now we cannot see the end. They shook the nation in which the persuasion prevailed that there was established an unshakable friendship of peoples. According to the data of the USSR Procuracy, during the 2 and 1/2 years around 600,000 persons have left their place of permanent residence, there have been 4,648 pogroms, 946 persons have been killed in interethnic conflicts and 8,652 have been wounded. In some places there have been real military operations involving heavy weapons and helicopters. The material loss from these clashes can scarcely be assessed but a total of 10 billion rubles has been given [5]. These figures are rising and will change by the time the article is published.

The dialectics of history is such that abrupt changes and major about-faces in the life of peoples (and there is no doubt that the nation is presently in a major historical about-face) externally are prepared for by little noticed, gradual and "quiet" shifts occurring under the action of profound forces over decades. The prerequisites for the current crisis in nationality and nationality-state relations in the USSR have matured in all spheres of life, including in the trends of the reproduction and migration of the population and in the interaction of languages. This is what we will be discussing. But, in drawing attention to the given linkage, we are not inclined to ascribe crucial significance to it. For a correct understanding of the reasons for the crisis in nationality relations, we must turn first of all to the basis, the socioeconomic crisis.

The increased social tension, as a consequence of the collapse of the consumer market, the universal deficit, growing inflation and the violating of established economic ties by the enterprises and regions have given rise to attempts to "fence oneself off," to switch to bartering and try at least temporarily to improve one's situation at the expense of others. The coming to power of nationalistic forces in a number of republics (the Baltic, Moldova [Moldavia], Armenia and Georgia) became possible in a situation of increasing dissatisfaction with the course of perestroyka and the impotence of the central bodies. But, in coming to power on a wave of chauvinism created by them and ethnic intolerance, these forces are carrying out a policy of separatism, isolation, even to the point of withdrawing from the Union and thereby contribute to an exacerbation of the economic crisis and to a further

collapse of the national economic complex and this ultimately strikes at the population of "their own" republics.

The view of economic sovereignty as absolute runs contrary to the urgent need for converting to a Union-wide market which is essential to all. There is equal harm in the absolutizing of political sovereignty and rights of the so-called indigenous nations<sup>3</sup> and which naturally has been rebuffed and inevitably leads to acute ethnic conflicts in the political sphere. The hundreds of thousands of refugees, the bloody pogroms, the establishing of groups of fighters and then their own military and police formations, all sorts of encroachments against the rights of the "nonindigenous" population, including depriving them of the right to vote in elections and compelling them to leave—all of this shatters and destabilizes the political situation in the nation.

We would point out one other important feature: in each sphere of social life the pressure of the accumulating events has brought about the appearance of an intrinsic, inner logic in the development of the process and a certain independence of its development. This independence naturally is limited by the interaction and interpenetration of all areas of social life. But as relative independence, it makes itself felt and with particular force in abrupt shifts of history.

In the sphere of nationality relations over the centuries, strong economic and cultural ties have come into being between the peoples of Russia and these gained a new impetus as a result of the October Revolution, the elimination of nationality suppression and the forming of a single national economic complex. The degree of integration of the regions and sectors in the USSR was higher than in the European economic community. The friendship of peoples withstood the testing of the Patriotic War and was strengthened in this. But the isolating of this aspect by science and propaganda with the lack of attention and at times the hushing up of problems in nationality relations, both those historically inherited and building up over the decades as a consequence of objective causes and subjective factors, including the errors made by the nation's leadership (and the crimes under Stalin), caused a great deal of harm. At present, on the wave of glasnost and perestroyka all these problems have ended up at the center of social life.

In actuality, the historically progressive policy bequeathed by Lenin of the greatest possible help from the center (RSFSR and the Ukraine) to the backward borderlands in the aim of gradually leveling out their economic and cultural level has borne fruit. The distance has been shortened, but the inequality has not been completely eliminated and could not be eliminated in such a short time under the very harsh historical conditions. At present, there is a correct understanding, on the one hand, of the questions of the inadmissibility of a gap of 2- or 3-fold in the standard of living between the republics, the dying out of the small nationalities of the North, the colossal ecological costs of industrialization

as well as monocropping in agricultural production and, on the other, the need to halt the annual transfer of many millions of rubles of assets from Russia into the other republics, when its historical center was falling into neglect and the social sphere in the new industrial regions of the RSFSR East and North were in a truly terrifying state.

The national-state demarcation carried out basically in the 1920s and continued after the war contributed to the economic upswing and cultural growth of the peoples, to the creation of their own intelligentsia and to the development of national self-awareness. But the errors committed in the course of this demarcation have now become one of the reasons for the protracted conflicts and territorial disputes which for now cannot be solved democratically. Stalin's deportation of a number of peoples during the war years (and immediately after it) and their return under Khrushchev to the places of their traditional residence left a profound trace in particular because the action of restoring justice was not completely carried out.

The Crimean Tatars, the Volga Germans and the Meskhetian Turks from Georgia are continuing their struggle for a return. But under conditions where the local population over the decades has settled in, built up their lives and protests against the "crowding," conflicts have broken out which cannot be easily resolved. The development of new industrial sectors, including the ecologically safe (mineral extraction, nuclear power plants, hydraulic engineering facilities and so forth) contributed to the increased productive forces in the republics (and largely were a response to their request). But the realization of these projects involved bringing in manpower from outside, from other republics and oblasts and the mass migration of the population and meant new problems including a reduced proportion of the indigenous population, ecological damage and so forth.

It is also essential to mention the following contradiction. The liberation of the Baltic, the Western oblasts of Ukraine and Belorussia from the Nazi occupiers involved a struggle against the military and police formations set up by the occupiers from the local population as well as the struggle against the nationalistic bands in the Baltic and the Western Ukraine which had gone on for years. Quite naturally, this was accompanied by victims on both sides and at times the innocent population suspected of supporting the bandit formations also suffered. There were very broad repressions before the war and after it. Incidentally, in counting the victims of repression, Russia would have the largest.

Such are the contradictions of history. But in a period of growing universal dissatisfaction with the course of perestroika, the deteriorating of the material situation and increased crime, the nationalistic parties and movements, in interpreting history in a one-sided manner, depict it merely as a sequence of losses for "their own" nation suffered due to the "imperialist policy" of the

Center. Here they willingly name Russia and the Russians as the "Center," in provoking and inspiring the unleashing of nationalistic feelings, including the old chauvinism directed against the Russian (and generally the Russian-speaking) population in a number of republics and oblasts and against the Soviet Army units stationed there and against the serving of local youth in it. But how can the current leadership of the CPSU and the nation, in proclaiming perestroika, including in the sphere of nationality relations on the basis of the full equality of peoples and observing the rights of USSR citizens wherever they may live, be held responsible for the entire previous period of history?

Gorbachev and his supporters in the CPSU leadership and in the USSR government can be criticized but not for the heritage given to them but rather for the untimeliness of political judgments, indecisiveness of action, and a systematic delay in responding to rapidly developing events. They were late in assessing the true essence of the political program of the People's Fronts of Latvia and Estonia and Sajudis in Lithuania, having accepted as authentic their vow of loyalty to democracy and perestroika and not having promptly supported the internationalist forces in these republics. They were also systematically late in unmasking and thwarting the activities of the well-organized shadow forces which unleashed bloody pogroms in Sumgait, Fergana, Baku, Dushanbe and Osh Oblast, who committed excesses in the center of Kishinev, Tbilisi, Baku and other cities, who violated the state frontier in the Transcaucasus, who attacked (and are attacking) the subunits of the Soviet Army and the Interior Troops guarding the tranquility of the population. The nationalists who have made it to power have not been shy either in ideological means or in organizing psychological stress against the "nonindigenous" population or in adopting various decrees and laws which violate the rights of the representatives of the national minorities and primarily the Russian-speaking (in its majority Russian) population. Some 60 million Soviet people reside outside their national state formations (and many do not even have such), this is over 20 percent of the population, and their civil rights should be protected under any conditions, whatever the further development of nationality relations.

The interrelated processes of differentiation and integration in the economy, politics and culture in a multinational nation inevitably assume a "nationality" component. At present, under the impact of the centrifugal forces, the development of differentiation in the national state structure of the USSR has reached the brink where differentiation threatens to become—to one degree or another—disintegration of the existing integrity and into the partial collapse of the Union. This is a real threat. For this reason, we must look closely at those factors in the development of nationality relations which "feed" both these trends.

### Population Reproduction and Nationality Relations

Over the 30 years the indications of a precrisis situation can be "felt" in the trends of sociodemographic development. Let us first examine the trends in the change of the size of the population by groups of peoples which are historically close in terms of way of life and region of residence and often in language (for example, all the basic peoples of Central Asia, with the exception of the Tajiks, are Turkic-speaking). Particularly standing out is the group of the three Eastern Slavic peoples which has a common root in Kievan Rus and are close in language and family traditions regardless of any dependence upon place of residence, that is, from Brest to Vladivostok, from the White Sea to the Black Sea: Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians.

In order to better understand the figures presented below in the Table, let us go back to certain concepts in demographic science. In the course of history, mankind (and thereby the ethnic communities) has consecutively gone through (different peoples at different times with certain particular features) three stages of demographic development with a fourth just appearing.

The peoples which made up Russia prior to 1917 were in the most diverse stages of historical development and hence on different sections of the curve describing the evolution of population reproduction. Over the last 7 decades much has changed but in our times the differences between them in demographic behavior are so great that often the average data employed in practical terms for the Union (for example, in a comparison with other countries) can explain little in scientific terms.

The first stage which lasted for long millennia in the preindustrial age is characterized by a high birthrate limited basically by biological factors and an equally high death rate from hunger, malnutrition, illness as well as accidents, wars and violence. As a result, the size of the population was stable or was growing very slowly, predominantly by broadening the range of habitat or, on the contrary, was declining because of pestilence, natural disasters and enemy invasions.

The second stage was brought to life by the rise of capitalism, by industrialization, urbanization, by better sanitary conditions, by an increased level of prosperity and culture as well as by the advances of medicine in combating epidemics. The birthrate indicator remained high (although it gradually dropped) but the indicator of the death rate declined rapidly. This stage is frequently termed a "demographic transition" or a "demographic explosion" since there is a significance increase in the population (in some countries up to 4-5 percent per annum). Western Europe underwent this explosion in the 19th Century. It began in Russia in the 1860s, but was interrupted by the mass losses during the years of World War I and the Civil War, collectivization and World War II. In the developing countries, the demographic explosion is in full swing but almost everywhere its "peak" has already passed (in the 1950s-1960s, on the

islands of Oceania in the 1970s), or is passing (West and Central Africa) [7, pp 30-31]. After the passage of the "peak" there begins a slow "drop" caused primarily by a change in the socioeconomic conditions and this sooner or later leads to the third stage.

This stage is characterized by a further drop in the mortality level, particularly infant (in Japan, 5 per 1,000 in the first year of life) due to the increased prosperity, the better ecological conditions, the advances of medicine and, as a result, the greater average life expectancy (in Japan up to 80 years). Simultaneously, there is a drop in the level of the birthrate, primarily due to family planning (and this is aided by the spread of modern contraceptives) but also by a number of destabilizing factors: the increased proportional amount of single parents, divorces, the decline in morals and so forth. As a result, the natural increase in the population becomes insignificant or halts. Thus, in the countries of Western and Northern Europe in 1989, the designated increase was as follows: 1.9 (per 1,000 of the population) in Sweden, 1.7 in Great Britain, 1.2 in Belgium, 0.1 in Austria and the GDR and in a number of extremely prosperous countries was negative (West Germany, Denmark and Hungary). If we take into account the average increase in life expectancy and the change in the age structure of the population, these figures show an already started process of *depopulation* which in a way is concealed by the insignificant natural increase and is covered over by the influx of immigrants which comprise up to 7-10 percent of the population in certain countries of Western Europe. Demography has long employed reproduction coefficients which have been "purged" of the designated factors. The most accurate of these, the so-called net reproduction coefficient of the population<sup>4</sup> in the developed countries of the West has long since crossed the "fatal line" of one. In 1970-1974, it was 1.03, in 1975-1979, it was 0.96 and in 1980-1984, 0.94 and continues to drop. In a number of the European countries, the situation has become simply frightening (0.7 in Austria and 0.67 in Denmark) [7, pp 243-252].

In a "consumer society" a trend develops and with the prevalence of this even special measures by the state (subsidies for children, aid to single mothers and so forth) do not have a substantial impact on the desire to be concerned with more than two children in a majority of the families. However, for the simple reproduction of the population it is essential that each formed family have an average of 2.1-2.3 and more children depending upon the marriage, infant mortality and other coefficients.

Under these conditions, it becomes essential to have a transition to the fourth stage at which sooner or later the trend toward depopulation should be overcome. Certain indications of the transition to this stage can be observed in a number of countries in the West and this has been caused by further advances in medicine, increased social security, by a strengthening of incentive factors (material and moral) and so forth. According to UN forecasts, the

net coefficient can reach a value of 0.97-0.99 by 2020-2024 in the countries of Western and Northern Europe and in North America (where the indicators for the Negro population as well as for the migrants from Asia and Latin America are above 1) by the end of the century [7, p 247].

The peoples inhabiting the Soviet Union are either at the second stage, that is, at the various levels of the "demographic transition" or at the third, when over the long run the danger of depopulation can be seen to a greater or lesser degree. Here, of course, there is a great range of

gradations: there are peoples which are precisely on the transition from the second to the third stage; certain small peoples of the North living under particularly harsh conditions have been unable to leave the first stage and as a consequence of the high mortality rate they are threatened with extinction.

As it is impossible to embrace the unembracable, let us move on to an analysis of the table which brings together (with certain differences) the group of ethnoses and shows the dynamics of the population reproduction indicators from 1959 through 1989.

**Increase in Size of USSR Population (1959-1989; Nationality Breakdown)**

Groups of Nationalities	Size of Population According to Census, Thousands				Growth Rate for Periods, %		
	1959	1970	1979	1989	1959-69	1970-78	1979-88
Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians	159,280	178,820	189,207	199,381	12.27	5.81	5.38
Indigenous nationalities of autonomous regions of Volga-Urals Region of the RSFSR*	10,252	11,905	12,445	13,008	16.12	4.54	4.52
Indigenous nationalities of autonomous regions of Northern Caucasus Region of RSFSR**	2,341	3,190	3,793	4,707	36.27	18.90	24.10
Indigenous nationalities of Baltic (Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians)	4,715	5,102	5,310	5,554	8.21	4.08	4.60
Indigenous nationalities of Transcaucasus Union Republics (Armenians, Georgians, Azeris)	8,419	11,184	13,198	15,401	32.84	18.01	16.69
Indigenous nationalities of Central Asian Republics (Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen, Kirghiz and Karakalpaks)	9,556	14,544	19,591	26,595	52.20	34.70	35.75
USSR	208,821	241,720	262,085	285,743	15.75	8.42	9.03

\*Tatars, Bashkirs, Chuvash, Mari, Mordvins, Udmurts, Komi and Komi-Permyaks. \*\*The ten nationalities of Dagestan as well as the Chechens, Ingush, Ossetians, Kabardins, Balkars, Karachai, Cherkess, Adyges and Abaz.

Groups of Nationalities	Average Annual*** Increase by Periods, %			Share of Nation's Population, %			
	1959-69	1970-78	1979-88	1959	1970	1979	1988
Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians	10.7	7.0	5.3	76.28	73.98	72.19	69.7
Indigenous nationalities of autonomous regions of Volga-Urals Region of the RSFSR*	13.7	4.9	4.8	4.91	4.93	4.75	4.55
Indigenous nationalities of autonomous regions of Northern Caucasus Region of RSFSR**	28.5	19.4	21.8	1.12	1.32	1.45	1.65
Indigenous nationalities of Baltic (Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians)	7.2	4.0	4.5	2.26	2.10	2.03	1.94
Indigenous nationalities of Transcaucasus Union Republics (Armenians, Georgians, Azeris)	26.3	18.6	15.6	4.03	4.62	5.04	5.39
Indigenous nationalities of Central Asian Republics (Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen, Kirghiz and Karakalpaks)	39.0	30.1	30.1	4.58	6.02	7.47	9.31
USSR	13.4	9.0	8.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

\*\*\*In the calculation it was taken into consideration that the first period was 11 years, the second period was 9, the third 10, as well as the running total (compound percentages).

From the table it is apparent that the Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians, these three peoples close in language, customs and behavior and united by a common origin have been partially displaced, particularly in the process of populating the southern steppes, Siberia and the Far East as well as the new industrial regions. One has merely to recall that there are 11.5 million Russians living in the Ukraine (this is 8 percent of the total number of Russians in the nation and more than 20 percent of the republic population), while there are 4,360,000 Ukrainians and 1,206,000 Belorussians in the RSFSR and this is, respectively, around 10 percent and over 12 percent of the total population of the nation's Ukrainian and Belorussian populations [8-9].

Precisely in the designated period these peoples finally "bid farewell" to the ever-abating "demographic transition" and moved to a stage when the prospect of depopulation becomes real. The most important factors determining this evolution are: industrialization and urbanization; migration from the countryside into the city accompanied by the ageing (and in some places the disappearance) of the rural population; the reduced number of children in the rural family which was recently large to the "urban" standards (1-2 children per family). Here an important role is also played by the protracted lack of amenities for the migrants in the cities and worker settlements, the housing crisis and deteriorating supply (particularly in the Ural, the Kuzbass, the oil and gas fields of Western Siberia, the zone of the BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline] and in the Far East). The foundations of the family are cracking. While the ratio of the number of marriages and divorces in 1950 was 0.5 divorce per 12 marriages in the RSFSR (calculated per 1,000 persons), in 1988, the figure was 3.9 per 9.5, that is, the number of divorces exceeded 40 percent of the number of marriages; there were similar figures for the Ukraine (over 40 percent) and Belorussia (34 percent) [10, pp 117-118]. As a result, there has been a rapid rise in the number of children in "incomplete" families (single mothers) and abandoned by parents and raised by the state in children's homes. The average size of a family in the three republics at the end of the 1970s was 3.3 persons and at the end of the 1980s 3.2 [11, p 220; 12]. Because of the exacerbation of the economic crisis, one can expect a rise in the unfavorable phenomena in the family and in population reproduction for the given group of peoples. This is also seen from the changes in the net coefficient. In 1960-1961, in the RSFSR this was 0.934, in 1980-1981, it declined to 0.878 and then rose somewhat to 1.005 in 1988; It must be taken into account that this coefficient averaged for the republic includes differences between the indicators for the Russians and a number of indigenous nationalities of the autonomous areas. It has described an analogous curve in the Ukraine: from 0.960 (in 1969-1970) it declined to 0.910 (in 1980-1981) and rose somewhat to 0.957 in 1988. In Belorussia, it declined from 1.092 (1969-1970) to 0.965 (1988) [10, p 114].

A certain rise in the birthrate in these republics in the 1980s can be explained by two circumstances. In the first

place, by the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers of 22 January 1981 which outlined a series of measures to improve assistance to families with children and primarily increasing the period of leave to tend for children (paid and unpaid) [19]. Secondly, the antialcohol campaign of 1985-1987 influenced in a certain manner the demographic indicators. But these are short-term factors. Thus, in just 1 year (in comparing 1989 with 1988), the coefficient of natural increase dropped for the RSFSR from 5.3 to 3.9, for the Ukraine from 2.8 to 1.8 and for Belorussia from 5.7 to 4.9 [13]. For this reason, the conclusion of our well-known demographers that "in the republics with the lowest birthrate at present no clear trend is observed for a drop in the birthrate of the real generations" [14] seems excessively optimistic. It is essential to take the long-term trend which, as is known, in social life always operates not rectilinearly but rather through deviations to both sides and which are caused by factors of a particular order.

The following data are very indicative for characterizing the demographic trends: at the end of the 1970s per 1,000 Russian women there were 1,773 children born by them, for the Ukrainian women 1,823 and for the Belorussian women 2,006 [11, p 358]. In considering the actual coefficients for marriage, sex-age birthrate and mortality, the figures for ensuring the simple reproduction of the population should be on a level of 2,200-2,300. And this is regardless of the substantial decline in the mortality rate, particularly in the Ukraine and Belorussia (to 11.7 and 12.9 in the first year of life per 1,000 born) [15]. As it is for over 30 years now, the basic ethnic mass of the USSR population has not provided for the simple replacement of generations.

As a result, as follows from the calculations (see the Table), the share of the Eastern Slav population in the USSR population has declined steadily and rapidly: from 76.3 percent in 1959 to 69.8 percent in 1989, and will continue to drop in the foreseeable future. This necessarily entails a relative decline in the economic potential of the three republics and which make up the historical nucleus for the community of peoples in our country.

We have specially isolated groups of nationalities which are indigenous for the autonomous regions<sup>5</sup> of two regions of the RSFSR: Volga-Ural and Northern Caucasus. Of course, it is essential to take into account that these peoples have also settled widely throughout the nation and, on the contrary, in the corresponding republics (for example, the Tatar ASSR) they do not always comprise a majority of the population. For this reason, we have taken not the groups of republics but rather the groups of nationalities as in the given instance we assume that the demographic indicators for the Tatars and Ossetians, the Chuvash and Chechens living in "their own" republic and outside of it are very close.

Among the indigenous nationalities of the Northern Caucasus, the "demographic explosion" is continuing

although with a varying degree of intensity. The annual average increase in the population has declined somewhat in comparison with the end of the 1950s but continues to remain on the level of such developing countries in the overseas East as Turkey (20.8), India (17.2), Sri Lanka (18.1) and Vietnam (20.4) (data for 1987) [7, p 63]. It is no surprise that the share of this group of peoples in the Union population over the 30 years has increased by more than 1.5-fold, from 1.12 percent to 1.65 percent. The birthrate continues to remain high, the family is large, the death rate is declining slightly, although its level is somewhat higher than among the Russian population of this region. Correspondingly, there is a high share of children and young persons in the population and this has brought about difficult problems, primarily in job placement. For a long time, a significant portion of the youth has not been employed in social production. In a number of republics, particularly in Checheno-Ingushetia, departure for seasonal work plays a growing role (one of the types of pendulum migration) [16].

Thus, a demographic situation is arising among the indigenous peoples of the Finno-Uighur and Turkic origin in the Volga-Ural region. Many centuries of joint dwelling with the Russians, both on the territory of the current autonomous areas and outside them, have caused a closeness in the way of life (only in rural settlements is a substantial national specific way maintained) and demographic conduct. The annual average increase in the population during the 1960s was somewhat higher than among the Russians, but then went into an abrupt decline and is currently below that of the Slavs. The share of these peoples in the total size of the nation's population since 1970 (4.93 percent) has begun to drop and according to the 1989 Census was 4.55 percent. Here a certain role is also played by assimilation processes.

The Baltic peoples are very similar in demographic terms with the peoples of Central and Northern Europe. For a long time, they have been in the "third" stage of the demographic evolution as we have termed it. The net coefficient in the Baltic Republics over the last three decades has fluctuated around 1, having dropped at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, and then rising somewhat. The Lithuanians to a larger degree than the Latvians and Estonians have maintained the traditions of an average-sized family. Per 1,000 female Lithuanians at the end of the 1970s, there were 1,795 children, while among the Estonians it was 1,599 and the Latvians 1,455 [11, p 358].

The annual rate of natural increase (0.4 percent in the 1970s and 0.45 in the 1980s) is  $\frac{1}{2}$  the amount of the nation as a whole and correspondingly the share of the Baltic peoples in the USSR population has declined: from 2.2 percent in 1959 to 1.94 percent in 1989. Simultaneously, as a consequence of the migration of population from other regions (Russian-speaking) and the somewhat higher birthrate among the new arrivals (a different age structure), the proportional amount of the

indigenous nationality in the population of the republics has declined: the share of Estonians in Estonia has dropped from 74.6 percent in 1959 to 61.5 percent in 1989; for Latvians in Latvia, from 62 percent to 52 percent [11, pp 128-129, 136-137; 17-18]. The situation is different in Lithuania where the share of the indigenous population is comparatively more stable and for this reason the problem of "migrants" discriminated against by the current authorities should not play a substantial role. But the "logic" of nationalism is always the same: the fishermen from Klaypeda and the power workers at Snejchus feel just as much psychological stress as do the miners in Kokhtla-Yarva and the machine builders in Riga.

The problem of the "migrants" has become a field of fierce political struggle. The People's Fronts of Estonia and Latvia and Sajudis in Lithuania, in coming to power, have adopted ever-harsher measures to restrict the rights of the Russian-speaking population, including that which lived in the republics during the years of bourgeois power as well as that group which settled immediately after the war. The offspring of these people can rightly consider themselves to be the "indigenous" population, not to mention the Poles in the southwestern rayons of Lithuania where they have lived for centuries. Undoubtedly the prospect of remaining in the minority on the territory of one's historical motherland cannot help but concern one. But the resettlement organized by the departments from other regions for the construction and operation of new facilities has stopped and the flow of spontaneous, unorganized migration has already changed direction, as we will describe in the next article. The nationalistic forces, including the extreme ones like the "Citizen Committees" (which are registering persons who lived in the given territory in 1940 and their direct offspring), are using the problem of the migrants for fanning a nationalistic psychosis and winning the votes of the indigenous population. The attempts to conduct a census of settlement, the demand of using only the official language everywhere, the reduction in the admission to Russian departments in the institutions of higher learning and, finally, the spread of chauvinism in everyday life—this is the atmosphere in these republics. It merely remains to be amazed at the shortsightedness of certain leaders in the Center who have been unable to see the true program of the separatist parties and movements behind their "perestroyka" phraseology.

The demographic situation differs fundamentally in the Transcaucasus Region and Central Asia. With slight differences in demographic development, the three main peoples of the Transcaucasus continue to maintain a higher rate of natural population increase than the average for the USSR, although it is gradually dropping: from 26.3 percent in the 1960s to 15.6 percent in the 1980s.

The residual phenomena of the "demographic transition" are present to the largest degree in Azerbaijan. The number of Azeris in the Union over the 30 years has increased by 2.3-fold (from 2,940,000 to 6,791,000), and

this brings them close to the Turkic-speaking peoples of Central Asia. In Georgia and Armenia, this transition is basically over. Over the 20 years (1969-1988) the net coefficient in Georgia declined from 1.233 to 1.058 and in Armenia, from 1.488 to 1.023 and in Azerbaijan, from 2.085 to 1.268. As was pointed out above, the data for the republics do not correlate fully with the nationality data because the republics are multinational and also because the number of Armenians, Azeris and Georgians residing outside the appropriate republic is very significant and growing.

Over the 30 years there has been a decline in the natural increase, but at present (15.6 per thousand) it is 3-fold higher than this coefficient among the Slavic population. The share of the designated peoples in the USSR population has been steadily growing: from 4 percent in 1959 to 5.4 percent in 1989. The consequences of the accelerated population growth are felt particularly in Armenia and Azerbaijan, where the problem of finding jobs for the youth is one of the most alarming, in forming a contingent being attracted by the nationalistic parties for demonstrations, detachments of guards and guerrillas. For example, military operations on the frontiers of Azerbaijan have been conducted by formations of the so-called fidains from the Armenian National Army (ANA).

The demographic explosion is making itself felt most acutely in Central Asia, where it occurred later than in other regions of the nation and under different historical conditions. The region entered the stage of fundamental changes which began in 1985 on the "ascending" section of the curve of this "explosion" and this exacerbates the acuteness of all the social and ethnic problems. Over the 30 years, the population of the five indigenous nationalities in the region has grown by 2.8-fold and this has substantially altered their proportional amount in the nation's population, from 4.6 percent to 9.3 percent, that is, by more than 2-fold. Here family planning for now has involved a very narrow circle of the urban population. Per 1,000 Uzbek women (the data of 1979) 3,293 children are born, for Turkmen females the figure is 3,299, for Kirghiz 3,363 and for Tajik 3,700 [11, p 358]. Since then these coefficients have changed little. A particularly acute situation has arisen in the areas of irrigated farming, as the rural population is little mobile. In Tajikistan the percentage of village inhabitants over the last two decades has grown (from 62.9 percent in 1970 to 67.4 percent in 1989) [10, p 25].

The trend toward an increase in the natural increase—in spite of the previously high (50 and over per 1,000 in certain oblasts) infant mortality—has been maintained. This indicator in Uzbekistan has risen from 26.4 in 1980 to 28.3 in 1988; in Turkmenia, respectively, from 26.0 to 28.2, in Kirghizia, from 21.2 to 23.8 (here the share of the Russian population is higher); in Tajikistan, from 29.0 to 33.0 [4, p 26].

Agrarian overpopulation and the increased number of unemployed youth create prerequisites for clashes based

on nationality and these are being prepared and carried out not without success by the nationalistic organizations with the aid of the mafia and often with the connivance of local authorities. This was the case in the pogroms of the Meskhetian Turks in Fergana and in the bloody clashes between the Kirghiz and Uzbek populations in Osh Oblast. The departure of the indigenous population outside the region is insignificant and the flow from the village to the cities of the region is growing. Here in the cities there are growing areas of primitive unequipped development without communal services and without sources of pure water supply. The population of these slums is highly inflammable material, particularly for the priests in the mosques. It was precisely in this manner that the pogrom arose in Dushanbe.

Thus, the differences in the nature of the national reproduction of the population in our country are very great both in terms of the regions and particularly in a nationality breakdown. The differences on the socioeconomic level are expressed in the surplus manpower in certain parts of the nation and the labor shortage in others. The conditionality of these concepts is beyond dispute and a transition to market relations will make the secret obvious and will exacerbate the situation; we will encounter unemployment also in regions which currently figure as labor-short. But over the examined period, the economic system did not undergo substantial changes while the new forms introduced such as the formation of cooperatives, leasing, individual labor activities and so forth by the time of the last census, the beginning of 1989, had not yet been developed and had just begun to tell on the use of the labor resources.

The given differences contain certain *prerequisites for a crisis* in interethnic relations, but these prerequisites are beginning to play an active role of the agent of friction and conflicts, in the first place, with the exacerbation of the economic situation, as was mentioned above; secondly, if they are not "absorbed" by migration, by the movement of workers and their families from some regions of the nation to others and by migration across state frontiers. The very "calm" attitude shown by the ruling circles of many developed nations of the West which have a low or even negative natural population increase coefficient to the threat of depopulation can be explained not at least by the possibilities of controlled manpower immigration from the less developed countries, including the former colonies and recently from the Eastern European countries. But this is a special question. As for the role of migration in the exacerbation of interethnic relations in our country, this will be taken up in the following article.

#### Footnotes

1. The promise of the former chairman of the USSR Goskomstat [State Statistics Committee] on the date for processing the 1989 Census remains unfulfilled [2].

2. The USSR Goskomstat has pointed out that in Armenia and Azerbaijan the census "was held under difficult conditions and this could influence the population count" [4, p 159].
3. The attempts theoretically to establish the absolute sovereignty of the republics and, in addition, the nations have been simply verbal confabulations [6].
4. The net reproduction coefficient of the female population indicates as an average how many young girls born by a single woman over her entire life must survive to the age of the mother at their birth (in maintaining the sex-age indicators for the birthrate and death rate of the given period, a year).
5. In the summer and autumn of 1990, a majority of these republics had abandoned the name of autonomous but remained as part of the RSFSR.
14. SOTSIOL. ISSLED., No 3, 1988, p 57.
15. STAT. PRESS-BYULLETEN GOSKOMSTATA SSSR, No 4, 1990, p 47.
16. SOTSIOL. ISSLED., No 1, 1989, pp 46-49.
17. "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1959 g." [The USSR National Economy in 1959], Moscow, Gosstatizdat, 1960, pp 19-20.
18. "Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 g." [Results of the 1970 All-Union Population Census], Moscow, Statistika, Vol IV, 1973, pp 280, 317.
19. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh, resheniyakh syezdov i Plenumov TsK" [The CPSU in Resolutions, Decisions of Congresses and Central Committee Plenums], Moscow, Politizdat, Vol 14, 1988, pp 125-132.

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12. VESTN. STATISTIKA, No 6, 1990, pp 78-79.
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### The Class Essence of "Symbiosis" (The Shadow Economy in an Administrative-Command System)

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ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 91 (signed to  
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[Article by Irina Aleksandrovna Goldenberg, candidate of economic sciences and science associate at the Institute for the Economic Problems of Scientific and Technical Progress of the USSR Academy of Sciences. This is her first appearance in our journal]

[Text] The words "class essence" found in the title of the given article will evoke a condescending smile from many readers as discussions about classes and the class struggle have long been unpopular. At the same time, while abandoning the dogmatic interpretation learned in school of viewing society as once and for all established "roles," "antagonisms," "types of social revolutions" and so forth, the Marxist-Leninist theory of classes can become a powerful tool of analysis and, to a certain degree, for forecasting the economic and political situation in the USSR. This theory which in no way has lost its pertinence provides an answer to the question of why perestroika has been initiated "from above" and to whose interests it conforms, why it is happening precisely now and what are its roots and prospects.

Let us begin with a question that seemingly does not apply to the issue: What is the shadow economy and what role does it play in modern Soviet society? Clearly, this is not only and not so much the underground production and speculation as it is the aggregate of informal socioeconomic relations within the confines of our familiar legal production, distribution, service sphere and so forth. These relations are materialized in monetary-material flows and, in particular, in the redistribution of real income, but in addition encompass the sphere of the formation and quasi-hereditary transfer of social status. The latter is equally important as the

former, as in our nation the availability of money in no way means a real and equal opportunity for all to satisfy various needs.

We are inclined to give the shadow economy a broadened interpretation, considering in it also the informal "secondary redistribution" of income and social privileges in the so-called nonmaterial sphere (education, public health, culture and science). With such an expanded understanding, all members of society to a greater or lesser degree are involved in the range of shadow economic relations. Who of us has not given a tip to a plumber, has not participated in collecting money for a good gift for a teacher, has not "secured" tickets for the train or airplane or has not brought a box of candy or cognac for a physician?

Even from the given simple examples, it can be seen that shadow economic relations do not always necessarily mean social injustice. By their nature, they are of a compensatory sort, and complement the relations established by the administrative system where the relations do not provide for the satisfying of various social and individual needs. The shadow economy exists as a sort of counterweight to the state-administrative system and has developed as a consequence of the obvious and nonobvious restrictions placed by the state on economic and other activities. In a classic model of an economy of free competition, there would be no place for the shadow relations.

Thus, the presence of a system of state administrative regulation over economic activity is a necessary condition for the rise of a shadow economy. However, this condition alone is not sufficient. Favorable grounds for the development of shadow relations are created solely by a system capable of intervening in a substantial manner in the processes of production, distribution, exchange and consumption and only in the instance when the intervention runs counter to the objective patterns of economic development. For example, an artificial reduction in the prices for consumer goods leads to the rise of speculative trade in them and this is a situation well familiar to Soviet citizens, which causes irritation in many but is not dangerous in and of itself. It is merely a matter of "raising prices"....

Nevertheless, any person who endeavors to reach the heart of economic processes feels that there is some danger here. If the functions of the shadow economy could be reduced to a rather harmless equalizing of supply and demand on the consumer market, in the given article there would be nothing worth talking about at all. We must be convinced that its functions in reality are much broader, that the shadow relations penetrate all our economic system and engender lasting social structures within our society and that they comprise the basic specific feature of that stage where we currently are.

As of now we have established that the shadow economy in and of itself has a complementary nature and is a sort of reverse image of the visible "above-water" part of the

economic system described in the textbooks. Having delved deeper, we discover that the shadow economy "in and of itself" does not exist; it functions in an inseparable unity with the economy being studied by students and carries out such an important role that the knowledge gained in the institute largely remains unused in real economic life. For this reason, it would be more correct to speak not about a shadow economy but rather shadow relations in the national economy.

What textbook describes the categories of supply for the cities and the dividing of consumer stocks, about the methods of delivering raw products and preassembled articles, the "shaking out" of capital investments or limits for housing construction and other such things? Certainly they comprise the basic clash in our economic life.

A clear example of the merging of shadow relations with the administrative-economic system is the mafia (organized crime). But there are also many other manifestations of this merger which are less criminal in their massiveness. Without trying to generalize and systematize all such manifestations, we would point merely to the fact that they are based upon the deformation of the functions and content of managerial labor the essence of this is in replacing the social criteria for the efficiency of economic activity by other criteria meeting the interests of individual groups.

From this standpoint, the shadow relations, regardless of their historical causality, represent something very dangerous and harmful for the health of the economic system as a whole. In order to assess the scale of their harmfulness, one has merely to recall the BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline], the diverting of the Siberian rivers, the spread of containerized vegetable storage facilities and the enormous number of other plans which were not adopted with a conscientious approach to their analysis and expert evaluation.

But the harm of the shadow relations is far from exhausted by the irrationality of economic decisions and by direct economic harm. In engendering the permanent social differentiation of the members of society, the symbiosis of the shadow economy with the administrative-economic system<sup>1</sup> assumes a self-replicating character. It encompasses constantly new spheres of activity, infecting the healthy tissue of the economy and multiplying the production of poor quality, resource-intensive products. Ultimately, this leads to the rotting of the economic organism as we are currently witnessing.

The history of the rise and the mechanism of the reproduction of this "symbiosis" is a vast area for fruitful scientific search. Without going into this particularly deeply, we would like to draw attention to certain external but very characteristic traits of the designated mechanism: 1) the retentiveness of the sectorial and departmental priorities (not their presence but primarily the permanency, the invariability); 2) the short-term orientation in taking managerial decisions, the focusing

of efforts on the "crucial" sectors to the detriment of the "secondary," for example, the development of the production and social infrastructure, the protecting of the environment; 3) the excessive tension in the plan quotas and their chronic lack of resources in the production sphere, the permanent necessity of "eliminating bottlenecks"; 4) the erosion of the normative base and the absence of effective supervision over its use; 5) the growing lag in the development of the consumer sphere (including housing construction, the domestic economy and services); 6) the substantial differences in the real purchasing power of the ruble for individual groups of persons and individual territories with the very limited opportunities for moving place of residence; 7) the varying access to the gratis and paid-for goods from the public consumption funds for the inhabitants of different territories, the employees of different sectors and individual contingents of workers; 8) the developed system of protectionism in the providing of jobs which offer better conditions for the application of labor (including both the characteristics of the labor itself as well as all types of received goods) and higher social status.

Are these not the failings of socialism per se? What is the short-term orientation here? the reader would ask. What can the linkage be between the sectorial priorities, the normative base and the impossibility of simply finding a good job? We would be forced to leave the curious reader alone with such questions as this is the subject of a separate and in no way brief discussion. We would merely point out that the listed phenomena have occurred in far from all the socialist countries or in any event they did not assume such a mass nature. Why this happened will soon become clear. For now let us move on to the question of the social stratification of society.

The theorists of Marxism-Leninism quite correctly asserted that mankind moves gradually toward the destruction of classes and with complete validity linked the inevitability of the obliteration of class differences to the increased productive forces of society. The history of modern Europe has persuasively shown this. However, neither the present nor the following generation will obviously be able to live in a completely classless society. It will not be able to do this because the withering away of classes presupposes a complete merging of mental and physical labor and even the most developed industrial countries are still far from this.

Lenin's definition of classes known to every student and provided by him in his work "Velikiy pochin" [The Great Undertaking] at present remains completely constructive. Having delved into the essence of the definition, it is not hard to understand that modern Soviet society is also in no way classless and the acuteness of the domestic political struggle which has broken out in our country is yet another affirmation of this.

In damping the ardor of those fond of bringing out the class affiliation of individual concrete persons and drawing the appropriate organizational conclusions, we

would point out that classes are a category of abstract scientific analysis. The given category can be correctly employed only in a theoretical context which we in the future will endeavor to adhere to.

Thus, what sort of classes do we have? A proletariat? A peasantry? An intelligentsia? Of, possibly, a technocracy? A bureaucratic apparatus? The military? It can be said with certainty that none of the classes known to the founders of Marxism-Leninism exists in modern Soviet society. The proletariat is a class which sells its manpower in exchange for a wage to the owners of the means of production. In our country, a labor market is lacking as well as private ownership of the means of production. A peasant is an independent commodity producer who sells the results of his labor on the market. In the USSR, there are virtually no individual peasant farms of the market type while the kolkhozes do not have the right to fully determine how much of what they will produce or to whom it will be sold at what price. A large portion of them operates at a loss and depends upon subsidies, credits and, consequently, does not have any independence at all.

Without retreating from the posed question, let us turn again to Lenin's definition. It clearly points out that the root of class differences must be sought in production relations. In being guided by this definition, it can be said with certainty that the mass spread of shadow relations in all spheres of social activity creates a particular type of production relations whereby a large group of persons, without possessing private ownership of the means of production, disposes of them with an additional (that is, not corresponding to the actual labor contribution) benefit for themselves and thereby assimilates the labor of the remaining members of society.

"Large groups of people which differ in terms of their place in a historically defined system of social production are called classes...." Is it possible to consider the Soviet model of socialism as a "historically determined system"? It is quite true that all stages in the development of socialism in the USSR, including the present one, were objectively caused. But they are not obligatory for the nations which set out on the path of socialism from a higher starting level. In letting the historians figure out the given problem, we in any event will observe caution and below will speak not about classes but rather trends of social stratification. The persons who obtain additional goods as a result of the functioning of the "symbiosis" may conditionally be called the "upper stratum" (possibly in the future a better term will appear).

A social stratum is an element in the social structure of society which, in contrast to a class structure, can be seen on a concrete empirical level. The "upper stratum," in being rather super or infrasocial, also has completely distinguishable features. For example, it is possible to reply with confidence in the negative to the question of whether a hospital nurse belongs to this stratum when she receives from the parents of a patient a "gratuity" for

additional services or even those which are her duty. The "extraincome" of the nurse has a purely compensatory character. She receives only money that is not paid to her by the state. There is no need for complex figures to prove this as any person so desiring could easily be put in the place of the nurse. On the contrary, a secretary who holds an easy job solely due to connections, even if her income consists of just the wages alone, belongs to the "upper stratum."

By these examples we would emphasize that, in the first place, the disparity between the received "additional goods" to the labor contribution is not necessarily expressed in additional income. This has two aspects. On the one hand, there are the "goods" which can include free time, the possibility of traveling, preferential consumption (orders, departmental sales, trips and so forth), social prestige and so forth. On the other hand, there is the labor, its attractiveness, conditions and so forth. In the second place, the "upper stratum" is a permanent formation within the social structure. It is self-reproducing by creating "more advantageous" jobs and filling them with representatives of this stratum. These jobs are filled by limiting the free access to the jobs on a competitive basis and by the developed system of protectionism. Thirdly, the "upper stratum" is not an independent formation. It exists as an economically significant phenomenon only within the "symbiosis," being caused by it and simultaneously its social base. The "upper stratum" has its representatives in all social groups. It cannot be identified either with the "bureaucratic apparatus," with the "party," or the mafia, the intelligentsia, although, of course, its key element is in the managerial sphere (understood by us in the broad sense).

In fearing that the notions of the so-described "upper stratum" will be excessively hazy, let us recall once again that a majority of the agents in the shadow relations, even if they act in the role of "sellers" or "distributors," are not classified in the "upper stratum," for the conformity of the degree of consumption to the degree of socially useful labor is for them observed on an average social level.

As the "upper stratum" is not so numerous and as it "exploits" the remaining members of society, and its activities lead the economic system to degradation, it is essential to destroy it as a class, and then a new life begins, so say the supporters of decisive measures in thirsting for changes. And in part they will be correct as such a posing of the question is not devoid of validity. However, from the scientific viewpoint, it needs clarification.

Just as it is impossible to destroy the class of the bourgeoisie without destroying capitalism, the "upper stratum" can be destroyed only together with the "symbiosis," that is, having undermined the economic basis of its existence. But what does the destruction of the "symbiosis" mean? What social forces will assume the carrying out of this task? Is it possible in principle?

In the search for an answer to the listed questions we have been able to establish that this system did not occur accidentally but, on the contrary, in a very natural manner. And precisely from the viewpoint of historical patterns one can speak at present about its further fate.

Before setting out to discuss the given question, we must make the following qualifications. In the first place, in using the term "socialism," we will have in mind real socialism and only that variety of it which has formed from an economy with an initially low level of development for the productive forces. (Virtually all the nations of the so-called socialist camp would be considered in this variety.) Secondly, the political economy (or, if you like, economic theory) of real socialism based on a low level of the productive forces and which for a number of reasons (which will be described below) has remained almost unanalyzed. For this reason, we will have to rely on our own ideas on the nature of this specific social system and its genesis. Thus, in reflecting on socialism, we have concluded that its nature contains the prerequisites for the development of shadow relations:

- 1) The thorough state control of the economy with the slightest miscalculations naturally creates the grounds for a "supplementary" shadow business; 2) the lack of a natural mechanism for equalizing the technical level and the production conditions places extremely high demands on the quality of the normative base and with its unsatisfactory quality makes the producers closely dependent upon the arbitrariness of the managerial bodies; 3) the noncommercial nature of investment, along with an orientation toward full employment, prevents the establishing of a necessary reserve for the rapid restructuring of the production structure and for this reason even a slight economic imbalance leads to a chronic, total deficit in the production sphere and then up the chain in the consumption sphere. The deficit is a rich medium for shadow relations; 4) the significant scale of the direct redistribution of assets on a gratis basis (in the form of investments, subsidies, measures of social protection and so forth) between the sectors, regions, groups of the population and so forth put at the disposal of the managerial personnel the material and financial resources which with poor supervision over their use can be turned into an object of shadow manipulations.

These organic properties of the socialist economic system are merely the prerequisites. They become the real reason for the genesis of shadow relations only against a background of a low culture of management and economic activity as a whole.<sup>2</sup> And culture, as is known, cannot be quickly acquired. This is created over the decades. In those comparatively backward semiagrarian nations (the USSR, China) where the transition to socialism occurred in the form of an abrupt jump, such a culture could not be prepared for by previous development. For this reason certain particular features of socialism were apparent in their negative model.

The economic development of our country, in addition to the listed common prerequisites, stands out in features which exacerbate these negative manifestations. Among these a particular place is held by the cultural and historical traditions and we will not focus on these but rather concentrate all attention on the economic aspects.

In the first place, the industrialization and depeasantization of the countryside with an orientation at large-scale industrial (including military) production, having legitimized the inequality between city and countryside, between producer and consumer, gave rise to a chronic, economically unjustified and ever-increasing lag in the consumer sphere. As a result, an extensive field of activity appeared for the supplementing shadow economy.

Secondly, the bringing together of the industrially developed and backward territories into a single economic organism gave rise to the massive flows of the redistribution of resources and these became a subject of shadow business.

Thirdly, the size of our economic system, its complexity and heterogeneity greatly impede supervision over the activities of the centralized managerial apparatus. In this manner, prerequisites are created for manipulating the standards and for all sorts of abuses and shadow machinations.

Finally, the tendency toward leveling in wages and the absence of effective interest on the part of the economic leaders and workers make any supervision out of place and ineffective.

Now it is understandable why the shadow relations have gained such strong development precisely in the USSR and China, where the conditions for the rise of socialism were similar. Just what was this development? How and when did this transition of quantity into quality occur, and when did the shadow relations get turned from a foreign body into an inseparable part of the economic organism? These questions await an answer. In setting them side, we still should say something about the history of the ensuing "symbiosis."

The period of its genesis as of now has a rather hazy time framework in our understanding. Clearly, this is within the limits of the mid-1950s and the beginning of the 1960s. In linking up with the legal economy, the shadow relations, like an epidemic, spread at a high speed. By the beginning of the 1980s, the "symbiosis" had reached its apex of development and simultaneously approached a critical mass. The mechanism of its reproduction was made the mechanism for the reproduction of the economic system as a whole.

But just what does all this mean?—the fatigued reader would ask next. It means a great deal, we would reply, appealing to his patience.

The entry of "symbiosis" into an age of maturity means the malignant degeneration of the entire economic

organism. Let us mention just one essential feature of the designated degeneration which has assumed a total nature and for this reason is noticeable, as they say, to the "naked eye."

This feature is the persistent imbalance in the group and social interests in the system of managerial motivations. When group interests contradict one another and at the same time the end goals of social development, this is not so terrible. On the contrary, in colliding and in reciprocally destroying one another, they form an equilibrium corresponding to the interests of society as a whole and thus assist progress. The misfortune comes if this does not happen, if the sum of group interests outweighs the social and forces the economy along a stalemate trajectory.

Precisely this situation was predominant in the 1970s. All attempts to turn the economy toward man, to increase the share of the group B sectors and to increase the actual priority of consumption were doomed ahead of time to collapse because these extremely important measures for society as a whole did not fit into the mechanism of the reproduction of "symbiosis" which opposed it. The pathologic symptom of group rule as a whole encompassed the production management sphere. The notorious departmental approach was only a particular instance. The main (universal) essence of the symptom was that the leading function of management was not the improving of production but rather the semishadow activities to ensure better conditions for the application of labor for individuals, collectives of brigades, shops, sectors and so forth.

In other words, the efforts of all levels of management workers were aimed predominantly at "forcing out" plans, resources, assets, standards, that is, at establishing the external conditions and not a rational organization of the production process itself. Such a method of "achieving production successes" during the period of maturity of "symbiosis" was significantly easier and in many instances the only available. As a result, the transition of the economy to a path of intensification became unfeasible as the mechanism of its reproduction assumed here a struggle to acquire resources and not their economic utilization.

Thus, on the one hand, the structural paralysis and the impossibility of a consumer reorientation in the national economy weakened the effectiveness of the human factor about which so much has been written while, on the other hand, the impossibility of intensification and the depletion of accessible reserves for growth put a limit on the expansion and qualitative improvement of production. In the literal sense there was a "plugging up" of the productive forces. The "symbiosis" had depleted the sources of its previous existence. Perestroika became inevitable.

At present, when the hopes for rapid success in the economic reforms being carried out have not come to be and the nation has ended up on the brink of an economic

crisis, many are inclined to see the main reason for the setbacks in the mistakes and miscalculations of our leadership (not counting, of course, the resistance from the covert and obvious enemies of perestroika). Since this widespread confusion pushes the public into the false and futile path of searching for those to blame, we are forced to state that in its spontaneous development, perestroika has assumed the direction stemming from its objective prerequisites. The basic direction (and this is now already clearly distinguishable) corresponds to the patterns of class struggle.

The objective prerequisite was the crisis of "symbiosis." The extensive nature of its reproduction made it possible to extend its activities only in breadth. Because of the natural limitations to such a spread, the economic basis for the flourishing of the "upper stratum" was ultimately undermined. Contradictions became exacerbated and the balance of forces changed within the "upper stratum" (the perestroika process disclosed its heterogeneity). In resolving these contradictions and simultaneously sacrificing certain of its members, it had to take active steps for its own self-preservation and as a result of this a new balance of forces gained a legitimate status. And so a socioclass scenario of perestroika created not by us but by history.

It is the task of historians to fill out this schematic scenario with living persons and colors while our immediate aim is to concretize it on the economic and sociological level.

The heterogeneity of the "upper stratum" is a direct consequence of the heterogeneity of "symbiosis" itself as this brought together two opposing economic principles: the shadow-market and the planned-administrative. In a centralized economic management system, these principles are unequal in legal terms as the shadow-market exists in a semilegal status. For this reason, the "upper stratum" naturally is divided into two substrata. The planned administrative elements prevail in the organizational and economic functions of one substratum and its representatives receive a portion of the additional goods in the form of high social status. The other substratum assumes the carrying out of shadow market functions and acquires additional goods through illegal channels, gradually exposing itself to the risk of unmasking.

At the moment of the rise of "symbiosis," the planned administrative principle was predominant. Then, in keeping with development as the critical mass was approached and as economic difficulties and deficits built up, the shadow market principle intensely increased its proportional amount. As a result, the unequal social status of the representatives of the shadow market substratum was in a flagrant discrepancy to their real economic role.

The crisis of the system which simultaneously became a "crisis of the upper levels" turned the establishing of the

legal equality between the two substrata into an economic necessity. Only the legalizing of the shadow market channels of appropriation could ensure a relative broadening of the flows of the redistribution of goods in favor of the "upper stratum." And only such an expansion could extend the existence of the "upper stratum" under the conditions of economic stagnation.

This also happened in the course of the economic reforms carried out "from above" (regardless of the will and the subjective intentions of those favoring their realization). There was no economic revival. Even on the contrary, there was a decline and disorganization of production. The explanation was a simple one. In the process of the functioning of "symbiosis," the objective criteria for assessing economic activity and the content of economic ties had become warped to such a degree that the results of the labor efforts of each economic principal (from the individual employee to the collectives, sectors and so forth) and their social recognition in the form of consumer goods provided in exchange for labor depended not so much upon the rational direction (from the viewpoint of society as a whole) of these efforts as upon the advantage of the external (in relation to the principal) conditions for the application of labor.<sup>3</sup>

It is precisely because of these conditions that the principals enter into so-called economic relations which are, as a rule, of a semishadow nature. The broadening of economic activity within the limits of "symbiosis," with the initial shortage of resources and a significant differentiation in the technical production level, leads to a situation where the external conditions for the application of labor become the dominant factor for the increased prosperity of the employees and collectives.

The achieving of favorable external conditions, in being formally facilitated by the granting of economic independence, is turned into the main core of economic activity on all levels while rational (from the viewpoint of society) labor efforts are moved into the background.<sup>4</sup> The improved organization of production within the competence of each management level and the seeking out of inner reserves become not pressing. For this reason, regardless of the possible positive structural shifts (the reduction in the loss-producing and technically backward types of production) "the marketization" of the "symbiosis" has entailed a further deterioration of the economic situation. A reduction in the internal production activeness is a natural and inevitable result from the policy being carried out of broadening economic liberties.

How is it that the market does not destroy the "symbiosis" and does not undermine the bases of its existence? On the one hand, it eliminates the bureaucratic apparatus of administrative management and, on the other, legalizes the shadow relations forcing them to serve social utility, the adherents of economic democracy argue. They would be completely right if it were possible to fall asleep with the dominance of "symbiosis" and wake up with a market. But such economic miracles do

not come about even in the imagination of the supporters of market reforms let alone in reality. And in reality the centralized management system cannot be replaced in an instant. In one way or another a transition is needed to the market.

Neither the theory nor the practice of market transformations in the socialist countries provides grounds for confidence that these transformations can be successfully carried out and that there is no limit to the implanting of commercial relations into the social system of initially the socialist type. The hurry and the unpreparedness of the market reforms being carried out in the USSR says nothing about the actual desire of their initiators to achieve the declared result. Hence, the transition to the market can last for decades. Whatever it is—protracted or brief—in the process of this transition: a) the "symbiosis" is altered but does not cease to exist (and this has been uniformly pointed out by the survival of the previous mechanism of reproduction the characteristic traits of which have been enumerated at the start of the article); b) an economic crisis inevitably occurs (its essence has been described above); c) the "upper stratum" holds on to the ruling positions, in gradually shifting a portion of its "administrative" representatives into the sphere of profitable legal business.

Just a minute! Certainly, the "bureaucratic apparatus" has put up fierce resistance to the introduction of the market and does not want to surrender its power and privileges and hence the "upper stratum" finds the market not to its advantage, our stubborn opponents will again argue. A significant portion of the apparatus workers is not part of the "upper stratum" and without possessing real power cannot create tangible obstacles to carrying out the innovations coming "from above." For this reason, the "resistance of the apparatus" is merely a struggle of the "planning-administrative" substratum against the "market" substratum for its share of the goods, that is, a struggle within the "upper stratum." As a result of this struggle a portion of the sharply increased legal income of the "marketeers" in one way or another becomes available to the "administrators." The transition to the market conforms fully to the interests of the "upper stratum," since it increases the share of social wealth redistributable to its favor at the expense of legalizing (incidentally, far from complete) the shadow activities within the context of "symbiosis."

But what about the secretary with the easy job?—you might ask—certainly she might lose her job in the course of reducing the personnel. Have no fear. She will be welcomed to work in a cooperative and will even be offered a higher salary without increasing the amount of work to be done. The establishing of cooperatives is a widespread form of altering the "symbiosis" without in any way eliminating its main essence.

But there are various types of cooperatives, say the supporters of decisive market changes not wanting to give up, and the democratization of domestic political life combined with economic pluralism accompanying

the transition to the market are one of the irrefutable proofs of social progress. Does democratization, both political and in the economic sphere, also play into the hands of the "upper stratum"?

It is hard to provide a single answer to this argument. Democratization has actually provided the possibility for many persons to realize their creative abilities and reserves of business entrepreneurship for the good of society. There are actually different types of cooperatives. Some of them (a significant minority) can rightly be considered examples of the effective socialist organization of production. Conditions have been established at individual enterprises (including cooperative ones) for operating at full force and for obtaining the corresponding remuneration for labor. However, many contingents of employees have merely gained an opportunity to "earn well" without excessively extending their labor efforts. Other contingents, on the contrary, have been deprived of such an opportunity. What conclusion must be drawn from this?

First let us put down the facts. The democratization of economic life has opened up a way to self-realization for many persons who are not among the "upper stratum," but on the part of the latter democratization was a measure forced to provide social support for the inevitable perestroika. The role of the labor collectives which in the course of the changes ended up under relatively favorable conditions is analogous to the role of the labor aristocracy in the balance of political forces in a bourgeois society. The "fattening up" of individual worker contingents (including the intelligentsia) is a traditional method for maintaining political stability in a class society without touching on its main contradictions. So democratization for the "upper stratum" was not the end but rather the means for achieving the end.

In addition, democracy is just the application of an equal right to all, that is, equality in relation to the law. Economic democracy with a very poorly elaborated administrative-economic legislation devolves into economic arbitrariness and the disorganization of production. Both are closely tied to the use of economic liberties by the representatives of the "upper stratum" in their own interests. This is one aspect of the question.

On the other hand, no one has shown that democracy and economic pluralism are possible solely under the conditions of a market and all the more that a transition to the market is a guarantee for positive shifts in social life (the increased crime, the absolute decline in the standard of living of individual groups of the population and the armed ethnic conflicts bespeak the reverse).

Let the reader draw his own conclusions. He will probably have other questions as well. Some of the questions raised still remain unanswered. The author makes no claim to any finality of judgment. Nevertheless, the analysis made makes it possible to draw positive conclusions on a practical and scientific level.

Those who hope to gain any formula for destroying the "symbiosis" will be disappointed. In order to draw up such formulas, it is essential to have a full understanding of the class structure of our society, to study in detail the mechanism for the reproduction of the "symbiosis" (and hence the entire national economy) and analyze the historical patterns of its development. The solution of these scientific problems depends not merely upon the zeal of the researchers. The "symbiosis" itself should reach such a stage of decomposition when its past becomes completely clear and light is shed on the future. Any class society establishes mechanisms of mimicry which impede its thorough scientific analysis. It is only on the threshold of a new stage of development, when the old mimicry mechanisms are destroyed in giving way to new ones, that the true nature of the departing society is revealed to anyone who wishes to study it.

At present, in practice one thing remains: a reasonable curtailment of economic liberties, a strengthening of the planning principle in national economic management combined with the spread of effective systems to materially encourage labor.

Is this a tactical retreat? Or a change in strategy? No. Above all, they are imperative measures which are far from sufficient to achieve economic stabilization. In the future, if the nation's leadership again decides to broaden the economic independence of the enterprises, the moral and economic harm caused here to society under the conditions of the dominance of this "symbiosis" can be prevented only in observing an obligatory demand: equal conditions should be ensured for the application of labor and for economic self-realization in all sectors of the national economy, for all enterprises, labor collectives and individuals. Only then is it possible to speak about a transition to an actually efficient type of economic reproduction which would bring Soviet society to the forward limits of social progress.

#### Footnotes

1. Below simply "symbiosis."
2. This culture includes not only the skill of the managers but also an effective system of monitoring their activities by society as a whole, including legal standards, democratic institutions of local self-government and so forth.
3. For the worker this is the types of performed (upon instructions of the foreman or brigade leader) jobs and the assessment of them, the length of enforced stoppages and overtime conditions. For a brigade or shop this is the availability of the necessary products, raw materials and equipment, the tautness of the plan, the "advantage" of one or another type of product to be manufactured and so forth. For the enterprise as a whole, this is the technical level of production, the volume of allocated resources, the prices for products and raw materials, the standards for the forming of funds and so forth.
4. With better starting positions (good technical equipment, the process of increasing prices for the products

and so forth) an improvement in the production process loses its primary significance, as there is an easier path to economic success by employing good external market conditions. With less advantageous positions, an improvement in production from the viewpoint of the collective is extremely difficult, as it requires efforts not repaid by a possible increase in the wage funds.

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#### Power and Property

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[Article by Vadim Valeryevich Radyayev, candidate of economic sciences and senior science associate at the Economics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He is the author of the book "Otchuzhdeniye truda. Iстория современности" [The Alienation of Labor. The History of Modern Times] (1989, co-author). This is the first time he appears in our journal; Ovsey Irmovich Shkaratan, doctor of historical sciences, professor and senior science associate at the Ethnography Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He is the author of the books "Problemy sotsialnoy strukturny rabochego klassa" [Problems of the Social Structure of the Working Class], (1970), "Etnosotsialnyye problemy goroda" [Ethnoscocial Problems of the City] (1986, co-author) and many others. He has appeared repeatedly in our journal]

[Text] The ordinary Soviet person, right up to the university professor, has for decades lived in a world of myths and legends the start to which was made by the great mythmaker Stalin. The world which surrounded the Soviet man was seemingly split into two. In one part was the finest nation with wise leaders and a happy populus; in the other, the daily realities of communal apartments, bad, ersatz food, physicians who did not know how to cure and officials to whom a bribe had to be given. Between the Scylla of myths and the Charybdis of daily realities there lived both persons who believed and who did not believe what surrounded them and what they were told. Somewhere far off over there books were being written by sovietologists in which there was a good deal of truth. In the nation there were heretics located on the two poles of the social ladder. On the one hand, there were certain workers of the CPSU Central Committee and on the other the highbrowed dissidents who by unfathomable ways gained information about the society surrounding them. But until the breakthrough made by M. Gorbachev with his glasnost and democratization (and at present timid and incomplete), the nation still lacked that critical mass of intellectualism which was essential for resolving the fate of the nation. At present this "critical mass" has begun to build up, however the answers to the questions raised by life have remained and continue to remain diverse.

A majority of those who dispute the existing system of social relations and the existing orders term them barracks, feudal socialism. A predominant majority of the authors nevertheless recognizes that the terrible society, with bloody despotic orders, millions of victims in peacetime years and an unprecedented level of exploiting the workers and peasants was all the same a socialist society, albeit a deformed one with deviations from a certain standard. Also widespread are the judgments that this order, this system is the direct result of applying the teachings of Marx—Lenin and a consequence of the violent embodiment of a theoretical utopia as a counter to the normal course of life. Our approach is somewhat different in that we will endeavor to provide an objective analysis of the established particular, independent method of production.

In the USSR and then in a whole series of other nations on different continents, a new social system was formed which was neither capitalist nor socialist. This was a system with particular, persistently reproducing features which marked the establishing of a new, independent socioeconomic formation. It was based upon the destruction of private capitalist property (as a rule, along with its representatives) and the direct (violent, extraeconomic) nationalization by the state of the decisive mass of the means of production. This system could be termed etatocratic.

Etatocracy (literally, the power of the state, from the French and Greek) is not a chain of deformations and deviations but rather an independent stage and at the same time a parallel branch in the historical development of modern society with its own particular laws. Etatocracy is widespread in the modern world. In the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, the new system triumphed after the violent shattering of the People's Democracies at the end of the 1940s. At the same time, etatocracy independently grew in the societies which had not known mature bourgeois relations and had followed a different historical path than did Europe, that is, China, Korea, Cuba and Vietnam and this confirms the nonaccidental nature of its rise. Etatocracy formed the basis of socioeconomic systems clearly in virtually all the nations of a noncapitalist orientation and these were nations with such a dissimilar level of development, management mechanism and sociopolitical system that it was far from easy to articulate the universal and specific elements of its relations. The etatocratic societies also differed in terms of the degree of the nationalizing of property, the level of the concentration of economic power, the degree of openness in relation to the external market and the role of parties and leaders and the scale of influence of the repressive bodies. But in these societies, both domestic and foreign observers noted the same pathologic phenomenon, the bureaucratization, the excessive power of the administrative apparatus and the strengthening of the state with the virtually complete absence of a civil society. Here it is a question of a particular type of bureaucracy which does not have similar forms in bourgeois countries and which concentrates in its hands both political and economic power.

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Thus, the first thing we might doubt is the obligatory identification of society with the predominance of state ownership with socialism. The search for historical analogies rather persuasively shows the presence in the past of societies of a nonsocialist type based precisely on state ownership. It is a question of the method of production which K. Marx called Asiatic, a particular socioeconomic formation which existed for millennia over enormous territories. Modern Soviet authors have concluded that the Ancient European and Ancient Eastern early class societies were different types of socioeconomic structures which appeared as a result of fundamentally different evolutionary processes [1]. Historical development has always followed a nonlinear path. The path from primitivism in far from all places led to relations of antic slavery and then to feudalism and capitalism. In many societies, development occurred completely differently.

The very term "Asiatic method of production" is not accurate since such societies existed on all continents. More precise is the term employed in recent years by certain Soviet orientalists "the state method of production." This system was based upon a hierarchy which controlled power and the law. Private ownership of the means of production and land was virtually absent. Predominant was collective ownership of the rural agricultural commune and the state embodied by the supreme ruler (the khan, tsar and pharaoh).

The owners of land were simultaneously the supreme ruler, the local authorities, the commune as a whole and individual commune members. The land, in essence, was property belonging to no one. It was precisely and only power which opened access to the possession of resources and to their distribution. Only by performing administrative functions was it possible to become individually rich. As a whole, in such societies, power not only arose before the ownership of land but ownership became isolated as a function of power. Here the content of ownership was determined by the structure of power relations. As a result, a particular type of relations was formed and this we call "power—property" [2].

In the arising social structure (supreme ruler—local leaders—the commune members—the unfree population), legal distinctions stood above economic ones. This was because society was divided not into classes but rather into class-like groups defined by the state. As a whole, social status was determined not by property distinctions but rather by power and prestige. Precisely power and prestige formed the highest social values while wealth, knowledge and social origin could serve only as means for achieving the main goal.

The chief principal exploiter was the state and it stood above society as a gigantic, unassailable divine force. The ruling bureaucratic strata did not separate themselves from the state, in enjoying its fruits and formed something like a ruling class. The aristocracy actually

was completely incorporated into the bureaucracy. The maintaining of power was the chief concern of the rulers. For maintaining the stability of the existing structure, the state relied on a system of corporations (the commune, caste or clan). In turn, the state ensured the external security of the nation and defended the population against local tyranny.

The basic form of exploiting relations was the centralized confiscation of surplus product in the form of the so-called rent tax which realized simultaneously the function of ownership of the land (rent) and the function of state power (the tax). (The main feature of the state method of production is manifested in the indivisibility of these functions.) This tax had a universal character for the free population of the nation, including the officials of the state apparatus. The officials involved in power could accumulate their own wealth. The differentiation and accumulation of property occurred also from below, as a result of the gradual enrichment of the commune leaders, the userers and certain of the most successful merchants and artisans. But there was not to be the full development of private property. The trend toward privatization came under the strict supervision of the state which not only protected the treasury against "selfish parasites" but also in every possible way contributed to a reduction in property differences by the sale of ranks and the confiscating of large estates.

Of course, the given method of production existed in diverse historical forms. But behind the external diversity one can see the essential traits of a socioeconomic system the homeostatic state of which was shattered (and very painfully) by the bourgeois colonial invasion.

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Let us return to the modern etatocratic system. History has a good memory, although nothing is precisely repeated. With the establishment of the etatocracy, historical development as it were put down a ring of a giant spiral on which societies of the power type were again formed. History was again following its own nonlinear path. The prebourgeois and early bourgeois societies were transformed (evolutionarily or as a result of anti-capitalist revolutions) into capitalist or etatocratic systems. Etagocracy does not follow capitalism without fail and does not stand above it on the ladder of social progress. In fact, this system has not produced productive forces that are more developed in comparison with capitalism, it has not provided the population with a higher level of material prosperity, it has not eliminated the hired nature of the labor force and has not raised man to a truly new spiritual height. In it there are exploiters and exploited, a particular system of standards and values, particular ideas of social justice and particular economic laws. We have chosen the Soviet Union as a general model for it can be considered a classic variation which in addition for a long time was intensely imposed on other countries and peoples as the only path of progress and prosperity.

How in fact does the latent essence of this society appear which for decades persuaded others and itself of its purist socialisticness? Let us first isolate the determining traits in the specific system of economic relations. These were formed on the basis of a highly economic nationalization, and the violent assimilation by the state of a predominant mass of the means of production.

In its general form, state ownership is seemingly anonymous. The state realizes this ownership in ceding it to its departments (ministries, state committees). And state property as such is gradually turned into the property of the departments which possess a lion's share of the state resources. There arises a departmental monopoly which knows no limit or even the slightest element of competition. And while capitalism comparatively rapidly went beyond the monopoly of giant corporations, etatocracy has reformed the entire economic system on a principle of the monopoly of sectorial departments. Theoretically this was justified by the rationalism of production organization and by the advisability of concentrating resources. For this reason it can be considered that the state monopolistic method of production is the economic basis of an etatocratic society.

Behind departmental property, in turn, are concealed the narrow group interests of the bureaucratic apparatus and the affiliated privileged strata which have the opportunity of employing the state in their own corporative goals. Here an important role is played by interests of personal appropriation. But they all are subordinate, as a rule, to the crucial group interest of preserving and strengthening their ruling position. Ownership of the means of production here in a formal legalistic sense belongs supposedly to all the workers. But they are not the owners and do not consider themselves as such. The joining of man with the means of production alienated from him has assumed the form of state hiring and this is in no way better and in certain regards worse than the capitalist one. Under capitalism the state in a certain form operates as an intermediary and a limiter of the claims by both parties. In our case, the state both hires, mediates and limits but, as a rule, only one party, the hired worker. It is no accident that in our national income 1.5-fold fewer funds is provided for wages than in the United States while the wage levels differ by approximately 10-fold. And if one understands by exploitation of the workers the ratio of the shares of product taken from the worker and left to him in the form of wages and the measures of social protection, then exploitation in the USSR, even according to the official data, is much higher. This is of an indirect nature and is linked to the centralized redistribution of the income of the enterprises and the population between the social groups. The instruments of this exploitation are: reduced wages governed by the noneconomic criteria of the importance of the sector and the enterprise; a rigid nonmarket system of price formation; tax benefits; the rates for forming the enterprise funds (including wages and for social needs) and so forth. This is an integrated developed system of economic and political levers for assimilating the unpaid labor of others.

Even ownership of one's own manpower has ceased to have a personal nature. This has been transformed into state property. Is it possible to speak about the personal nature of this property with the existence of a passport system and residence rules, the accounting of continuous labor employment, the rigid control of leaving for work and residence outside the USSR and, finally, the direct assigning of workers to a specific plant or kolkhoz? The state regulates the basic flows of worker movement (the "labor resource" and "human factor" are probably the most suitable designations of the role of man in the etatocratic system of production). The training and retraining of the labor force is also at state expense and according to the unified state model. We must also not forget that for a majority state hiring remains the predominant or sole source of the means of production.

Even with a superficial examination of the economic relations in etatocracy, one is immediately struck by their irrationality. On virtually all levels, economic activity appears as a chain of inefficient decisions with previously unbalanced plans being imposed, outbursts of actual worker initiative suppressed, expensive and extremely scarce resources squandered, gigantic and completely unnecessary projects erected and a universal struggle for the harvest carried out after which the finished product is allowed to calmly rot at the warehouses. From a purely economic viewpoint, this picture is actually inexplicable and not only from the viewpoint of high theory but often simple common sense. (Not everything is written off to inability and incompetence, although these have never been in short supply.) But we must not give way to the enticement of explaining everything by this apparent rationality. Any absurd thing ultimately has terrestrial roots and in the given instance everything has been very reasonably established from the standpoint of certain interests.

The problem is that total state ownership arose on the basis of political power and was determined by its structure. The main feature of the economic system surrounding us is that it is a direct continuation of political power. Politics and ideology here are indisputably higher than economics. The so-called base and superstructure have changed places. Moreover, their separation seemingly has lost its sense. The place of "pure" economic ties has been assumed by a particular type of relations which can be called power—property. Here economic relations lose their independence. Policy invades their very content and often has the decisive, formative element. In this system the secretary of a party committee (rayon and higher) not only takes an active part in the economic processes but also in many areas dictates his will to the economic leaders. The sectorial ministries and departments, these powerful representatives of the state, are merely considered to be the economic executive bodies. They operate like political bodies. And here not being particularly concerned for the legal niceties; for the creators of the law are the departments themselves.

A particular feature of the economy of etatocracy as a system is a fundamental absence of independent economic laws. The general trend of production is predetermined by the willful actions of the haves. Of course, economic limits do not disappear but they are rather mobile. For economic efficiency here is not the goal and criterion for assessing the results of economic (including management) activity. The approach to the economy of an etatocratic system using measures of economic rationalism (efficient—inefficient, profitable—loss) is doomed ahead of time to failure. The business principals do not endeavor to increase the economic efficiency of their activities (all the more for all society). The main goal of the etatocracy is the reproduction and expansion of its own power and this is not directly dependent upon the scale and methods of consuming the resources. This does not mean that complete arbitrariness and anarchy prevail, for arbitrary actions have their own laws. And voluntarism in the economy in being taken to the extreme is capable of ending up (and is already ending up) against its creators. As for the economic sphere itself, under these conditions it is formed into a sufficiently ordered system of relations which follows its own logic.

The essence of the socioeconomic system can be comprehended if the basic law of its functioning and development is found. For many years any honest researcher could not fail to notice the striking contradiction between the proclaimed basic law (a rise in material prosperity and free harmonious development of all members of society) and the realities of life. Clearly production was subordinate to a completely different goal. And it seemed that the basic economic law of etatocracy consisted in the constant self-growth (strengthening and multiplying) of state property. Planning and administration were subordinate to the growth of state ownership as this conformed most to the interests of the etatocracy and the entire structure of the national economy was essentially focused on this. This entire race for indicators was merely a means for reinforcing and strengthening political power, for increasing its internal and international authority.

The state was able to maintain a relatively favorable economic dynamics by squandering enormous resources. Initially, the chief labor resources were consumed. Then the compulsory system within and outside the barbed wire began to fail and the rapacious squandering of natural resources became the main source. When the limit of the "gift" raw material came into view and the distinguishable appearance of ecological disaster arose, the "normal" state of stagnation began to slip into crisis.

But the final failure of the etatocratic system was disclosed under the conditions of the transition to a modern information economy and high technology. It is impossible to achieve a lasting success with the aid of semi-indentured labor where flexible and dynamic forms of organizing production are needed. The main motivating force of the "computer revolution" is the scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs, managers, that is, the technocratic elite.

But can persons with university education diplomas do much in a country where they are depressed by their work and domestic irregularity, where they are equated in wages with medium- and low-skilled workers, and where they are constantly shown their place (and this place is far from the most respected)? When the measure of professionalism is considered to be the art of fulfilling the orders from the leadership, what can one demand from a predominant majority of the specialists? While on the eve of World War II in industry the salaries of engineers were more than twice those of the workers, now engineers without managerial functions earn much less than the workers.

The actual coalition of upper managers with the broad masses of workers in unskilled labor and protected by barriers of departmental protectionism has gradually turned us into a society of semiprofessionals and quarter professionals. In fearing the loss of their social support, the conservative elements of the ruling elite have prevented a strengthening of the positions of the technocratic groups and have inhibited technological progress. Characteristic is a resistance to increasing the share of workers engaged in mental labor in large cities and resistance to attempts at the deindustrialization of the cities which are centers of national culture and human capital. The policy is being continued of supporting gigantic enterprises which are the focus of unskilled manpower; on the other hand, the small firms and cooperatives producing an intellectual product are experiencing enormous difficulties. All of this is a consequence of the struggle of the etatocratic system for self-preservation.

Thus, in the USSR with the elimination of private property and classes, power—property relationships emerged in the forefront. Here the ruling elite was seen by a portion of the researchers as a new ruling class. This idea was first voiced in the prewar years by B. Rizzi and J. Burnham and in the 1950s by M. Djilas, St. Ossowski and others [3]. Quite recently a similar notion has been proposed in the USSR by S. Andreyev who has asserted that the managerial apparatus possesses all the features of a social class and creates for itself the possibility of appropriating alien labor which does not belong to it using its position in the system of social production [4]. However, we feel that in fact the etatocracy (the given concept is broader than the bureaucracy) is not a "new class," since it, although capable of utilizing state property for selfish purposes to acquire a surplus number of goods in life, is incapable of disposing of the means of production fully as its own and exploiting them as its own in the production process. The etatocracy reproduces itself not through a particular economic relation to the means of production but rather through its monopoly position in the system of power and through its "ownership of the state." Here the etatocracy is not distinguishable from the state. For this reason, we feel that those researchers are correct who view the rulers not as an economic class but rather as a distinct social stratum [5].

The view of Soviet society as an etatocratic one assumes that in it the determinants are not the dichotomous class relations but rather the stratified relations of inequality over the place in the "power—property" system. This does not mean that relations involving the means of production are to be excluded from among the factors of social differentiation. But these are expressed not in the opposition of "owner—nonowner" but rather in a continuum reflecting the degree of the appropriation of these means depending upon position in the power hierarchy and which forms the core of the entire social structure. The ruling strata form the etatocracy which disposes of state property while a majority of the workers is alienated from economic-political power. The actions of the etatocracy are sanctified by the ideology of "carrying out the will of the people." But its group interests show a constant trend toward separation.

In the Soviet Union the etatocracy can be rather clearly traced empirically (if the corresponding information would be made available) through an analysis of the nomenklatura system. The nomenklatura is the principle of a hierarchically organized structure and the support frame of the etatocracy. It includes the leaders of the state administrative bodies and their structural subdivisions, the leaders and instructors in the party and all-Union public organizations; the leaders of the enterprises and institutions in the state and kolkhoz sectors of the national economy; the generals and senior officers of the army, state security and public safety bodies. Undoubtedly, among the leaders of varying rank there are progressively thinking persons and conservatives dedicated to the cause, careerists, qualified professionals and semiprofessionals. But their belonging to the etatocratic strata is determined by the objective position in the official power structure.

The etatocracy is not an aggregate of closed strata. The representatives of literally all social groups in principle can get into it. The indispensable conditions are political conviction and personal loyalty to the leadership. So vertical mobility does exist although this is almost completely subordinate to the will of the apparatus and the promoting of the "successful" individuals occurs not as a result of a competitive movement from below but rather on the basis of a specific choice from above (the necessary number of workers, kolkhoz members, men, women and so forth). The carefully regulated social mobility guarantees replacement with general stability in the entire power structure. In the etatocratic system, education and skill, entrepreneurship and person wealth do not guarantee their possessor a high social position. On the contrary, the status and privileges of a man are determined by his place in the power structure and this place opens up for him and his heirs easier routes to knowledge and material prosperity.

In the press information has begun to appear on the privileges of the nomenklatura. This is the truth but not the whole truth. In practical terms, in the ideal instance

for such a society all people hold a certain social "ecological niche" which guarantees the receiving of a definite sum of goods and services. The effectiveness of labor here is of secondary importance. The main thing is the profession, position, sector and even the region, city where a person lives. (Characteristically, for example, a very good and qualified worker, for instance, in light industry can receive significantly less wages and other goods than a very average worker at a defense plant.) The sanatoriums and vacation homes, the quality of the products which can be acquired and the possibility of obtaining nonstandard treatment—all of this has been a matter of departmental allocation over the decades.

The general stability of society was maintained precisely by the system of social guarantees for the broad inferior strata of the population, that is, by establishing virtually full employment (including for the mass of unskilled labor); low but dependable income for working at less than full capacity; confidence and tranquility provided by the absence of competition; the receiving of a minimum (albeit poor quality) social goods (free education, public health and so forth). The etatocracy maintained an unique union with the less qualified and educated groups of the population over the head of its most educated, qualified and creative part.

Such relations have substantially influenced the entire system of organizing life. The civil ties which only were established after the elimination of serfholding and the obtaining of definite rights of self-administration by the cities and rural communes gradually died out. Primarily because by the 1930s independent principles of economic life had disappeared. All workers had been turned into state servants. It was the state which decided and even now decides what enterprise is to be built where, what closed down, how many apartments of what type are to be built, what the street width will be, what the children are to be taught in schools and so forth. Naturally, as a result, the independence of the population died out and the people simply lost the habit of taking independent decisions and bearing independent responsibility for them.

A characteristic trait of the system was the saving of funds in the reproduction and development of man. Ending up in a particularly difficult situation (relatively and sometimes also absolutely) were the highly skilled workers and intelligentsia (engineers, teachers, physicians, scientists) who to a significant degree were deprived of the opportunity to extensively reproduce their culture. The problem of the semieducated and semi-intellectual is one of the tragic consequences of the etatocratic administration. As a result, the etatocracy blocked the path for the peoples of our country to ascend into a modern information society.

The dominant groups in the existing situation not without reason preferred to maintain the mirage of successful socialist construction, and election by the people belonging to a particular, previously unknown society. In this context an important role was played by

that ideological cliche (on the destruction of the exploitation of man by man and growing social heterogeneity) and belief in this is still present both in the mass mind as well as among many social scientists. The subtext of such attitudes, in our view, is that there are no groups with their own, special interests, all have similar needs and orientation and the same goals; there is, thus, a complete monolithicness in society. In actuality, the view of the standardizing of life has meant a suppression of the productive trends toward a growing diversity of social and economic forms, toward a living pluralism in culture and spiritual life. Such ideas are to the advantage of only the etatocracy for simplifying the tasks of manipulating society.

The history of mankind, with the exception of its darkest periods, is a growth of diversity among relations, social groups and ways of life. The desire to impoverish the system of social relations inevitably leads to the stagnation of society. "Operating" in this very direction was the man-made model invented by the great mythmaker I.V. Stalin for social structure "two + one" (the two friendly classes and the social stratum of the intelligentsia). This entire formula was stitched together from miscomprehensions and contradictions. The classes of workers and kolkhoz peasantry were isolated according to a single criterion (the differences in state and kolkhoz-cooperative forms of ownership) and the intelligentsia according to another (in terms of the nature of labor: mental—physical). The secret purpose of such an operation comes down to establishing the idea of the leading role of the working class in relation to the intelligentsia and it serves as a tool for artificially putting the intelligentsia in opposition to the workers, and is employed by the conservative social groups for restraining the most educated and best informed strata of the population. The very concept of "stratum of the intelligentsia" in relation to the categories of the workers who are 4-fold more numerous than the kolkhoz members and are profoundly differentiated in terms of place and role in the power-economic relations is unproductive (this would include all, from the minister to the accountant).

There is a different situation in putting the kolkhoz members in a separate social group (class). The gradual process occurring over long decades of expropriating the land of the peasants and turning the kolkhozes into state institutions long ago ended with the actual converting of the cooperative peasants into the same hired workers as the sovkhoz workers. Thus, the formula of "two + one" conceals behind the apparently growing homogeneity averaged and artificially designed social groups and a rather sharp and growing stratification of society.

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Extremely important is the question of the historical nature of etatocracy. By the time of the October Revolution, Russia was a fusion of historical eras existing over one enormous territory. Progressive enterprises and large concerns, serious scientific schools, magnificent

literature and art—all of this was submerged in a multi-million-strong peasant world among whom there not only survived the memory of the recent serfdom but also living and working were those who themselves had been the slaves of the landowners. Particularly complicated was the situation in the nationality borderlands. Many of the peoples residing there, virtually completely illiterate, had not yet come even into the initial forms of capitalist relations. High mortality, mass epidemic illnesses and isolation from modern civilization characterized the life of these seemingly hopelessly backward peoples.

Such a recent historical past in and of itself became a factor which unusually complicated the transition to socialist forms of life. Characteristically, according to numerous observations, the customary social relations which had existed over the ages even under "socialism" again and again were reborn and reproduced in many regions of the nation, although the officially recognized state-socialist values were always the external form of these relations.

In Russia of the revolutionary period, the realistic alternative to etatocracy was only a gradual economic expansion and deepening of capitalism as this would have destroyed the surviving forms of semifeastal and patriarchal relations and going on hand in hand with a rise in the educational and cultural level of a predominant mass of the population. It would be difficult to deny that the establishing of the etatocratic method of production in our nation and others largely had a natural character and there were serious objective and subjective prerequisites.

One can argue as long as one likes about the potential effectiveness of the NEP [New Economic Policy] in the event of its continuation and development. But we must have our feet firmly on the ground and realize that after the victory and defense of the new political power, with that social structure, level of economic development and general culture of the population, there was no realistic alternative to the etatocratic system. Here a recognition of the naturalness of etatocracy in no instance means the acceptance of the historical inevitability of the social and economic costs, the monstrous repressions and the justification of which would be simply criminal, for an opportunity existed for the development of etatocracy in less harsh and inhumane forms.

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What contribution has etatocracy made to the treasury of social progress? Alas, it does not shine in positive results. It might be alright if things were limited to a sharp lag in the economic sphere. But we have also lagged behind in the area of social relations where our superiority was constantly emphasized. It means something that we hold the 77th place in the world in terms of per capita personal consumption and the 28th in terms of the educational level. Such figures show that we have politely ceded our place not only to all the developed countries but also to many of the second and third ranks. Etatocracy finds its historical limit under the miserly

conditions of the reproduction of man, his underconsumption and underdevelopment. It is not needed by modern mankind and is not capable of answering the needs of our times, including dynamicness, a move toward a new type of individual who is immeasurably richer in spiritual terms than in former historical ages.

And what about the current revolution? (This is unconditionally a revolution. It is a question of the changing of social formations.) This commenced in the Eastern European countries under the banner of the renewal of socialism but in essence this is an antietatocratic revolution. It can provide a way out of the blind alley of the state monopolistic method of production.

What are the new guidelines? They include a transition to a mixed economy with significant privatization of the means of production, and the right of people to have private property. This means the development of the market, it is the shaping of the institutions of a civil society, a multiparty system, the abandoning of the dividing of society into leading and led strata and classes, reliance on all the healthy social forces and consideration of their diverse economic, political, nationality and cultural interests. This means the establishing of the primacy of common human values.

In practice, the diverse social forces headed by the nomenklatura workers and the ideologists of scientific communism acted decisively against the first, even timid steps toward a market economy and a civil society. Of course, there have also been victories in this struggle. During these years, particularly noticeable have been the successes of the cooperatives, a majority of which, in essence, are small private enterprises. In just 2 years (1988-1989), the number of employees in cooperatives has increased by 137-fold (from 70,000 to 4.5 million in January 1990). The product volume has reached 41 billion rubles, that is, 5 percent of the gross national product. And this has occurred under conditions where the state sector has been marking time, without providing any increases. Seemingly here is the path, here is the salvation in a market, cooperatives, and private property. But even now very acute debates have been underway. In opening the first session of the Presidential Council, M.S. Gorbachev again repeated that "in looking realistically at things, it can be said that state property remains predominant...." [6].

In this same speech he, it seems to me, partially explained the reasons for his cautious attitude toward the denationalization of property, having pointed out the "unbelievable political, economic and psychological difficulties." In actuality, the tragic fact is the conservatism of not individual groups, not even individuals, but rather enormous masses who believe that at present they are living under socialism and that it must be "rectified." In the minds of very many, the market forms of management are unilaterally identified with exploitation, inequality and unemployment.

Yes, certainly, there is no more terrible obstacle for the reformers than the prejudices of the people. Many understand the state ownership of the means of production, free social services and a guaranteed job as the values of socialism. Production efficiency, the privileges of talent, social justice in the form of payment for the quantity, quality and uniqueness of labor for these people are not part of their notion of socialism. Nevertheless, the balance of the supporters and opponents of the etatocratic system step by step is changing in favor of the latter.

The population of large cities, the younger generation and a large portion of the intelligentsia and skilled workers form the antietatocratic front. It is a different matter that in this milieu there are also many prejudices, hesitations and obsolete stereotypes. For this reason, it can be anticipated that the process of the "reorganization" of the country to the normal principles of a socially oriented market economy and civil society will require significant time and enormous effort by the progressive forces.

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#### Medicine and Biology as Sociohumanitarian Sciences

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[Editorial roundtable written up by V.I. Shamshurin]

[Text] At present, in scientific and current affairs literature a great deal of attention is being paid to man. However, very frequently this is done in a strictly declarative manner, that is, we must, supposedly, pay more attention to man, carry out concrete research, for example, in sociology and so forth. But just what is man? Who and what are studied in investigating man? His thoughts, aspirations, hopes, desires, beliefs; or external forms of conduct, deeds, way of life, morals, social, legal, moral and other standards and views? Or possibly, the methods by which man organizes his own life in a society of others such as him? Or do they search for substantiation for purposefully compiled social schemes, utopias, questionnaires, polls and so forth? The scientist, the sociologist, must be clearly aware, for example, of with what he precisely is concerned in conducting a poll, questionnaire and here clearly define for himself the cardinal philosophical viewpoint which will determine the various results of the research: Is man totally and completely the product of external circumstances (natural, social), that is, a mechanism, or as a living organism does he possess free will and an independent spirit? For the sociologist these are crucial questions. But what do the representatives of other sciences, for example of biology, physiology or for instance medicine, think about this matter? Seemingly, they are totally and completely involved with the corporeal aspect of human life, with man's physical health and external conduct. But there is also the interior world of man and it is indispensable for the physician and biologist to consider this. Participating in the discussion of this and other questions were: R.A. Chizhenkova, candidate of biological sciences and senior science associate at the Biophysics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; A.S. Ivanov, candidate of medical sciences and senior science associate at the Surgery Center of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences; I.I. Sventitskiy, candidate of technical sciences and senior science associate at the Institute of Soil Science and Photosynthesis of the USSR Academy of Sciences; V.V. Semenov, candidate of philosophical sciences and physician; A.I. Panchenko, doctor of philosophical sciences and head of the department of philosophical sciences of the INION [Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences] of the USSR Academy of Sciences; V.I. Shamshurin, candidate of philosophical sciences and editor of the journal SOTSILOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (chairing the session).

**V.I. Shamshurin:** I would like to raise the following questions for discussion. What is the spiritual organization of man as a member of society? What is the role of analyzing the nature of human interests in their relation to social development? As is known, the social conduct of people, according to M. Weber, is organized in accord with their view or their understanding of social reality. But, if we view these problems from the viewpoint of natural sciences directly involved with man (biology and medicine), what can be said about the implied importance of these problems?

If, for instance, a biologist merely examines a body organ and a physician merely treats this, then there is no need

for the "questioning" which precedes contact with man. The only thing needed is the practical skill of a "plaintiff," that is, a certain questionnaire with questions which must be answered by merely "yes" or "no," as all the remainder is superfluous. This is like a harnessed horse running in blinders. It runs but it does not know where or who and, more importantly, why it is being guided. And possibly it is not necessary to guide at all. Far from the best coachman is in control here and at best he is idle and at worst he gets in the way. What driver is needed?

Any humanitarian science is not only an analysis of the sense of words and proper meanings (as in Ancient Greece, although Aristotle mentioned the physician Hippocrates, Plato, and the God of Medicine Asklepios in relation to politics). This is, above all, an analysis of successful, beneficial social actions (as was felt in Ancient Rome), that is, direct or indirect contact with controlling the social behavior of man.

The essence of the latter approach is that if you have a good idea or an ideal, whatever it might be, then show it in fact, in practice, and thereby persuade me of your truthfulness. This does not mean that a primitive utilitarian demand is being made of "let us get a feel" for what you are thinking. No, this is a completely reasonable desire to be certain that an idea or concept is effective and that the system, as the cyberneticians say, "possesses feedback." A social analysis of the actions of man, that is, his rights and duties reinforced in the word and with the aid of the word—this is what we have in mind in the given instance. And this means the actions related to the social body, to politics, the economy, that is, to any concrete manifestation of human life activity and in the given instance, with biology and medicine. Certainly, the natural scientists and physicians know the ancient philosophical truth that "a body without reason is dead." Then we are no longer involved with biology, surgery or cardiology but rather with pathologic anatomy. Plato wrote: "The person with a naturally healthy body who leads a healthy way of life but catches some unusual illness, for such persons and in such a state Asklepios pointed out how they should be treated: with medicines and bleeding the illness must be driven out, in maintaining, however, the ordinary way of life so that social affairs do not suffer" ("The Republic," 407a). Thus, what is the role of social relations in the health of man and society?

**V.V. Semenov:** In actuality in recent years, one can hear more and more often the opinion that the sociohumanitarian sciences must turn to the living man, to his problems, and not be limited to abstract cognitive limits of research or the "somatic" pragmatic questions. In the literature there are enough examples of such an appeal, but for now what results have we encountered? A separate area of cognition has arisen entitled "border problems of science" and "common scientific problems" and here completely different disciplines are brought together reflecting one or another aspect of human activity: political science, economics, natural scientific

research and medicine. Such an association thus remains a range of disciplines which are unrelated except for the idea of man. The futility of the attempts to isolate common grounds for such diverse areas of knowledge is reflected in the problem widely discussed in methodology of the incommensurability of theories. No general concept of man is obtained nor can it be with such an approach. What one now understands by this is in essence a mechanical or even an eclectic bringing together of various disciplines. An effective general concept of man as a social individual should be provided in such a positive science as sociology in its interaction with political science, political economy and other disciplines. The specific area of research is the following. Dialectics asserts that there are no positive phenomena which do not have a negative aspect and which not only grows along with the positive but under certain conditions turns the positive into the negative, and under certain conditions this can also lead to ecological, medical-biological and then social crises and disasters. In order that this does not happen, it is essential to study the social mechanisms of crisis prevention. Such mechanisms should be found in the structures of society itself, in its social institutions as a legitimate resistance to the "positive" and which grows as the positive phenomenon is converted into the negative. Here is one of the areas of social research and a point of contact between the humanitarian and social sciences.

**A.I. Panchenko:** In my view, the interaction of the humanitarian-social and natural sciences can be most beneficial in the area of the problems of humanizing biology and medicine. This conclusion can be confirmed, in the first place, from the example of literature on the mass information media and in books for now basically published abroad. They raise the questions of parapsychology, psychokinesis, extrac sensory perception, unidentified flying objects, astrology and so forth and these at present are also being discussed actively in our country. Here, it seems to me, the basic object of discussion to a significant degree relates to social psychology and it can be said the issue of the "social health of society." In other words, during those moments of history when society is in a crisis stage of its development, certain things which "replace" reality are cultivated "above" and actively perceived, supported and experienced "below." Moreover, on a general level the rise of such things, in my view, is tied to a need for "miracles" and this is internally inherent to man. Here it would be possible to argue about different historical forms of rationality or mentality, about political regimes, about global crises, or whatever you wish, but in man there is a need for a "miracle" and this is possibly responsible for the maintaining of "social health" and for creative activity. In my view, this need is one of the inner resources of human existence. And it must be supported, regardless of the distorted forms of its employment, for example, in the mass information media. Of course, here the role of medical workers is far from the last.

Secondly, in that same literature all the sought or supposedly visible "substitute" things and abilities are established from the "scientific" viewpoint. Here it is essential to figure out what a scientific viewpoint means. This has a common cultural point as there is the old tradition of putting natural science into opposition to the "sciences dealing with the spirit" (W. Dilthey). If such a tradition is valid, then we cannot view biology as a sociohumanitarian discipline. I propose that the designated tradition is not quite valid. Certainly any sciences in one way or another derive from the needs of man and ultimately arrive at disclosing the conditions of his life. Natural sciences disclose the natural conditions, while the sociohumanitarian sciences show the social and spiritual ones. Understandable in this context is the great interest which is now being shown in the so-called anthropic principle in cosmology: together with physics, cosmology shows that the organization of the Universe is precisely one where life could arise in it and where man could appear along with life. The opinion of V.I. Vernadskiy is confirmed that life is a cosmic phenomenon.

But is there a natural science on human capabilities and human conduct (social) in that very sense as a science on inanimate objects? The impression is gained that many parapsychologists would like to fit their subject of research into the framework of methods worked out by natural science. Parapsychology has a rather long history. Thus, in 1882, the Society of Psychic Research was founded in Great Britain and this set as its goal the study of those human abilities which "are inexplicable on the basis of any broadly accepted hypotheses." Since the, parapsychology has acquired an institutionalized development. The anthology "Basic Experiments in Parapsychology" published in 1884 in Great Britain under the editorship of K.R. Rao has pointed out that around 2,000 such "basic experiments" have now been carried out. But what is the interesting point? The interesting point was that the rate of definite results for all these experiments was assessed at 50 percent. This means that the experiments did not produce anything definite. Certainly for physics a result with a probability of 50.0001 percent would be more definite, but 50 percent is complete ambiguity. In turn, this can mean only one thing: experimental methods in physics which are perfectly applicable to investigating inanimate objects cannot be applied unconditionally to researching the phenomena of the psyche and consciousness. Psychic and psychophysical relationships can scarcely be modeled in the same manner as physical causal relationships (and actually a majority of the experimental parapsychologists is involved in this).

Thirdly, on the basis of the so-called "experiments" and practice of parapsychologists, numerous speculations and falsifications have arisen. Parapsychology has been even turned into a sort of "business." An example would be the activities of the famous conjuror, U. Geller, who appeared recently on our Central Television. Somewhat before, 15-20 years ago, Geller demonstrated his tricks on British Television and he not only "wound" and

"stopped" watches, but also taught "spoons and forks to bend," and this was enormously successful (particularly with children). So, the screens of current Soviet television are offering us rather obsolete information. This information, incidentally, has not informed us that in 1975, another famous magician, J. Randy, published a book entitled "The Magic of Uri Geller." It condemns Geller for violating professional ethics of illusionists evident, in particular, in Geller's use of the terms "psychokinesis," "extrasensory perception" and "parapsychology." "This," commented J. Randy and the English physicist G. Taylor, "as well as the story of Geller's doctoring photographs for the Israeli newspapers showing him together with Sofia Loren led to a decline in Geller's popularity...."

I do not want to doubt the abilities of Geller or the necessity of investigating the depths of the human psyche, but at the same time it cannot be doubted that tricks are possible in such practices. The same Randy describes a case when young persons trained by him joined a collective at the Parapsychology Laboratory of Washington University, convinced the co-workers of this laboratory of their "supernatural" abilities and then at a press conference unmasked both this "supernaturalness" and the convictions and activities of the parapsychologists.

Fourthly, and now from the truly philosophical viewpoint (that is, from the metaphysical and metaspiritual viewpoint divorced from the concrete realities of our life), here the problem arises of the relationship of the spirit and the body, the psychic and the physi(olog)ical, the mind and matter. Again the old "accursed" problem arises of what was first—matter or mind? Clearly, on the abstract level the posing of this question makes no sense. Clearly, for philosophy as well as for life, science, practice and medicine, both are important, although in concrete situations, at specific historical stages and in specific concepts (including in sociology!) preference can be given to one or the other. The idealistic system of Hegel did not prevent him from disclosing the development dialectics of the conscience. The dualistic philosophical position of the Australian neurophysiologist G. Eckles did not prevent him from investigating the ion mechanisms for the transmission of nerve impulses (he received the Nobel Prize for this). Profound materialistic convictions also do not prevent the carrying out of scientific research and the achieving of outstanding results. However, up to the present no philosopher has been able to reduce the entire diversity of the world to just the spiritual or just the corporal. For this reason, of course, we do have grounds for putting medicine and biology into a sociohumanitarian context.

**I.I. Sventitskiy:** I would like to examine the relationship of social and natural sciences from the following position. The exacerbation of the global natural scientific, social and production problems clearly has a common prime cause. The essence of this is that man in his activities has not considered the important laws of

nature. One of these is the energy extremality of self-organizing and, particularly, living systems. The latter in their development spontaneously strive for the fullest utilization of the free (accessible) energy under the existing external conditions. Modern achievements in the 1970s and 1980s in nonequilibrium thermodynamics (G. Nicolis, I. Prigogine), the physics of self-organization and evolution (V. Ebeling, R. Feistel) as well as ecological bioenergetics show that the structural organization of living systems and their functional relations have a common energy extremality or bioenergetic purpose. An energy economicness of living nature can be traced in all stages of its development and in all its manifestations, with the exception of the present stage in the development of human society.

The destruction and pollution of the environment, in reaching a scale threatening the health of people and the possibility of their further existence, is the result primarily of the wasteful, noneconomic use of enormous energy capacity which human society has gained in recent decades. The ecological problem is largely exacerbated by the food problem. The intensification of food production everywhere has been accompanied by an exceptionally rapid rise in the expenditures of anthropogenic energy per unit of product, by an accelerated growth of pollution and destruction of the environment, by a deterioration of food quality and by a negative influence of it [food?] on human health.

The genesis and initial development of culture and social relations of all peoples, regardless of their nationality and geographic location, obviously and with good reason are permeated with and accompanied by artistic images of the methods of securing food, the most precious and irreplaceable type of free energy.

**V.I. Shamshurin:** You are right. At present, this is being intensely studied by representatives of a recent current in foreign sociology, the followers of "figurative" sociology of N. Elias.

**I.I. Sventitskiy:** And they are right to do this, as the needs of man in the preindustrial period were very largely determined by the energy found in food. During extensive industrial development, the technogenic energy consumed by man surpassed by many-fold the energy consumed in food. During this period technologies were clearly energy-wasteful and this became the main reason for the exacerbation of global problems. Precisely man's awareness of the particularly important social importance of bioenergetic extremality in the development of living systems, including human society, and the inevitability of shifting it to autotrophy will make it possible to accelerate the development of energy-saving and ecologically safe technologies, protect nature and ensure the survival of man under the conditions of the biosphere.

**V.I. Shamshurin:** Thus, the points of contact and similarity of social and natural sciences can be seen. What about the differences? In what way does philosophy differ from medicine?

**A.S. Ivanov:** The difference is as follows. Our main philosophical aphorism "know thyself" (or "nature" or "society") belongs to the realm of recommendations, advice for long research, wishes and desires for ideals that would be difficult to achieve at the given moment, ones more desired than urgent. This is proper but not the one needed now. Our aphorism is "physician, cure thyself." It has a concrete appeal and offers clear practical guidance. In the mouth of any patient, it can be a direct demand and a "verb in the imperative" and moreover has the character of direct completed action.

What sort of art can you have, he [the patient] might say, if you yourself are not healthy and look bad; I will not come to you for treatment. Such an understanding in medicine of one's own purpose has come down from the times of Hippocrates who said that a physician should look decent in order to extol his ability by his appearance.

**V.I. Shamshurin:** Plato in this sense makes a very accurate comment: "Certainly in my opinion they treat the body not with the body, otherwise it would be inadmissible to have a poor corporeal state of the physician himself, rather they treat the body with the soul, and the soul cannot treat well if the physician's is poor or has become such." Why do I recall Plato? He, in my view, provides the most surprising correlation between medicine and the sciences dealing with society. Thus, in one of his sociopolitical works, "The Republic" in comparing medicine and legal art, he legitimizes them only under the condition that "both of them are concerned for the citizens viable both in terms of body and soul...." ("The Republic," 410).

**A.S. Ivanov:** That is precisely the point. I constantly take instantaneous decisions in operations and I bear an enormous burden of responsibility—both moral and, incidentally, legal. On this level, precisely from the legal viewpoint, philosophers and sociologists in their activities are not involved in the law. I have never heard that they had responsibility stipulated precisely by the law and not by arbitrariness (since there has been more than enough persecution of the social scientists) for socioideological recommendations that have been ineffective or even lethal for society. Physicians treat both the body and the soul. And here I am a member of the humanities. Incidentally, I, as a cardiologist, am extremely close to the philosophical principle that "truth passes through the heart" which is rather well known and is inherent to the ancient philosophical cultural tradition which bears a name similar to the name of my profession, crypto- or cardiognosis. Hippocrates put it clearly: "The physician-philosopher is like God." Let us recall again the classic Russian literature of the 19th Century. Prince V.F. Odoyevskiy in his "The Story of the Cock, Cat and Frog" very precisely examines the role of psychoanalysis in the treatment of hypochondriacs. And this is from the viewpoint of surgery! At present, unfortunately, an analysis of the inner motives of man is applied basically in psychotherapy and sex pathology.

**V.I. Shamshurin:** Is there a difference (and in what manner) between the inner world of a patient and the inner world of a healthy person? In other words, if we turn to the specific work of a physician, is it helpful for him to know the particular features of the mind of his patients—both ailing and healthy? For instance, preop, during the operation and postop? What mental sets of the patient favor the achieving of health and which ones harm it? On this level, what are your tested procedures for “translating” or converting certain mental sets of the “respondents” into others? Are these being studies?

**A.S. Ivanov:** How can these be combined or, more accurately, how can healthy internal spiritual activity be made from sick? This question is important, in my view, from any viewpoint. Both as a “eternal, fatal” question of philosophy as well as an urgent, applied question for the research sociologist developing a concrete social program in the area of state, ethnic relations or a physician struggling directly for the health of a specific person.

Unfortunately, in medicine the answers to the given question is a particular matter worked out by each physician by trial and error. And as a result—everyone knows to say the least. Basically, this is studied in the medical schools and this is written about in the special scientific research and practical manuals. But nowhere do they write or teach about what a person thinks in experiencing pain!

Generally, the role of thought and conscious motives in our work (both for the physician and for the patient) for me has assumed an ever-greater role. Seemingly, this is a philosophical question but in medicine it is pertinent as never before. Who should be considered sick? How does ailing flesh influence optimistic spirits? These are not abstract questions. Behind them, in essence, stands society's attitude toward the disabled. To what degree are they to be considered equal to persons with normal motor activity? Regardless of all declarations about humanism, the very fact that our subway and underpasses, our stairwells are not adapted for wheelchairs (which, incidentally, are produced in insufficient numbers and of poor quality) bespeaks a great deal. And the birth of sick children? In antiquity this question was easily resolved as they were thrown off the Tarpeian Rock. Our culture based upon charity and veneration of life, that is, on principles deriving from Christianity, cannot permit itself such a harsh equating of the internal and external world, such vulgar and even harsh materialism of paganism: “In a healthy body is a healthy mind.” Here medicine should be clearly aware of its own philosophical positions. The mystery of life must be held secret, “it must not be harmed,” as the same Hippocrates said. To assume that the spirit, mental richness and fullness of life can be apparent and, consequently, accessible to all, both to those who are now well situated as well as those who are still powerless, but he [the physician] must remember that the key to recovery is in his hands. The forces of his spirit are in a potential state. Here we might refer to the experience of V. Dikul who

literally worked miracles. Certainly, the imparting of a courageous attitude toward life and to the vicissitudes of life is a function of humanitarian science, for example philosophy, which must go hand in hand with medicine. It is a different matter that the philosophy needed by man should be oriented precisely at him, and consider the concrete difficulties, joys, hardships, ideas, sadness and hope. It should not be on impersonal schemes and distant social abstractions behind which man cannot be seen and which provide no rosy glow for anything, no comfort, hope or certainty and no real way to achieve any of these. For this reason, we, the physicians, as no one else understand the representatives of the humanities who speak about the moral or “prophylactic” essence of their work. On this level, the role of domestic philosophical culture—the Russian philosophy at the end of the 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th—for the physicians are as important as for the researchers of the history of culture. The names of V.S. Solov'yev, N.I. Berdyayev and others for us represent not only a distant cognitive but also practical professional interest. As for the study of motivation, ideas and images, this is a matter for the humanities, for the philosophers and sociologists. Here also there are great opportunities for interdisciplinary contacts as the physicians have enormous concrete material which requires professional sociological analysis. And now I am speaking responsibly as an official representative of the All-Union Scientific Surgery Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Here we perform diverse operations on vitally important organs including the intestines, liver, lungs and heart, including the transplanting of these organs and the reimplantation of extremities. We also observe persons in the “distant” period after the operation, considering here the most diverse factors. We monitor not only the function of the organ operated on, but also the quality and way of life as a whole of our patients. This, in my view, is what we are now talking about.

At present, we at the Center operate under conditions of cost accounting (here is the importance of the socioeconomic factor for you) and this has opened up great opportunities both for the physicians, for the patients, and both on a creative and applied-organizational level. It has become easier for us to establish contact as the physician has moved closer to man. For example, contracts are being concluded with various enterprises of not only Moscow but also the entire nation to study and treat both employees and their relatives. This brings enormous benefit to the health of specific individuals (and not to the abstract “population” as a whole, as was the case before) and makes it possible to thoroughly study man on a modern level (we have the most advanced equipment) and promptly treat the illnesses.

**V.I. Shamshurin:** In actuality, what principle should underlie the definition of man's health? Real altruism and humanism with its assertion of the generic essence of human mental activity preserving in his “image and likeness” the equal rights of all persons to the spiritual

and material values of mankind's culture? Or misanthropy and xenophobia based upon the principle of "ethnic selectivity" with its constant "veterinary" desire to place people, as Chaadayev wrote, in closed stalls? Here the arguments inherent to these social concepts and drawn from one or another "national genealogy" must prove that the harmonious combination of the fullness of thought and physical activity are possible only within the limits of one but only one nation more often understood biologically, in the form of a certain "selection," when the possibility is admitted of achieving a certain "pure-breed strain of new people" and "builders of a new society."

**R.A. Chizhenkova:** The role of social science and particularly culture in the natural sciences is much greater than the most convinced representatives of the humanities can imagine. For me, a natural scientist, this is indisputable.

In recent decades in reviewing the problems of the development of society it has become a rule to discard psychological questions with extreme decisiveness and with extraordinary closeness seek out the boundary between the social and biological aspects of man, thereby splitting social sciences away from natural sciences, that is, from the foundation. Social sciences were being turned into the area of a parascience. As for the biological characteristics of man, such a deep abyss was created between them and social phenomena that man was actually no more than a "cog" in the social mechanism. Here there was a confusing of such concepts as society and the crowd, the individual and personality.

**V.I. Shamshurin:** How do you view the consequences of the notion of a "cog" in biology and in the social sciences?

**R.A. Chizhenkova:** The complete adaptation of a biological species to surrounding reality paralyzes its development and ultimately leads to extinction (P. Teilhard de Chardin). This is the case in biology. In and of itself social adaptation is a good thing. However, the variation of it which is optimal for the individual as a rule is an impediment in the development of society. To some degree it works for the good of the individual but not for the social organism. Those who rested on their laurels during the "cult of personality" and "stagnation" evolved with maximum accuracy an optimum method of conduct for themselves. The policy of carrot and stick and the corresponding notion of a "cog" gave rise to the committing of certain actions and the abandoning of others. But the population "which does not know how to live" is the engine of progress. Precisely those who were unable or who could not adopt the line of conduct imposed on them are the hope of society, even posthumously. The Russian intelligentsia has always stood out both in its high morality and in its low socioutilitarian adaptation and in its absence of what previously was called "mercenary." In Russia, the intellectuals were always the pioneers, the defenders of law and...perished under the wheel of history in order years later to return

to the people as an achieved long-term social good and social charity. Tragedy went hand in hand with the development of progressive thought.

The portion of the people who possess high adaptation abilities on the social level allowing them to secure the goods of life, can adapt to any conditions. But for the personality, for its development and activity, it is essential to have space and the possibility of choosing also inner spiritual freedom. Without this, the personality is not realized and this is always a tragedy.

**V.I. Shamshurin:** Spirituality, morality—are these ordinary concepts for a biologist...?

**R.A. Chizhenkova:** No. Merely abstract appeals to restore morality are futile. These cannot operate in isolation from the other aspects of social life. Nevertheless, the perfection of a society should be measured by the attitude to the living and even the nonliving world and not only and not so much by the attitude toward women (this is too narrow). This is what comprises the higher spirituality which brings together the entire noosphere. Possibly it was something like this that E. Le Roy had in mind when in 1927 he proposed the term "noosphere." Reason will embellish the new (anthropogenic) age in the world. The last (incomplete) book by V.I. Vernadskiy "Nauchnaya mysl kak planetarnoye yavleniye" [Scientific Thought as a Planetary Phenomenon] was devoted to an optimistic belief in human reason. At present, in relation to perestroika, we are rethinking the economic principles of the life of society. But the measure of economic gain cannot completely serve as the fundamental criterion for the reasonability of one or another innovation. This criterion must be employed only in an aggregate with other ones. Neither economic successes nor technical progress are a justification of human suffering or the fading of nature. Priority lies with the principles of morality. The Hippocratic medical oath "Do Not Cause Harm!" should be found in all spheres of social life as a "symbol of belief" in the modern age.

Culture requires urgent concern. K. Marx warned about the danger of combining a revolution and a low cultural level and concern was voiced over this in Russia in 1917. Even if it is admitted that positive changes occurred over the decades, there has not been the proper optimism since no judgments have been made. Undoubtedly, illiteracy has been eliminated, however to some degree the cultural heritage was destroyed and it is this which preserves the wisdom of previous generations.

Man should correspond to his proud name of *Homo sapiens*, both as a biological species, as a moral personality and as a social principal.

**V.I. Shamshurin:** Certainly we must not allow a pagan denial of the Christian culture which has come down to us or the destruction of the higher accomplishments of modern civilization and its common human values.

The hard-hearted social theories with all their reciprocal disdain generally derive from the same primitive interpretation of the social ideology first expressed by the Ancient Jews, the chosen nature of one, separately taken people or social group. The falaciousness of the various "veterinary" solutions to the very complex problems of man, society (their purpose) and world history is not merely obvious, but also involves the blood of an enormous number of victims and literally shouts inhumanity. When, for the sake of an abstract scheme which justifies the inequality of people, peoples and classes, they begin killing, then this is inadmissible from any viewpoint, from the philosophical, the sociological, the medical and the biological.

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### Problems of Studying Informal Youth Groups

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[Article by Nikolay Valentinovich Kofyrin, co-workers at the Scientific Research Institute for Interdisciplinary Social Research at Leningrad State University. This is the first time he appears in our journal]

[Text] The boom in the "informal movement" has led to a situation where numerous studies of the youth associations as it were start from the image of the informal groups which has assumed the form of a stereotype in the mass mind. Basically, attention is given to the typologizing and classifying than it is to a profound analysis. Basically, they study the politicized and socially useful youth associations which more and more actively are participating in perestroika. The informal juvenile-youth groups at the place of residence remain "in the shadows" intentionally maintaining their semilegal status. By an informal group we understand a certain type of youth association which has arisen and exists for the sake of satisfying the needs and interests of its members and the activities of which are not regulated by legal documents and are not accountable to state and social organizations.

According to the estimates of certain researchers, around 50 percent of the youth under the age of 30 is a member of some informal association, and approximately 9 percent is in groups of an asocial nature [1]. While the social organizations and unregistered social associations are bringing their normative and value structure into conformity with the officially regulated, the informal youth groups emphatically are developing their own subculture the basic traits of which are exclusiveness and an alternative approach.

It would be wrong to feel that in a state under the law all informal associations or groups would want to be institutionalized and acquire official status. This is an oversimplified view of the problem. There has always been

and will be a definite part which under no conditions wants to be registered and thereby destroy its basis.

Marginality in relation to, on the one hand, social associations and organizations and, on the other, to the semilegal and illegal criminal groups in a number of instances develops a criminogenic subculture in the informal youth groups. The problem of studying the criminogenic nature of the informal groups has been intensified with the increased crime among juveniles and persons under the age of 30. Thus, the 21 percent increase in the crime rate of the former [juveniles] in 1989, in comparison with 1988 (both as a whole for the nation and in Leningrad) was largely caused by its group nature. In Leningrad, juveniles committed one out of every five crimes with more than 60 percent in groups [2]. Their number as a whole for the nation increased by 15 percent over 1988 [3]. In comparison with the first half of 1988, in 1989, there were 14 percent more juveniles involved in group crimes [4]. However, this is only the tip of the iceberg.

The publications and studies at best contain only an analysis of very indirect sources (criminal cases, data from complete polls of the students in schools and PTU [vocational-technical school], and the questioning of violators of the law) and without any analysis of a concrete group and this as a whole distorts a description of the phenomenon [5-7].

In the autumn of 1989, we conducted a concrete study of informal youth groups at the place of residence in three rayons of Leningrad using a questionnaire, interviewing and participating observation. This made it possible to record youth groups which differed in terms of the criminogenic degree and refute certain stereotypes. As a total, we anonymously questioned 345 young men (70 percent) and women (30 percent) who considered themselves in 47 different groups. Some 78.5 percent of the respondents was juveniles. Some 326 questionnaires underwent mathematical processing, including those which did not contain demographic data. The percentage of refusal to fill out the questionnaires did not exceed 1. Here 16 persons purposefully gave their last names and the members of one of the groups independently signed and wrote in their addresses on a statement compiled by them to the municipal authorities.

The questioning at places of meeting (doorways, basements, parks, squares, courtyards and so forth) was carried out by two permanent investigators, one of which was the author of these lines. The late autumn evening was intentionally chosen in order to weed out outsiders and "bores" to maximally disclose the backbone of the group. We assumed that we would have to resort to a "guide" from the law enforcement bodies to the meeting places. However, such was not necessary as in the process of our work a trusting atmosphere was established and this contributed to the valid filling out of the questionnaires and also made it possible to find the

meeting places of other groups. The respondents often offered to take us there and this encouraged sincerity of the answers.

We consciously did not try to seek out a certain type and found a broad spectrum including friendly groups of classmates, groups involved in a leisure exercise, criminogenic and criminal groups. The desire to describe a "pure" type of group, for example, criminal, leads to the distorting of reality and to the substituting of hypothetical schemes for it. For this reason, we use the notion of a "intermediate group" [8]. In defining the antisocial trend of an informal group, we disclosed the most essential features. As a result, we reached a conclusion that there was a struggle between two trends: 1) institutionalization by realizing socially useful aspirations; 2) criminalization due to the impossibility of achieving the goals legally. These trends can run both in parallel and also intersect, with the forming of their own leisure niches or with involvement in already existing structures of work with juveniles for realizing antisocial interests and ideas.

The quantitative composition of the respondents varied from 4-5 to 25-30 persons in a group. Some 31 percent was schoolchildren, 26 percent was students of the PTU, 10 percent was students of the technical schools, 6 percent students in VUZes, 23 percent was workers and 6 percent was not employed or studying anywhere. Almost  $\frac{1}{4}$  was made up of migrants born outside of Leningrad. Some 85 percent lived with their parents, 5 percent in a dormitory, 3 percent separately from parents, 3 percent with friends, 1 percent with relatives and 3 percent did not provide an answer. Some 64 percent named their group. Here 34 percent had belonged previously to other groups and this shows the high level of internal migration. For obtaining a more complete socio-logical picture, it was necessary to determine the social factors contributing to the "departure" of the youth to the informal groups, that is, the impossibility of self-realization in the family, school, public organizations or conflicts with teachers and parents. We analyzed the data as a whole, we isolated the most characteristic groups as well as individuals having ideas of speculation, prostitution or the most dangerous forms of criminal activity or were already engaged in this.

The reasons for joining and remaining in an informal group are as follows: for 45 percent of those questioned it was joint amusements, 42 percent merely wanted to spend their free time, 34 percent found it the absence of adults and supervision, 31 percent for unusual adventures and experiences, 29 percent found common interests with the other group members, and 27 percent wanted an opportunity to speak with others who understood you; 23 percent of those questioned replied that the members of the group are "very interesting fellows" and 9 percent had other reasons. Thus, the reasons are rather traditional. At the same time, the external reasons for joining a group at the place of residence are very indicative: 43 percent gave inner loneliness and a desire to find friends, 31 percent mentioned "fed up with

everything," 16 percent mentioned arguments with parents, 11 percent mentioned conflicts with school or on the job (with the teachers, superiors), 10 percent did not trust adults and had been disappointed in the people around them, 9 percent protested against the formalism and lies, while 12 percent "simply did not know what else to do."

To the question "indicate where you would be able to gain recognition and show yourself as an individual," not more than 10 percent replied: in school, on the job, in public life and in the family, while 21 percent gave during leisure time, 19 percent among classmates and 52 percent among friends in the group. Some 17 percent was completely satisfied with their housing conditions, 8 percent with their monetary situation, 17 percent with what they had at their personal disposal (clothing, books, things), 4 percent with relations with teachers and immediate superior, 18 percent with their father, 30 percent with their mother, 65 percent with friends, 6 percent with studies (job) and 25 percent with themselves.

In speaking about the most important values of life, 65 percent mentioned true friends, 56 percent mentioned love between a young man and young girl and 39 percent respect from others. The least important of the 18 proposed adaptive values (following the method of M. Rogich) were: an understanding of the surrounding world and people with 5 percent, an awareness of the beauty of nature and art with 5 percent, and active creative activities with 4 percent. Here 28 percent was satisfied with the way their life was developing, 25 percent was not satisfied, 36 percent found it hard to answer and 11 percent did not reply.

A rather high alienation from the standards and values of an individual involved in active creative activity is expressed in so-called outsiderness [9]. Or more accurately in forced outsiderness. Indicative was the fact that along with the widely held view "it is not important from where you get the money only that you have it" (44 percent) and "in our times you cannot achieve anything without force" (33 percent), some 41 percent of those questioned agreed with the judgment "do unto others as you would have them do unto you."

A predominant majority (64 percent) was satisfied with the time they spent in the group, and the most widespread form of leisure was hanging out ["tusovka"], and then visiting video game centers and discotheques (respectively, 65, 46 and 39 percent). Some 32 percent replied that they walked around the city, 28 percent "sat around at someone's house," 15 percent "stayed down in their basement" and 13 percent participated in sports. Of the video films there was a preference for subjects of terror, comedy and eroticism. The current myth on the infectious influence of crime blockbusters was not confirmed and only 13 percent liked to see them.

Hanging out in the cellar, entranceway or square is largely forced because of the commercialization of leisure. Many respondents had not more than 50 rubles a

month for their own needs, for  $\frac{1}{3}$  their requirements did not go over 100 rubles a month, while  $\frac{1}{4}$  would like to have 500 rubles and more a month. At present, in Leningrad, over 25 juvenile clubs which were set up specially for kids from disfavored and low-income families charge fees. Probably for this reason, 52 percent of those questioned would like to establish their own club, but only  $\frac{1}{3}$  of them agreed that this club be run by and under the supervision of an official organization. The city has been flooded by automatic games while with the introduction of cost accounting at the enterprises finding jobs for the youth has become even more complex. In order to earn money 24 percent are ready to work, 10 percent to gain it by any method, even if it is necessary to steal or take, and 8 percent consider it admissible to beg.

Of those who committed a crime in a group,  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the juveniles was in a state of alcoholic intoxication. According to our data, a total of 12 percent does not use alcohol at all and 39 percent use it rather regularly. Some 34 percent had tried drugs and toxic substances. In the group 14 percent are ready to try this and if they insisted, another 5 percent. Naturally, 28 percent consider drinking "one of the joys of life," while 11 percent would agree to sniff or swallow something in order to "get high."

An involvement in violence has been formed, on the one hand, by the principles of the group itself and, on the other, by the violence shown toward the juvenile in the family. Some 13 percent had been exposed to such actions by the father, 9 percent by the mother, and 49 percent had suffered this at the hands of unknown contemporaries. Some 31 percent is inclined to settle conflicts by force and 20 percent use force after a warning. Some 45 percent employ force immediately in response to a verbal insult and 44 percent would reply in the same manner. In order to have authority in the group, it is essential above all to know how to fight well (42 percent), be physically strong (34 percent) and just (34). Some 71 percent had to fight with unknown juveniles, 40 percent with members of another group, 30 percent with acquaintances from school class, and 21 percent with fellows living nearby but not from their own group. One-half of the informal group members was ready to use various weapons in fighting against another group. Here 28 percent would chose a knife, brass knuckles or some "cold steel," 23 percent would use a special device they made themselves, 6 percent a firearm, 10 percent a cannister with gas, 4 percent explosives, while 29 percent mentioned sticks, spears and so forth.

Some 52 percent of those questioned were often involved in fights with other groups, and 36 percent defended their own territory against them. For this reason in an attack a predominant majority (79 percent) would naturally fight in order to support "their own." Hostile relations with other groups were observed in 25 percent. Thus, in the group the juvenile is searching not only for mental protection but also physical.

In Leningrad over the year the number of participants in group juvenile crimes increased by 16 percent, and the number of recidivists by 11 percent. Of the persons questioned, 47 percent replied that in their group there were persons who had been condemned or had returned from places of incarceration. Here these persons as a whole had a criminalizing influence (the selfish reasons of committing infractions, the abuse of alcohol, drug and toxic substances and the strengthening of legal nihilism).

Some 14 percent of the respondents did not know anything about criminal and administrative liability, while 47 percent assumed that laws were one thing and life another. Some 39 percent felt that it was necessary to support one another in everything, even if the group's actions contradicted the law. To a request from cooperative members to protect them against racketeers for a good fee, 28 percent replied affirmatively and would also endeavor to persuade their comrades, 31 percent agreed to do this only along with the group, 28 percent personally refused, 9 percent would do this under special conditions (if the law would not be broken, if a very high payment was offered and so forth) and 4 percent did not answer. Certainly behind the mask of cooperative members the representatives of organized crime could be concealed.

It must be stated that the informal groups based on place of residence are rather criminogenic. Thus, 55 percent replied that they "sometimes acted up together with the group," 9 percent "had done a black market deal with a foreigner," 40 percent "sometimes did not spend the night at home," 44 percent "sometimes skipped school (work)," 46 percent said "if our girls want fellows we do not refuse them this" (!), 28 percent had "profitably sold scarce article," 23 percent said "we give no quarter to any persons arriving here from the republics" and 28 percent replied "if something is found we take it for our own."

Some 32 percent had been taken to the police by themselves, 42 percent together with the group and 19 percent had been registered. As a total in the city almost 11,000 juveniles are registered. However, of those who committed a crime,  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the juveniles previously had not been registered.

Undoubtedly, a portion of the informal groups at their place of residence gradually will be criminalized and will eventually grow into criminal groups. But this does not mean that all informal juvenile and youth associations must be viewed as potentially criminal, even if the criminogenic level is rather high. At present, it is important to objectively assess the clash of the trends of criminalization and institutionalization for choosing adequate methods for influencing each specific group. The confusing of the various groups into a single whole under the name "youth groupings" and the mechanical extrapolation of work methods with criminal groups to them will only provide directly opposite results. To leave the juveniles without attention would mean to leave them under the influence of organized crime.

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### Way of Life and Health of Kazakh Population

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ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 91 (signed to  
press 03 Dec 90) pp 86-87

[Article by Gulyum Oshakhpayevna Asylbekova, shop therapist at the medical unit of the Dzhezkazgan Nonferrous Metal Scientific-Production Association; Maksut Karimovich Kulzhanov, candidate of medical sciences and laboratory head at the Scientific Research Institute for Hygiene and Vocational Illnesses Under the Kazakh Ministry of Public Health; and Zaure Khamildullovna Khasanova, junior science associate at the Scientific Research Institute for Hygiene and Vocational Illnesses Under the Kazakh Ministry of Public Health. This is the first time they appear in our journal]

[Text] Upon the initiative and with the assistance of the Permanent Commission for Public Health and Social Security of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet, in 1988, the republic Center for the Protection of the Population's Health conducted a sociological study of the reciprocal influence of the way of life and the state of health of the republic's population. A questionnaire was distributed among the inhabitants of Alma-Ata and East Kazakhstan Oblasts as well as the

population of Alma-Ata, Karaganda, Chimkent, Tselinograd and Ust-Kamenogorsk. The choice of objects was made following a regional principle. A total of 1,136 persons was polled.

As for the social composition of the respondents, 51.2 percent was employed in industry, 15.6 percent in agriculture, 7.4 percent in public health, 4.4 percent in public education and 21.4 percent in other spheres of the national economy. In professional terms, those polled were distributed in the following manner: 48.4 percent workers, 37.6 percent white collar personnel, 8.9 percent kolkhoz members and 5.1 percent managers.

Males comprised 30.5 percent and females 69.5 percent. Among those polled, 0.9 percent was 16-19 years of age, 20.6 percent was 20-29 years, 42.4 percent was 30-39 years, 23.2 percent was 40-49 years, 9.3 percent was 50-59 years, and 3.6 percent was 60 years and older. Some 65 percent was married, 7.2 percent had not been married, 6.1 percent was divorced, 3 percent was widowed and the remainder did not reply.

From the literature it is known that the state of health of the people depends upon their material well-being, housing conditions and so forth. In our research, 26.7 percent of the respondents having a higher education viewed their state of health as good, 20 percent with an incomplete higher education, 16.6 percent with a specialized secondary, 20 percent with a secondary and 8.8 percent with an incomplete secondary. Viewing their health as bad was 28.5 percent of the respondents with a primary education, 34.7 percent with an incomplete secondary, 16 percent with a secondary and 17.6 percent with a higher education. Some 40.6 percent of the managers, 18.7 percent of the white collar personnel and 20.8 percent of the workers viewed their health as good; the remainder did not reply.

The research established that in families with a low income (50 rubles per member) there was over 45 percent of the persons with poor health, while in the group with an income level of 151-200 rubles, the figure was 6.1 percent.

The habitat has a substantial influence on health (see the Table).

### State of Health of the Population in Individual Regions of Kazakh SSR, %

Region	State of Health			
	Poor	Satisfactory	Good	No Reply
Cities				
Alma-Ata	17.8	57.4	24.4	0.4
Karaganda	15.4	61.5	21.6	1.5
Chimkent	27.0	44.9	13.5	14.6
Tselinograd	15.2	60.9	19.6	4.3
Oblasts				
Alma-Ata	20.7	51.7	27.6	
East Kazakhstan:				
Urban population	28.6	57.1	11.9	2.4
Rural population	15.2	62.8	18.6	3.4

A linkage was established between the level of environmental pollution and the health of the public. In recent years, the ecological situation in the republic has significantly deteriorated, particularly in Chimkent and in East Kazakhstan Oblast and this was reflected in the poll results with more than  $\frac{1}{4}$  (27 percent) of the Chimkent inhabitants assessing the state of their health as bad. A special word must be said about the urban population of East Kazakhstan Oblast, where 28.6 percent of the respondents viewed their health as bad. Here 13.7 percent of those polled mentioned the aggregate effect of a number of negative factors: noise, gasiness and dustiness; 23 percent mentioned the effect of high or low temperatures; 2.6 percent mentioned vibration; 1 percent electromagnetic radiation. A number of those polled (from 14.7 percent to 37.6 percent depending upon the region), in addition to the negative effects related to harmful production, had been exposed to the effect of bad environmental factors (gasiness, high noise level, absence of greenery and so forth) at their place of residence.

The research showed that concern for maintaining health also depends upon the assessment of the state of health. At present, one of the urgent tasks is to instill an aware attitude toward one's health. An ailing person causes harm not only to himself but also to society. An imbalanced diet, the use of alcohol, smoking as well as poor social and domestic conditions make the measures being carried out by the public health bodies ineffective.

Thus, because of the skeptical attitude toward the capabilities of medicine, the lack of the necessary knowledge and skills, some 79.7 percent of the respondents gave little attention to their health, and  $\frac{1}{4}$  of them felt that this was not necessary; 38.2 percent of those polled remembered their health only with its deterioration, and only 6.1 percent was constantly concerned for it.

To the question "What impedes you from paying attention to your health?" 12 percent replied that they lacked the skills and habits of watching their health; 10.6 percent pointed out that they did not have enough strength of will or discipline; 8.4 percent pointed to the lack of the necessary medical knowledge and the inaccessibility of consultation; 20.2 percent of the respondents lacked time.

The negative attitude of a person to his own health and the health of those around can vary from the failure to observe elementary rules of personal hygiene, diet, working and leisure conditions to the destruction of it by alcohol, smoking and drugs. By changing the way of life it would be possible to improve the health of  $\frac{1}{2}$  of those polled.

At present, particular attention is being paid to health as a social and economic value. An important area in the activities of the Center for the Protection of Health of the Kazakh Ministry of Public Health is to shape a healthy way of life of the population. In order to carry out effective and systematic work in this area, it is

essential to study the way of life and take a differentiated approach to its components. Thus, if it is a question of eradicating harmful habits, instilling proper contact, conduct and diet, observing working and leisure conditions, participating in sports and physical culture, much can be done by effective propaganda of a healthy way of life, using mass information media, lectures and pamphlets. At the same time, practical recommendations are required for carrying out effective sanitary educational work considering the specific conditions under which the republic's population lives and works.

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### Method of Structured Observation in Evaluating Municipal Transport Operations

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[Article by P.V. Bizukov and Ye.B. Savelyev]

[Text] At present, the poll is becoming the basic tool of the sociologists. But it is better to study a number of problems by other methods which provide a greater effect and require fewer expenditures. We would like to offer to the readers' attention the method of structured observation which has been used in studying municipal transport operations in Kemerovo.\*

The problem situation was as follows: in our city, as in many others incidentally, passengers are not satisfied with transport operations. The long wait, the crowding, the dirty vehicles and the churlish conduct of the drivers—this and much else turns a trip on municipal transport into torture. We examined the different possibilities for the polling and interviewing of passengers. But this involved rather large monetary expenditures and the involvement of the people. Finally, the choice fell to the observation method. A bus was chosen as the object as this is the most universal conveyance. The subject of the research was defined as follows: a) intensity (the number of buses passing a stop during the observation period); b) rhythmicalness (the traffic interval between the buses on one route); c) degree of fullness (four degrees were established: "empty" when there were seats, "moderately full" with people standing but spaces between them, "full" when there were no spaces but the doors closely freely and "over-full" where the doors could not close at the moment of departure (people were standing on the stairs). The stops were the observation post. Five stops were chosen on the main routes.

In Kemerovo there are an enterprise rayon and also "bedroom rayons." A specific feature of the stops is that this is that they are the "busiest points" for many municipal transport routes. Two stops are boundary ones of the "bedroom rayons" with the central rayons, while two others border the enterprise rayon. Here the observers could clearly note the fullness of the buses as

they emerged from the key rayons of the city. The last, fifth stop, was in the central rayon and almost all the routes ran through it. The observation hours were: from 0700 to 0800 hours and from 1730 to 1830 hours (the peak hours), from 1000 to 1100 hours and from 2000 to

2100 hours. It was necessary to carry out a total of 20 observations (four times at the five stops). The data were recorded on a special blank and then encoded and processed on a computer.

Observation Blank								
Stop Volgogradskaya Street					Petrov			
Observation Time 0700-0800 Hours			Full Name of Observer					
Number	Route No.	Time of Departure	Degree of Fullness					
			Empty	Moderately Full	Full	Over-Full		
1	20	01			x			
2	18	01		x				
3	...							
4								
...								

Empty—with seats; Moderately Full—people standing but spaces between them; Full—no spaces but doors close freely at moment of departure; Over-Full—doors do not close at moment of departure.

The observer was given the following instructions:

- 1) The observation was to be carried out on one persons or two persons together;
- 2) It was essential ahead of time, before the start of the observation, to enter the name of the stop and the time on the Blank;
- 3) It was essential to get to the stop early in order to become familiar with the situation and choose a good position;
- 4) The choice of the position was determined by two elements: the route numbers and the degree of fullness of the departing buses should be clearly visible;
- 5) During the observation it was essential to remain as casual as possible and not become apparent to the drivers and passengers;
- 6) To bring along several pencils, pens or Flomasters;
- 7) The observation procedure should commence strictly at 0000 minutes of the corresponding hour and end exactly 60 minutes later;
- 8) The observer was to enter on the Blank the route numbers of all passing buses;
- 9) Buses which did not stop were to be designated by the time of passage and the comment that the bus was over-full.

Thus, the structured nonparticipatory field observation made it possible to acquire the following information:

- a) The number of buses:—by halts,—time intervals,—a simultaneous picture of traffic for each time period for all five routes.

b) The average, minimum and maximum interval in traffic along one bus route at different hours.

c) The degree of fullness of the buses at different hours, for the individual routes and as a whole for all buses at each stop.

An analysis of the obtained information made it possible to draw the following conclusions. Extraordinary traffic unevenness is characteristic virtually for all the routes at any time of the day. During the evening hours, the peak of traffic intensity is approximately 30 percent lower than in the morning hours. During the time interval of 1000-1100 hours on the route there is 2-fold fewer vehicles than in the morning. In the evening, this drops to 3.5-fold fewer! Traffic rhythmicness is completely absent. During an hour several buses on one route can pass by and then follows a break until the next "flock." If they had traveled evenly, the interval between them would have always been slight. Certain routes are threatened with disappearing from the line, that is, the buses do not appear at the stops over the hour. Thus, schedule interruptions have become the norm. The dispatcher services do not carry out their job.

The unevenness of transport operations leads one to the following reflections. The main thing is to deliver the people to their destination and it is less important to help them return home promptly. It is in no way obligatory to provide transport for visiting a cafe, movie or theater in the evening. Consequently, municipal transport is a means for delivering manpower to the places of its employment and no more.

What conclusions can be drawn? First of all, there should be a rigid schedule for the traffic of the buses and information about this at each stop. Then a majority of passengers would find their buses, they would know the precise time and this would greatly ease their transport concerns. Nor must we forget normal bus traffic during

the evening hours. It is just as important to carry the city dwellers to the theater, park or visiting as it is to take them to work. Unfortunately, there is little concern for this.

We have become convinced that the above-described method fully justified our expectations. All the set tasks were provided with exhaustive information. The drawing on additional sources was not required. The research results were rather steady and in the autumn this repeated the same data. The situation remained as before regardless of the "measures taken by the municipal executive committee."

#### Footnote

\* The work was conducted by the Sociological Laboratory of Kemerovo University.

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#### What Is the Social Base of the RSFSR Communist Party?

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[Unattributed interview with I. Osadchiy, leader of the Preparatory Committee for the RSFSR Constituent Congress]

[Text] The founding of the RSFSR Communist Party continues to remain at the center of attention of the republic's political life.

In this context, the editors have asked the leader of the Preparatory Committee of the RSFSR Constituent Congress, I. Osadchiy, to answer the most acute and frequent questions which at present are heard on the pages of the newspapers, over the radio and television broadcasts, in the labor collectives and street demonstrations, at party meetings and in other audiences. At the same time, we have felt it necessary to offer to the reader that viewpoint concerning the organizing of the RSFSR Communist Party which was reflected in the newspaper RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA (29 September 1990).

[Editors] How have preparations gone for establishing the RSFSR Communist Party?

[Osadchiy] The idea of forming a communist party of Russian communists arose long ago but assumed particular acuteness in recent months in line with posing the questions of complete sovereignty and economic independence of the Union republics and the Russian Federation in particular. This was aided also by such factors as the forming of state and public institutions in the republic (the formation of the Russian Komsomol, the RSFSR Federation of Independent Trade Unions, the practical steps to found the Russian Academy of Sciences and other republic structures).

The maturing of the idea of the immediate founding of the RSFSR Communist Party was also substantially impacted by the rapid process of the politicization of Russian society as well as the appearance of numerous different, including outrightly antisocialist parties and movements.

Also undoubtedly felt was the growing political, socio-economic and spiritual crisis in the nation as a whole and the growing of valid concern for the fate of socialism and for the fate of the USSR.

The attempts made to link together the forces of the 10-million-strong army of Russian communists with the aid of the Buro of the CPSU Central Committee for the RSFSR and the Russian Buro of the CPSU Central Committee did not produce the desired results.

It must also be said that from the autumn of 1989, in a whole series of regions of the RSFSR, initiative movements and groups of communists appeared favoring the rapid establishing of a communist party in the Russian Federation. Ultimately they organized themselves and have held two stages of an Initiative Congress of Russian Communists in Leningrad.

In March 1990, the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, in responding to the sharply increased mood among the Russian communists in favor of establishing the RSFSR Communist Party, came out in favor of convening the Russian Conference of the CPSU, having stipulated that the delegates elected by the RSFSR party organizations to the 28th CPSU Congress, would simultaneously be delegates to the Russian party conference.

The express polls conducted among the communists as well as consideration of the opinions prevailing at the kray, oblast and okrug CPSU conferences and an analysis of the letters to the CPSU Central Committee, to PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA showed that at the end of April an absolute majority of the RSFSR communists favored the establishing of a Russian Communist Party.

It must also be said that the maturing of the opinion on the advisability of establishing a RSFSR Communist Party among a number of the leaders of the CPSU Central Committee clearly lagged behind the mood of the party masses. This circumstance caused ambiguity and created a contradictory situation and gave rise to hesitations among the party workers and many communists.

Thus, the formation and establishing of the idea of forming the RSFSR Communist Party occurred primarily upon the initiative and under the pressure of the party masses. Their attitude was crucial in taking the final decision. On 3 May 1990, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee came out in favor of including the question of establishing a communist party in the RSFSR on the agenda of the Russian Party Conference.

[Editors] Whom does the Preparatory Committee of the Russian Party Conference represent?

[Osadchiy] The March (1990) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee placed responsibility for convening and conducting the conference of RSFSR communists on the Russian Buro of the CPSU Central Committee and felt it advisable to organize a preparatory committee from representatives of all the kray, oblast and okrug organizations of the CPSU in the Russian Federation.

The Preparatory Committee includes 87 persons elected at the plenums of the kray, oblast, okrug and Moscow municipal CPSU organizations. In terms of vocation they include: 15 workers, 2 kolkhoz members, 12 workers in science, culture and public education, 4 economic leaders, 2 soviet workers, 21 secretaries of primary party organizations, 2 chairmen of party commissions, 28 elected party workers (secretaries of the CPSU obkoms, okrug committee, gorkoms and raykoms) and 1 worker from the party apparatus.

Representatives from the organizational buros of the Initiative Congress of the Russian Communists, the Marxist and Democratic Platforms were not officially part of the Preparatory Committee but its members have propounded various approaches and views reflecting the positions and attitudes of the communists of all RSFSR regions.

Only in the concluding stage of preparing for the Russian Party Conference, at the request of the Orgburo of the Initiative Congress of Russian Communists were its representatives with a consultative voice included in the work groups of the Preparatory Committee. Other "platforms" and movements did not show any initiative on this level.

The task of the Preparatory Committee included: working out draft documents and materials on those questions which would be discussed at the Russian Party Conference. As it drew nearer, it was becoming obvious that the conference delegates would declare themselves to be the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party. In this context the Preparatory Committee worked out draft documents and proposals also for a constituent congress.

With the involvement of members of the Preparatory Committee, such questions were also settled as inviting to the Congress some 200 workers and kolkhoz members, a group of the scientific and creative intelligentsia, representatives of the "platforms" and movements in the CPSU, delegations from the communist parties of the Union republics, public organizations as well as drawing up proposals on the membership of the conference leading bodies and the structure of the leading bodies of the RSFSR Communist Party.

The work of the Preparatory Committee was organized on a basis of extensive party democracy, a free, creative exchange of opinions and comradely debates in preparing the drafts of all the documents and proposals. The

involvement of the regular workers from the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee, as a rule, was restricted to providing the necessary information and reference material to the work groups of the Preparatory Committee. Although there were exceptions here as attempts were made to establish parallel ("apparatus") work groups for preparing certain documents and materials. This can be viewed as the fear that the public Preparatory Committee could not handle its tasks. Naturally, such facts gave rise to a certain nervousness in the work. But these unpleasant "exceptions" were not characteristic for the overall, very sincere and benevolent atmosphere in which the joint work went on between the Preparatory Committee and the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee.

[Editors] So then how did the process of the organizing of the RSFSR Communist Party commence?

[Osadchiy] On 19 June 1990, the Russian Party Conference was opened. An absolute majority of its delegates favored the establishing of the RSFSR Communist Party as part of the CPSU and operating on the basis of its By-Laws and program documents.

The Russian Party Conference with an absolute predominance of the delegate votes declared itself to be the Constituent Congress and proclaimed the formation of the RSFSR Communist Party. The Constituent Congress with the presence of alternate candidates and by secret voting elected I.K. Polozkov the first secretary of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party, as well as the 153 members of its Central Committee and adopted a number of documents. However, at the request of four oblast, three okrug and the Moscow City party organizations, the organizing of the entire membership of the Central Committee was not concluded. The Central Control Commission of the RSFSR Communist Party was also not elected. This created a difficult situation. The process of the organizing of the communist party of the Russian communists had to be concluded at the second stage of the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party.

[Editors] How was the second stage of the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party prepared?

[Osadchiy] On 5 July 1990, during the period of the holding of the 28th CPSU Congress, there was a meeting of the elected members of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party and the delegation leaders including the secretaries of the raykoms and obkoms of the CPSU from the Russian Federation. Here they organized the Coordinating Council from elected members of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party. The meeting recognized the advisability of extending the powers of the Preparatory Committee and instructed it to concentrate on working out the draft documents which would be put up for review at the second stage of the Constituent Congress. In addition to the members of the Preparatory Committee, the work group to prepare the draft Action Program of the RSFSR

Communist Party included members of the CPSU Central Committee (from the party organizations of the Russian Federation), members of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party, congress delegates, social scientists, representatives from the group Communists of Russia from the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies, the section of reformist communists from the Democratic Platform in the CPSU, the Marxist Platform, and the Orgburo of the Initiative Congress of Russian Communists. Every day the Preparatory Committee receives scores and hundreds of letters from all the corners of the Russian Federation, from the Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Latvia and from the other Union republics. A public reception room was opened for the Preparatory Committee and this was visited by several hundred persons who left their comments and proposals. In their majority, they were Muscovites but also communists arrived from Leningrad and Ryazan, Poltava and Tashkent and many other places. All of them with full validity can consider themselves the co-authors of the draft Action Program. By the efforts of the Preparatory Committee drafts were also worked out on the Regulations Governing the Central Control Commission of the RSFSR Communist Party and on a party referendum.

The membership of the work group was quite fluid. Actually, eight-ten persons worked permanently. The remaining members circulated between the party organizations and the working staff of the Preparatory Committee. This made it possible to take the daily pulse of the republic's disquieted and tense life and to feel the mood of the communists and all RSFSR citizens. Even during the holding of the 28th CPSU Congress, the Preparatory Committee appealed to all the elected members of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party with a request to submit their proposals on the draft Action Program. An analogous appeal was addressed to the members of the Preparatory Committee representing all the kray, oblast and okrug party organizations in the republic. In reflecting the attitudes of the communists, a majority of the members of the Central Committee and the Preparatory Committee sent in many proposals and requests. Also studied and generalized were the proposals and requests found in the speeches by delegates at the 28th CPSU Congress and the Russian Party Conference as well as numerous articles in the periodical press. Thus, the draft of the Action Program arose in the very thick of the party masses, and reflected their thoughts and aspirations and the "vital life" of the republic. Over the 2 months between the first and second stages of the Constituent Congress as a result of intense "double-shift work," and without days off, six versions were written for the draft of the Action Program of the RSFSR Communist Party. A very difficult task confronting the work group was that of preparing a document which to a maximum degree would consolidate and unify the various attitudes, currents and platforms actually existing in the republic party organizations. There were storms of emotion and heated disputes with the tension reaching a limit and a culminating point. But reason and responsibility prevailed. Although

in the socioeconomic section of the draft of the Action Program it was necessary to designate alternative approaches, as a whole a general document was published for discussion and submitted to the delegates at the second stage of the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party.

[Editors] What were the basic results from the second stage of the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party? And what will be the future?

[Osadchiy] The second stage of the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party (4-6 September 1990) completed the process of founding the RSFSR Communist Party. The full membership of the Central Committee was elected (it numbers 272 persons), and the Central Control Commission and its chairman, N.S. Stolyarov, were elected. The Regulation Governing the Central Control Commission and the Regulation on a Party Referendum in the RSFSR Communist Party were approved.

The Congress paid basic attention to discussing the draft of the Action Program. In many speeches, numerous approving words were heard on its content but there was also very harsh and at times withering criticism. Certain delegates saw the main flaw in the draft of the Action Program in the fact that it contradicts and even means a departure from the positions of the 28th CPSU Congress. However, these assertions have no grounds to them. For in essence the draft of the Action Program has been based on the documents of the 28th Party Congress and has been worked out in developing their ideas. At the same time, it does reflect the actual situation in society and the mood of a majority of the communists and workers of the RSFSR.

Another focus of the criticism was objectively valid and this was that the draft of the Action Program had been published 2 weeks before the start of the work of the second stage of the Constituent Congress (19 August). Because of this, hundreds and thousands of the party organizations in institutions of learning (and not only them) where the communists were on vacation could not discuss it. And this is a significant part of the intellectual potential in the RSFSR Communist Party and it would not be right not to consider its voice. In this context, the Preparatory Committee has proposed that the draft of the Action Program be examined by the Congress as a basis for the further enriching of it by the communists in the process of discussion and the final version be approved then at the joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the RSFSR Communist Party. The draft of the Action Program and the entire diverse collective of its authors are open to an objective, well reasoned and constructive criticism. The draft has weak and disputable points, there is declarativeness and contradictoriness and editorial "sins" and thorough work must be done on it to bring it to the required condition.

The Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party has favored the view that the republic party organizations in their activities be guided by the By-Laws and Program Documents of the 28th CPSU Congress. The Congress also instructed the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party to continue work in the basic areas of activity for the RSFSR Communist Party considering a further discussion of the draft of the Action Program and the correcting of its weak points. The work on the program document of the Russian communists is continuing and a new version of it was proposed to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party in October 1990.

[Editors] The RSFSR Communist Party has been established. What now?

[Osadchiy] The RSFSR Communist Party possesses mighty potential; it should become an influential political force in the republic. But its role and authority will be determined not by the numbers but rather by the militancy, by vital activity and by the ability to actually express and defend the interests of the broadest masses of workers.

The situation today in Soviet society is characterized by a rapid increase in political hostility. Nationalistic, separatist and anticomunist attitudes are being sharply felt. The people are particularly depressed and are rightfully indignant over the empty shelves in the stores, the short-temperedness in lines, the lack of domestic amenities, the unchecked crime and interethnic conflicts. Uncertainty of tomorrow is growing. The people are tired of expectation and promises. Their trust can be won only by deeds, by specific steps to improve the situation and overcome the crisis. This is also the main practical task of the RSFSR Communist Party and its Central Committee as well as each Russian communist. It can be carried out only by constantly being in the thick of the masses, knowing their mood and carrying out their will.

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#### **Readiness for Compromise: The Last Word in the Debate Over the RSFSR Communist Party Has Not Been Said**

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[Unattributed interview with members of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party, A. Dmitriyev, doctor of philosophical sciences and editor-in-chief of the journal SOTSILOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA and V. Lipitskiy, doctor of philosophical sciences and sector head at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism Under the CPSU Central Committee]

[Text] The debate which has developed in the second stage of the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party and its results continue to be widely discussed on society, causing the most contradictory responses. At present, answering the questions of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA are the members of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party, doctor of philosophical sciences and editor-in-chief of the journal SOTSILOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, A. Dmitriyev, and doctor of philosophical sciences and sector head at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism Under the CPSU Central Committee, V. Lipitskiy. An important detail is that they are members of the Central Committee as representatives of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU (the section of reformist communists).

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] What, from your viewpoint, has become the main question determining the course of debate at the Congress?

[Dmitriyev] Undoubtedly, the attitude toward economic reform. In the view of the market one can make out two clearly different viewpoints and each of these is based on its own system of values.

The first contains the traditional notion of socialism on a basis of such values as public ownership of the means of production, distribution according to labor, and restricting the sphere of action of commodity-monetary relations. The supporters of this position consider the transition to a market to be a step backward and a temporary retreat under the pressure of circumstances. We do not share it as it is impossible to carry out a long-term policy proceeding from such a view. Practice has shown all the absurdity of the administrative-state organization of the economy.

The other system of views which was also strongly expressed at the Congress can be described as market socialism. This means that over an extended historical period a dictatorship of production efficiency should be established on the basis of diverse forms of ownership, including private. In this instance, the new model of socialism in practice could realize basic human values.

It can be said definitely that at present the main danger for the Russian communists is the conflict between the adherents of one or another side. And particularly the implacability of those who do not see that low production efficiency, waste and the growing lag behind world progress are more lethal than the costs (and they undoubtedly are very important) of a market economy.

But at the Congress there were also promising moments which showed the possibility of agreement and a readiness of the delegates to reach compromises.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] The Congress gained a solid reputation of being conservative. In this instance how can one explain the election of supporters of the Democratic Platform to the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission?

[Lipitskiy] I see this as a symptom of the changes which have occurred in the political awareness of many delegates. At the Congress we in no way concealed ourselves but openly stated our views. The representatives of the platforms were particularly set apart on the candidate lists so that the voting would not be blind. One of the members of the Democratic Platform, Yu. Protasenko (Leningrad), in the course of discussing the candidacies gave a full description of his position and...was elected, although there were many votes against, some 642.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] Will the several radicals who have joined the new Central Committee and Central Control Commission be able to achieve anything real?

[Lipitskiy] At present, in these bodies a small but active group of like thinkers is coming into being. Our intentions are to assist in carrying out a policy aimed at supporting a market economic reform, at constructive interaction with the republic Supreme Soviet, collaboration with other parties and social movements and the full democratization of internal party life. We feel it necessary to have the immediate and open solution to the legal questions arising over the property of the CPSU. In considering all circumstances related to the founding of the RSFSR Communist Party, we feel it advisable to convene its next congress in 1991, having prepared the program and by-law documents of the party for this.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] Your colleagues on the Democratic Platform in having broken with the CPSU criticize you for a conciliatory policy....

[Lipitskiy] The leaders of this wing of the Democratic Platform and who stand at the sources of the movement have made a decisive contribution to its development. Largely due precisely to their efforts the first steps have been taken to renew the party. But their implacability and refusal of any compromises, in my view, are not the best policy. At present, it would be hard to think up any greater gift to the conservative forces than the withdrawal from the CPSU of progressively thinking persons or a refusal to join the elective bodies. The Communist Party remains an influential factor in our social life and we cannot be indifferent in what direction this factor will operate and by what methods. Involvement in working out and implementing party policy and simultaneously democratic control—this is now where the reformist communists see their mission.

[Dmitriyev] Of course, there should be the issue of the fundamental reform of the party and working out a new model of it. This also means a new understanding of the principle of democratic centralism, where democracy develops as far as possible and central administration as far as necessary. Here the accent is on work among the population through the party clubs. In a word, modernization and not the "paraffinization" [mothballing] of the party. As is now fashionable to say, no other solution is provided.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] At the Congress was the voice of representatives of the working class heard? How did they get along with the other delegates?

[Dmitriyev] What is presently occurring in society often diverges with the interests of the workers who have become disappointed in the party's impotence having repeatedly promised to change the situation for the better. This could be heard both in the Constituent Congress as well as on the spot, in the party organizations. The instances of the workers leaving the party cannot help but cause concern.

There are various reasons here. One of them is the awareness that in the CPSU and in society itself the influence of the workers has declined with a simultaneous strengthening of other social groups.

The "clash" of the workers with the intellectuals of both a rightist and leftist bent was noticed in the course of discussing the program and in proposing the leading bodies of the party. This situation must not be ignored. The attitude of the delegates who argued in favor of "more workers in the central party bodies" reflects the concern of the largest social group of our society for its future.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] The response to the Constituent Congress has been varied and for many even painful. What are your predictions for the future?

[Dmitriyev] At present, one can see three approaches in the intentions of the communists who do not agree with the spirit and the line of the Congress. The first is an attempt to create an alternative Russian Communist Party on the platform of the CPSU. The weakness here is seen in the fact that yet another communist party under the conditions of mass withdrawal from the existing ones will scarcely be viable. The second approach which has been proposed by a number of party organizations is to join the CPSU directly, in bypassing the RSFSR Communist Party. This is related to the contradictions which are not resolvable by the current By-Laws, it will lead to a further breaking up of the forces and is suitable only for the largest organizations capable of becoming independent principals in a contract with the CPSU in the event of its federalization.

[Lipitskiy] We feel that there is a third preferable way with the formation of a platform of democratic forces within the republic Communist Party and on the basis of this platform it would be possible to prepare for the next congress and ensure a progressive nature for its decisions. Such work has already been started by the bloc Democratic Unity which arose at the Congress. We will also continue this work. The last word in the debate over the RSFSR Communist Party has not yet been said.

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